Lieutenant General Eric A. Vas [Retired]
PVSM
Chapter 2
Role of the Armed Forces in a Democracy 20
Chapter 3 X-
, Y- & Z- 34
Chapter 4
Exploits of a Mountain Brigade in Tank Territory 43
Chapter 5
Expanding Military Roles, Internal Security & Morale 58
Chapter 6
Terrorism and Insurgency 70
Chapter 7
Jammu and Kashmir 97
Chapter 8 India’s
Path to Nuclear Power 113
Chapter 9
South Asia’s Day After 124
Chapter 10
Role & Functions of National Security Advisers 130
Chapter 11
Afghanistan & Central Asia 141
Chapter 12
Kargil: A Wider Perceptive 153
Chapter 13 Nuclear
Policy Options 174
Chapter 14 The
Break-up of Yugoslavia 185
Chapter 15
India’s Response to Globalisation 195
Map 1 The
Sialkot Sector [insert at page 44 of
Chapter 4]
Map 2 North
Eastern India [insert at page 75 of Chapter 6]
Map 3 Jammu
and Kashmir [insert at page 98 of
Chapter 7]
Map 4
Medieval West & Central Asia [insert at page 143 of Chapter 11]
Map 5 Modern
Central Asia [insert at page 145 of Chapter 11]
Map 6 Kargil
[insert at page 156 of Chapter 12]
Map 7 The
Balkans [insert at page 186 of Chapter 14]
ONE
Values
are the beliefs and rules, which govern our behaviour. Values are derived from one’s parents,
religion, society, profession and so on.
A group of values form a code of conduct. Doctors, lawyers and military men all have
their won professional codes of conduct.
At the national level we have framed a Constitution, which proclaims
that India will be a secular democratic republic. We have laid down a code of conduct in the
form of various rights for each citizen.
These rights and values are not unique.
They have been framed, in somewhat different words, in a Charter by the
United Nations and accepted by most countries as a universal code of human
rights. Those who seek peace and
prosperity for themselves and their loved ones, should begin with an
examination of these values and the roots of India’s democratic traditions.
“Power” is a human ability to act together in a group. Power, unlike “love”, is never an individual
quality. It exists only so long as the
group exists. When we speak of a
“powerful individual” we are in fact implying that the individual is empowered
by a party to act in their name. The
moment the party disintegrates, the individual no longer remains a powerful
individual. When we speak of someone
being a “powerful personality” we are probably referring to his strength, which
may be derived from character or some other personal attribute. “Strength” always refers to a personal
quality of an individual, which may display itself in relation to other things
or persons, but is essentially independent of them. It is the nature of a group to abhor
individuality or independence, which is the property of strength. The strongest individual can always be
overpowered by the group, which will often combine for no other purpose than to
subdue a strong individual precisely because of his peculiar quality of
independence.
“Authority” is another term, which is frequently misused. Authority can be vested in individuals or in
an office. The personal authority
between parent and child or teacher and pupil, is an example of the former. Service officers who have to be saluted and
obeyed even if they were inefficient exemplify authority vested in
offices. The hallmark of hierarchical
authority is the unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey;
neither coercion nor persuasion is needed to evoke obedience. All that is required for one to remain in
authority is respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority is therefore,
contempt and one of the surest ways to undermine authority is not violence but
laughter. All dictators, therefore, fear
humour.
“Force” is often used as a synonym for “violence”, but it is
best that the two terms be used separately.
Force indicates the energy released by physical or social actions, for
example, “force of nature” or “the fore of circumstances”. Force may or may not be violent. Military forces may be deployed for coercion
without violence; moral, economic or diplomatic force may be employed for
coercion with or without the support of violence. Strength and violence are closely
related. The former is natural and the
latter is derived from instruments. The
instruments of violence, like all other tools, are used to multiply natural
strength. Since violence, as distinct
from power, force or strength always needs implements; the technological
revolution was specially marked in warfare.
In
so far as power implies compulsion or a capacity to compulsion,
“responsibility” suggests a control, whether moral or legal, that rationalises
and regulates what might otherwise be irrational, immoral or amoral “Do onto others as you would have
others do onto you.” The power and
significance of these 11 words reside in the fact they represent a spiritual
truth. Democracy is founded on this
basic Golden Rule which has been annunciated from the very earliest period of
mankind’s history. Buddha preached it to
his disciples so did Christ. It is
written in Mosaic Law. What follows from
this self-evident truth is that the individual is the spiritual centre of
society.
Nevertheless, some believe that the
state, not the individual, is the spiritual centre of society. According to this view, known as “statism”,
government assumes a moral importance that outweighs individual claims. Statists believe that government should make
decisions for individuals. Since
individuals usually prefer to make their own decisions, coercion and compulsion
become necessary correctives. This is
why the statist has no use for the Golden Rule. But Indian philosophers from
earliest times have told us that, “each immoral action sows its own
irrationality into the pattern of events.”
A government that breaks the moral law encoded in the Golden Rule will
have a profound effect on all those living under it. The genesis and genius of the Golden Rule is
that it is a two-way street. The Golden
Rule teaches us that we are all brothers.
Statism teaches us that we are the children and the government is the
parent.
Indians
were leading exponents of the concepts of mediaeval democracy. Religious
freedom, tolerance and the acceptance of unity in diversity formed part of our
social and cultural heritage. But we were
not acquainted with the Industrial Revolution and the military force and
political power that flowed from its consequences. . The East India Company’s aim was
to expand its commercial operations in India.
When Moghul rule began to crumble, they attempted to safeguard their
economic interests by raising mercenary forces and arranging alliances with
co-operative Indian rulers. The Great
Indian Mutiny of 1856 was a joint Hindu-Muslim attempt to revive Moghul rule and
fight against creeping political rule by foreigners. The attempt failed. But Britain’s parliament was forced to
intervene, curb shameless commercial depredations, freeze the territorial
boundaries between British India and the princely states, and establish formal
governance over the Indian sub-continent under its jurisdiction.
The Raj
replaced commercial greed by the rule of law, appointed enlightened civil
servants, provided tolerant governance and projected the prospect of preparing
India for eventual self-rule. Over the
years, which followed the establishment of the Raj, India began to respect
British administration and laws, admire its new educational systems, and
welcome its inspiring political doctrines of democracy and liberty, and learn
the English language. Under British
tutelage we came to learn that democracy in its modern version provides
opportunities for effective participation by all adults, for equality in
voting, for gaining enlightened understanding of key issues through a free
press. This implies representative
government; party competition, the secret ballot, and all founded on guarantees
of individual rights and freedoms.
Britain’s imperial rule in India was an example of organised
statism. To begin with this was
acceptable to many as the best short-term alternative to anarchy; the people
looked upon the government as their “ma-baap” (mother and father). Although
democracy cannot be exported and must be grown from within; Indians came to
realise that Britain’s modern political doctrines of democracy and liberty in many
ways echoed India’s traditional values of tolerance, and unity in diversity.
The gradual formation of elected local civic bodies; municipal corporations and
provincial assemblies gave credibility and stability to the Raj. This was a period of a bourgeois Indian
Renaissance, which threw up a galaxy of outstanding Indian scientists, writers,
politicians and leaders in every walk of life. Because of their early adoption
of English and modern education, Hindus predominated in this outburst of
talent.
But imperial
statism, no matter how benign, is a self-defeating system, which demeans both
ruler and ruled. Not surprisingly, over
the years, British colonial rule deteriorated into a master-slave relationship. After World War I, Indian leaders began
demanding self-rule The Raj lost its reputation for impartial governance when
it began encouraging religious differences in an attempt to divide and rule. It
hoped that a British presence in India would be perpetuated as a neutral
arbitrator between warring communal forces.
Anglo-Indian relations, which had been based on democratic ideals, began
to lose its credibility and deteriorated into an imperial master-slave
relationship. Indians resented this Imperial policy and fought for freedom
from repressive rule. There was never a religious quarrel between Hindu India
and Christian Britain. It was, as
always, a battle of values; arrogant autocratic rule versus democracy.
The
Congress Party, a secular political organisation, spearheaded India’s freedom
struggle. Mr. M.A. Jinnah was a shrewd
barrister and a staunch member of the Congress Party. His personal values were secular. He enjoyed eating pork and drinking wine. He
was a strict disciplinarian who believed in the rule of law. He resigned from the Congress because he
disagreed with Gandhi’s mass disobedience movement. He joined the Muslim League
to take advantage of Britain’s “divide and rule” policy. He sided with the British and thereby hoped
to gain a political edge over the Congress.
He tactics were to keep branding the Congress as a Hindu organisation
during the freedom struggle and thus win Muslim support by playing on their
fears of Hindu hegemony. He appealed to
the religious fervour of simple people in order to win his short term political
objective.
Jinnah
knew that religion was a poor foundation for statehood. He believed that once
he came into power, he could control events to suit his larger purpose. . After
partition, he tried to wipe the communal slate clean. In his inaugural speech to the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, he publicly launched a plea for the
values of secularism and pluralism when he said, “In course of time all these
angularities of the majority and minority communities will vanish…..We are
starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal
citizens of one State…..I think we should keep that in front of us as an ideal,
and you will find that in due course of time Hindus and Muslims will cease to
be Hindus and Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal
faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the
state.” But Pakistan’s feudal elite
lacked his perception and did not share his values. Jinnah soon came to realise
that he had awakened communal forces, which were beyond his control. On his deathbed he confessed to his doctor
that “the creation of Pakistan has been the greatest blunder of my life.”
Many
forms of power can be exhibited in the name of state governments. The one thing that they all have in common is
that power is exercised by the few over the many. When we say that voters “choose” their
representatives, the truth is that the candidate’s friends are having him
elected. The people are free to elect or reject him, but this freedom can only
be exercised for a few minutes during an election. As soon as they have elected their
representative, “slavery” overtakes the electorate until the next
election. The voters, whose business is
simply to give a freedom to take responsibility and then, pronounce a verdict
at the next polls on how it has discharged its job, do not control parliament
in its actions.
The
whole history of politics is a record of the war between freedom and
authority. The problem of reconciling
liberty with authority necessitates an examination of a power system from two
separate points of view: those who exercise power [the elected leaders] and
those who have power inflicted upon them [the electorate composed of ordinary
citizens.] In a democratic system, the
members of a political party express their wishes and it is the duty o their
representatives leaders to translate their wishes into political action. This often entails careful reconciliation and
manipulation by leaders who have not only to retain their hold over their
followers but have also to curb the unduly prejudicial or over-ambitious
desires of the electorate.
The
ordinary citizen’s reaction to his rulers may or may not be voiced; this will
depend on whether he lives in open or a closed society. All governments eventually exist on public
opinion. Power is in direct proportion
to the strength of public opinion. All
power decays as soon as the people cease to uphold a government. Just as tyrants and dictators cannot exist
exclusively on violence, so also there is always a price to be pad for freedom
even for the most elementary ones under the most benign power. The electorate or the ruled always pays the
price. The history of politics is
therefore largely the struggle of the ruled to lower the price and of their
rulers to raise it. The only political
freedom capable of enduring in the face of money-power, is one that is so
balanced so as to keep the privileged from overwhelming the under-privileged by
ability or cunning, and the under-privileged from robbing the privileged by
violence and votes. Hence, the secret
of any political balancing act is to attack the privileged, defend the
under-privileged and placate the middle classes.
.
When the British withdrew from the
sub-continent, India declared itself a Republic functioning under a
Constitution that embodies all the essentials of a modern democracy. However, many have come to realise that real
democracy means more than simply drafting a constitution and holding elections.
History warns us not to associate freedom with a written constitution. There
are people who have been free without a written constitution; others who have
had written guarantees have lived in slavery. No written constitution can
ensure that a people acquire the capacity to balance the concepts of Equality,
Justice and Liberty. These three words
encompass a major area of contemporary moral uncertainty in a world that faces
the prospect of a no-growth economy, in which the inequalities of wealth are
unlikely to be ameliorated by increased production except through significant
social organisation. No form of
government needs good leaders so much as democracy.
There
is a distinction between the principle that political power is best entrusted
to a majority and the unacceptable claim that what the majority does with that
power is beyond criticism, and must never be resisted. The right to dissent is
fundamental in a democratic nation. A
democratic society therefore needs a clear and truthful account of events, of
their background and causes, a forum of discussion and informed criticism and a
means whereby individuals and groups can express a point of view, dissent or
advocate a cause. The responsibility for
fulfilling these needs rests largely on the press, which discharges a vital
democratic duty by functioning as the watchdog of public interest and in this
role constantly reviews and criticises the government’s actions and policies.
Ironically after Partition more Muslims
remained in India than the number in Pakistan. Within India, Muslims now form 20
percent of the population, a substantial minority group, spread all over the
country. To begin with they were
bewildered and felt that they had been abandoned by Muslims who had migrated to
Pakistan. Extremist Hindu organisations
accused them of being Pakistani fifth columnists and told them they were not
welcome in India and they should also migrate to Pakistan. To some extent this
distrust of Indian Muslims at that time was understandable as it was based on
the painful reality of partition. Muslims had failed to understand the Indian
tradition that diversity cannot be resolved by separation but only through
co-existence and co-operation. They had
refused to join the freedom struggle, sided with the British and abandoned
centuries of Muslim heritage which is interwoven into India’s history. Unfortunately this distrust persists even
till today in some minds due to a mixture of facts, myths and misconceptions,
which prevail, not only in India, but also throughout the Western World. [This aspect is covered in Chapter 15.]
The wounds of Partition took some time to heal in India. To begin with, hot headed Hindus and Muslims
were quick to pick a quarrel. If the
police were slow to react, this would flare up into a major communal riot.
However, the dust of those dark days slowly settled down. India kept faith with its ancient philosophy
that all religions lead to God, and with its tradition of tolerance. Over the
years that followed, India was able to hold numerous fair and free elections to
state and central assemblies, create an independent judiciary, uphold a free
press, and effect a steady economic growth. The establishment of numerous
independent democratic institutions strengthened Indian secularism and the
concept of unity in diversity. During that
time, Muslims in Indian learnt to exercise their electoral rights as free and
equal citizens. They have broken out of
their “minority” complex. Today, many
have become Indian icons in the fields of art, the film world, literature,
music, and sport.
In the post-Cold War
world, when the ideological tensions of the past no longer dominate, an
international consensus on the need to promote sound governance as a foundation
for development has emerged. Sustainable
development, it is now generally agreed, can only be achieved through a
strengthening of democratic governance, institutions and processes that provide
the necessary framework for social and economic progress. This has led many to ask: why has economic
progress been so slow in democratic India?
What is it that currently sours public opinion in India against our
stumbling political process? Is India
doomed to face political instability and an increase in religious tensions and
fundamentalism? Has democracy a
future? How long can an increasingly
interdependent world survive part democratic and part authoritarian? These and
other related questions are discussed in the paragraphs, which follow.
Every human being has a need to believe
and belong. Traditionally, this impulse
finds expression through religion. In
fact, statists are looking for far more than a maternal embrace in the arms of
big government. They are looking for
nothing less than a new religion (actually, old religions in a modern garb,)
literally for redemption through the state.
Georg Hegel attempted to marry God and state at the altar of
philosophy. He said, “The Universal is
to be found in the State…and the State is the Divine idea as it exists on
earth…We must therefore worship the State as the Manifestation of the Divine on
earth.” Half a century later, Marx
picked up where Hegel left off, promising that socialism could become the
“functional equivalent of religion”.
Religion, he said, was nothing more than “the sigh of a distressed
creature…the spirit of spiritless conditions…the opium of the masses.” Millions had faith in communism even though
its system of governance violated the Golden Rule.
Just
as there is an intimate relationship between democracy and the Golden Rule, so
also is there an intricate and intimate relationship between civilization and
administration. Whenever any kind of
civilization has arisen, society has divided itself into groups, whether as
families, tribes, social clubs, public companies, trade unions or political
parties. Self-government by each
individual member is possible only in very small group. In larger groups, such self-government or
democracy is not practicable. In such
circumstances, leaders are thrown up who have to function through a
bureaucracy. This is the Law of Oligarchy
and it is of universal application, equally so to the club, a government or a
giant corporation. Oligarchies can never
be truly democratic because sovereignty, by definition, is not transferable. Thus it is not possible for the mass to
delegate its sovereignty. This inability
to exercise true self-government in large groups does not condemn democracy but
underlines its inevitable imperfections.
Administration
has been an integral part of civilization and without the foundation and
framework it supplied, civilization would not have developed. No large-scale democracy can function without
political institutions. This implies
elected officials, free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression,
alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and inclusive
citizenship. With the steady expansion
of rudimentary social systems into increasingly elaborate systems of
governance, the notions of politics and political systems became increasingly
linked with the concept of public administration designed to implement the
policy decisions of ruling regimes or governments. It is in this context that the aphorism
”politics is the lifeblood of administration” takes on a distinctive meaning
and the relationship between politics and administration becomes just as
intricate and intimate as that between civilization and administration.
A healthy and satisfactory life for
the individual can be obtained only through varied and extensive political,
social and economic arrangements, and these arrangements are largely
administrative in nature. Thus,
reciprocal relationships have to be developed between the administration and
the citizenry to facilitate the exchange of information and to enhance the
qualitative levels of a thinking government.
Some have called this kind of political society ‘the service state’ or
‘the administrative state’. Whatever
term we may give it, administration ultimately is education. In the context of a positive, policy-oriented
state, administration becomes the primary service-delivery system for democracy
and in effect, the principal manager of democracy’s end products.
One of the deepest and truest relationships
that can exist between human beings is an extension of the Golden Rule. It consists in the giving and receiving of knowledge
about right conduct, in the formation of one’s character by another, and the
acceptance of another’s guidance in one’s own growth. Democracy is a political system that fosters
a life of free and enriching communion.
It follows, then, that the realisation of a free and enriching communion
becomes a basic responsibility of a viable and dynamic democratic
administrative system committed to the humanistic imperative of an intelligent
love. Democracy perceived in terms of
this ideal is essentially a moral system.
A civil servant with a colonial
mentality cannot administer a free people efficiently because he lacks a
democratic code of ethics, which ought to be a significant part of his
qualifications as a manager. No amount
of study of the ‘science’ of administration will provide him with this
code. Moral choice can be viewed
alternately in positive and negative terms.
The old Indian Civil Service [ICS] provided a rigid steel frame within
which moral choice was perceived in the constricted sense of a clearly defined
code of ethics. In this environment, a
negative morality is bound to prevail in a manner thoroughly consistent with
the characteristics of a negative, reactive, detached state. To a very real extent, codes of ethics
devised in this context become sets of procedural ethics as reflected in
clearly defined rules, regulations and procedures. On the other hand, a positive sense of
ethical/moral consciousness demands that the basic responsibility of all public
administrators is to insure that every moral choice is specifically intended to
enhance the well-being of the citizenry.
In
1947, the British members of the ICS left India. The remaining Indian members were slowly
liquidated by time. The service was
substituted by the Indian Administrative Service [IAS]. Most of the Indian politicians distrusted the
old ICS cadre. This was not so much
because they had supported their British rulers as because the new rulers
suffered from an inferiority complex due to their lack of administrative experience,
and had to depend a great deal on the ICS. When the IAS was formed, it was
dinned into them that they must not imitate the ICS “brown sahibs” and must
strive to be different from their predecessors; they were expected to be
patriotic, dedicated, public spirited and democratic. The young men who joined the IAS were soon to
realise that the average politician’s interpretation of those high sounding
words was not exactly the same as the administrators. Alas, the relationship
between the ministers and civil servants has never been a healthy one. It was
therefore not surprising that the politicians soon began complaining that
though the British had left India, the ghost of the Raj still manifested itself
in the souls of the IAS district officers. Some even began to compare the IAS
nostalgically and unfavourably with the ICS; the IAS were incompetent, lazy and
lacked spirit of service.
In fact the IAS recruits some of the finest of
our young men, who do not enjoy the same privileges, which the old ICS had, nor
have the same power as they had. Two
factors weigh heavily against them; firstly, the social and economical
expectations of rural India in a developing nation which wants quick results
puts great pressure upon them, specially when over-ambitious targets are
expected from them; secondly, the inexperience of local politicians, who lack
the basic concepts of administration and management, makes it difficult for
them to maintain a minimum competence in their district administration.
Ministers keep interfering in the decision-making process and day-to-day work,
ignore the rules at lower levels and illegally overrule the decisions made by
police and civil servants.
Paradoxically, there is difficulty
in developing a positive ethic and governing through the normative values of
sincerity, authenticity, caring and communion. Viewed from an organisational
perspective, the consequences of expressing genuine concern, or truly caring
can be quite dysfunctional. When an
administrator makes a personal commitment either to a colleague or to a
citizen, this might evoke a sense of moral obligation. This can become a form of corruption if the
sense of obligation runs counter to the rational decision- making required to
ensure the proper functioning of the civil servant’s organisation. It is for this reason, therefore, that one of
the oldest traditions stemming from the most ancient civilizations is the
concept of a detached and objective administrative impersonality. A good civil
servant has to establish a balance between detachment and caring.
To a scrupulous man, obedience to a
commandment because it is commanded, becomes more important than love of
neighbour or even love of God. This exactitude in observance is termed
legalism. It is the expression of negative
dispassionate morality, which has also been described as an ethics of civility,
or a morality of inertia. In the dull
daily world of an unimaginative bureaucracy moral choice is not an option. Necessity alone dictates actions; a necessity the administrator can neither
refuse nor even imagine refusing.
Imposed by circumstances and maintained by habit, moral inertia negates
any connection between administrative action and the purposefulness of
democracy. Indeed it negates any
connection between the reality of the present and the hopes of the future. Such a morality animates deeds performed
without thought and without choice, but also, most certainly, without
excitement and without love, and without compassion, or anger or enthusiasm.
Moral
inertia may be displayed in every facet of governance. As Reinhold Niebuhr has said, “Any justice which
is only justice soon degenerates into something less than justice.” The inertia of morality results in an ethical
vacuum that is well reflected in one stanza from a poem by Dorothy Sayers:
By
lavish and progressive measures
Our
neighbour’s wants are all relieved;
We are not
called to share his pleasures,
And in his
grief we are grieved.
Some
Asian leaders, notably Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir bin Mohamad of
Malaysia, contrast Asian discipline and stability with the disorder and
decadence they witness in the individualistic West. They suggest that the Asian tradition values
the group more than the individual, order more than argument, authority more
than liberty, solidarity more than freedom. They denounce attempts to impose Western
democratic standards on Asian countries as a new form of Western
imperialism. If the claim that human
rights are universal is proof of Western arrogance, then the restriction of
those rights to Europe and America brands non-Western people as lesser breeds,
incapable of appreciating personal liberty and self-government, and that
attitude is surely Western arrogance too.
Both India and
Japan are functioning democracies. In
fact, many Asians fight for human rights, and at the risk of their freedom and
their lives. Why must we assume that Lee
Kuan Yew is the embodiment of Asian values rather than Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the courageous opposition leader who has been under prolonged house arrest in
Burma? A pre-Tiananmen Square wall
poster in Beijing proclaimed: “We cannot
tolerate that human rights and democracy are only slogans of the Western
bourgeoisie and the Eastern proletariat only needs dictatorship.” The economist Amartya Sen said, “The
so-called Asian Values that are invoked to justify authoritarianism are not
especially Asian in any significant sense.”
Perhaps what Asian autocrats actually mean by traditional values is that
“anyone who disagrees with us should shut up.”
History
tells us that democracy produces many desirable consequences: it avoids
tyranny, fosters essential rights and general freedom, it encourages
self-determination, moral autonomy and human development, and it protects
essential personal interests and produces political equality and prosperity. It is true that short-term political
stability and prosperity can be achieved through suppression of human rights.
Yet 20th Century history teaches us that the spectacular economic
growth sometimes attained in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes is always
brought to an end by the very repression that it necessitates. Freedom of the human spirit is indispensable
to sustainable human development. But democracy provides no absolute guarantee
for peace and stability. Countries may
experience numerous setbacks along the long road to democracy, as fragile
government institutions risk falling victim to disorganisation , manipulation
and corruption.
Failure of a political system
ostensibly representing the people can be most disturbing and disheartening to
a nation. We have seen examples in
recent history of such political failure; followed by a popular search for
identity in ethnic division, fundamentalism and intolerance that inevitably
leads to discord and conflict. It has
become evident in recent years that economic development efforts in countries
lacking sound governance structures and practices rarely lead to sustainable
results. India inherited a colonial
administrative structure. We are trying
to convert the negative aspect of this administration and search for positive
solutions to development challenges that are unique to our circumstances. But
reform of an administrative system cannot be achieved solely through enacting
better laws, establishing a more powerful government, or recruiting brilliant
civil servants. We have to also nurture
democratic public forums and deliberative meetings among ordinary citizens and
politicians.
Good governance in India supports
basic human rights and participatory forms of government. This support is based on a conviction that
our diversity can only be truly manifested through the mechanisms of democratic
institutions, which enable people to freely express their views and participate
in the political processes. Good
governance entails a vast set of democratic processes and institutions at every
level of society, from the village panchayat, to the thesil and district
councils, regional, national and international institutions. These allow the voices of the people to be
heard, conflicting interests to be peacefully resolved, and a forging of
consensus towards greater social progress.
Good governance is based on a conviction that a system that places
sovereignty in the hands of the people is more likely to invest in its people.
Upholding
the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to social, political and
economic affairs, is a cornerstone of good governance. Unless there is legal certainty, commerce,
savings and investments are generally discouraged or forced into the
underground. As democratic institutions
are strengthened, so too is the demand for accountability in public
affairs. Efforts to promote greater
transparency and openness in public affairs to increase public trust and route
out abuses of power are increasingly implemented as a part of governance
reforms.
Although prevalent in most
societies, corruption has a more debilitating impact on India [and other poor
countries] by discouraging trade and investment, encouraging misappropriation
of public resources and denying services to the poor. It is frequently asserted that India needs to
enhance governance institutions in order to attract foreign investment. Equally
important will be the role of good governance in creating an environment
conducive to domestic savings and investment.
Apart
from inefficient administrators and poor governance, there are other factors,
which can cause a crisis in democratic India. “Crisis” is a strong and often
overused term. It is only justified if
it signifies a precarious systemic state in which a society hovers between
decomposition and a rallying of collective energy. Real political crises threaten civil war or
dictatorship. India has never
experienced a real political crisis.
The
term “civic discontent” or even “moral crisis” best describes the malaise that
currently assails Indian public opinion.
It is less conflictual, more rooted in civil society that has become
deeply distrustful of the political system which seems to be flawed because it
has failed to deliver results after 50 years of representative rule. It is a manifestation of a crisis, not
economic or political, but moral: a growing lack of public faith in the
political system, and the issue of accommodating the religious rights of Hindu,
Muslim, Christian, Sikh and others, while preserving democracy. India’s moral crisis is nurtured by growing
inequalities of income, feverish and often conspicuous consumption and the
frenzied pursuit of windfall gains in real estate and speculative finance.
Apart from imperial and communist
statists, there are other varieties of statists who challenge democratic India
by attempting to compromise the constitutional and democratic process. They adopt a threefold strategy to do
this. First, they preach the value of
security over freedom. Second, they
manipulate the language. Third, they use
existing laws and the judicial process in ingenious ways to overcome public
opinion.
The first part of this strategy
propagates the dream of political salvation by inducing visions of
government-engineered utopia. [Ram Raj
in India; and Eelam in Sri Lanka.]
Ordinary people do not trust and even fear utopian solutions. The French economist Frederick Bastiat
derided the utopian approach when he said, “The State is that great fictitious
entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else.” In statist terms the nation is called
“community”, and anyone who questions this equation is accused of opposing
"shared values” and "the common good". Social security is perhaps the strongest
expression of community solidarity.
Social security is based on the premise that we all belong to one
community with everyone sharing responsibility not only for contributing to
their own and their family’s security, but also to the security of everyone
else, present and future.
In the early years of independence,
large public sector projects and government sponsored schemes attracted public
support. This was seen as a quick means of promoting industrial growth and
enriching the community in India, even though vast empirical data demonstrates
that privatization would produce better results, fuel economic growth, and make
the system more competitive and fair.
Today, the government is quite rightly trying to close down unprofitable
public sector units. At the same time it
is illogically reluctant to allow established Indian capitalists like Tata to
invest in ventures such as an airline and an international airport. When opponents attack privatization, because
they fear it would weaken “community”, what they really fear is that such a
plan would keep the government and bureaucrat out of the picture. The point it would seem is not to expand the
pie of benefits for each individual citizen;
the point is to keep the public pie-cutters employed.
Statism’s
second means of trying to outwit democracy is through the manipulation of
language. We have entered an Orwellian
era wherein words are twisted to express lofty sentiments and confuse the
public. Thus we find entitlement
replacing responsibility; coercion being
described as compassion; compulsory
redistribution being called sharing;
caste, religious and linguistic quotas being substituted for
diversity; and suicide being prescribed
as “death with dignity”. The public
debate on these issues has become completely corrupted. The reason is that, if you tell the people
directly that you want to raise their taxes, transfer their wealth, classify
and count them by their castes, creeds and language, or let the doctors kill
them, most will object. Statists know
this and therefore are obliged to obfuscate.
In such a world, notions of right and wrong which have contributed to
civilization’s painstaking progress over thousands of years are completely
stood on their head. Without absolutes,
what is right and what is wrong depend on your point of view.
The third strategy employed by statists is to
use our laws and our courts to overcome popular will. The Constitution is conveniently referred to
as a “living document”. It is can be
amended at will and reinterpreted as political expediency demands. Legislative and judicial activism, is
attempting to undermine the belief that the Constitution must be interpreted
according to its original intent. That
is why the appointment of judges may become one of the fiercest political struggles
in the coming years.
The
framers of the Constitution saw the Centre as one island of power in a sea of
states, each exercising its own liberties.
Over the years we have seen erosion of the federal concept with the
Centre becoming a sea of power and the states striving to become islands of
liberty. Today, even those islands of
liberty are being eroded. We see the
culmination of this trend in the spectacle of liberal politicians and citizen
groups no longer being able to depend on legislative procedures and
increasingly having to rely on Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and the
judicial process to achieve its ends.
After 1997,
for the first time in history, more people on our planet live under democracy
than dictatorship; 3.5 billion people live in democracies, 2.66 billion do
not. According to end-of-history
doctrine as expounded by its prophet, the minority can look forward to “the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final forms of human
government.” This euphoric claim should
ring a warning bell. The same hopes were
projected when the world moved from the 19th to the 20th
Century. People of goodwill in 1900 believed in the inevitability of democracy,
the invincibility of progress, the decency of human nature, and the coming
reign of reason and peace.
In fact the
century has been marked by hate, irrationality and wars, which, at one time
threatened the very survival of the human race.
The Great War (1914-18) unleashed angry energies of revolution, not for
democracy but against it. Bolshevism in
Russia, Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, militarism in Japan all despised,
denounced and wherever they could, destroyed individual rights and the
processes of self-government. A decade
later the Great Depression exposed the pretension that democracy would
guarantee prosperity. A decade later
contempt for democracy spread among elites and masses alike; contempt for
parliamentary dithering, for liberties of expression and opposition, for
bourgeois civility and cowardice, for pragmatic muddling through. A decade later the Second World War found
liberal society fighting for survival with its back to the wall. In 1941 less
than a dozen democracies were left on the planet. The political, economic and moral failures of
democracy had handed the initiative to totalitarianism. Even after World War
II, many believed that communism was the wave of the future.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
liberal and authoritarian systems are almost equally poised, with the numerical
edge in favour of the former. But we
should be warned. If liberal democracy
failed in the 20th Century to organise a humane, prosperous and
peaceful world, that could well happen again in the 21st
Century. After all, democracy in its
modern version is at most 200 years old.
A majority of the world’s inhabitants may be living under democracy in
the year 2000, but democratic hegemony is a mere drop in the ocean of world
history. We should have no doubt that
the failure of democracy could only invite some alternative creed, which will
offer better security, but would tolerate less freedom and enforce more
authority. Apart from the threats and
challenges outlined above, democratic systems must contend with tremendous
inner stresses. Modern democracy is the
political offspring of technology and capitalism, the two most dynamic and
destabilising forces loose in the world today.
Both are being driven onward by self-generated momentum that strains the
bond of social control and political sovereignty. Technology created innovations that laid the
foundation for capitalism and that in time generated rationalism, individualism
and democracy. At first technological
advance was unsystematic and intermittent.
Today it is institutionalised.
In the 20th
Century, scientific and technological innovation increased at an exponential
rate. This was a thousand times greater
in 1900 than in 1800. Since then this
has doubled ten times over, and the speed has annihilated both space and time.
The relentless law of acceleration now hurtles us into a new age. The Industrial Revolution came to India as a
second-hand colonial impact and extended over a period of 300 years. This allowed time for human and institutional
adjustment. The Computer Revolution is
far swifter, more concentrated, and more drastic in its impact. It poses problems for democracy.
The
Computer Revolution threatens to destroy more jobs than it creates. It also threatens to erect new and rigid
class barriers, especially between the computer-literate and the
computer-illiterate. This crosses the barriers of the educated classes and the
dalits. This will create new areas of
economic inequality. [Economic
inequality has already grown in the United States to the point where disparities
are greater in egalitarian America than in the class-ridden societies of
Europe.] The computer will also effect the procedures of democratic
politics. Democracy in its simplest form
is termed “Pure democracy”; the system
in which citizens assemble and administer the government in person. Pure democracy functions at the village and
small town level. At the state and
national level, we have to have a system in which the majority expresses its
will through a scheme of representation.
The interactivity introduced by the computer will soon make “pure
democracy” feasible on a national scale.
Is the emergence of cyberdemocracy, under whatever name, a desirable
prospect?
While the
onrush of technology creates long-term challenges and opportunities for a
political system, the onrush of capitalism has more immediate and disruptive
consequences. Democracy is impossible
without private ownership (capital) because private property (resources beyond
the arbitrary reach of the state) provides the only secure basis for political
opposition and intellectual freedom. But
the capital market is no guarantee of democracy, as Hitler, Mussolini, Deng
Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew have amply demonstrated. Democracy requires capitalism, but capitalism
does not require democracy, at least in the short term. .
Capitalism
has proved itself the supreme engine of innovation, production, and
distribution. But its method takes heed
of little beyond its own profit. In its
economic theory, capitalism rests on the concept of equilibrium. But stationary capitalism is a contradiction
in terms. In practice its virtues drive
it toward disequilibrium. This is the
dilemma of all contemporary political systems, whether rightist or leftist. The
unfettered market undermines the values of stability, morality, family, community,
work, discipline, and delayed gratification.
The marketplace fosters greed, short-termism, exploitation of prurient
appetites, easy fraud, and a selfish ethos.
All these are contrary to proclaimed conservative ideals. Even leading capitalists are appalled by what
runaway capitalism has wrought. George
Soros writes: “Although I have made a
fortune in the financial markets, I now fear that the untrammeled
intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values
into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic
society…uninhibited pursuit of self-interest [results in]…intolerable
inequities and instability.”
Both the
Computer Revolution and Capitalism are creatively destructive. One aspect of capitalist creativity is the
globalized economy. One, unplanned
outcome of capitalist destruction is the nation-state, the traditional site for
democracy (and communism). As Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. explains: “The computer
turns the untrammeled market into a global juggernaut crashing across
frontiers, enfeebling national powers of taxation and regulation, undercutting
national management of interest rates and exchange rates, widening disparities
of wealth both within and between nations, dragging down labour standards,
degrading the environment, denying nations the shaping of their own economic
destiny, accountable to no one, creating a world economy without a world
polity. Cyberspace is beyond national
control. No authorities exist to provide international control. Where is democracy now?”
Undoubtedly
there will be significant pockets of resistance to the democratic idea. These will not be confined to Asia
alone. Resistance will be reinforced by
defensive reactions to relentless globalization, which drives people to seek
refuge from its powerful forces that are beyond their control and
comprehension. They crave the politics
of identity. The faster the world
integrates, the more people will huddle in their religious or ethnic or national
enclaves. These reactions are not
confined to the Third World. Many people
lead lives of quiet desperation in modern societies. They hunger for deeper spiritual meaning to
their lives, and are turning to old religions and new cults for faith, solace
and support. Militant reaction to
globalization is an upsurge of religious fundamentalism that is today being
expressed in parts of the Islamic world.
Fifty
years of freedom have educated our people in democracy by providing for a
continuous investment by the people in their society through their
participation in the political processes that shape the national agenda. Over the years, despite many flaws and
hesitations, India has developed and established numerous, strong and separate
government, quasi-government and non-government centres of democratic
power. Each of these institutions
represents vested interests and independent centres of decision-making. At the same time we have held a number of
free and fair elections to parliament, state assemblies and local bodies. Each
election has taught our citizens to cherish their constitutional rights.
Despite resistance from those who see democracy as a threat to their power, the
spread of democratic ideas throughout the world will continue, simultaneously
with globalization. Because of globalization,
India, like all other nation states, will slowly decline as an effective power
unit. Despite this decline, nationalism
will persist as the world’s most potent political emotion. There is therefore a
national-based rationale for weaving the promotion of human rights and
democracy into the fabric of Indian foreign policy as a whole. At the same time, the Indian political system
in the coming decade will have to learn to manage the pressures of technology
and capitalism.
Until the use
of computers becomes more wide spread, dealing with the Computer Revolution
will remain a matter of education and sound management. This is unlikely to disrupt India’s
democratic politics in the coming decade.
Dealing with capitalism is our more immediate problem. The growth of capitalism cannot be arrested. Unbridled capitalism, with low wages, long
hours, and exploited workers, excites social resentments and revives class
warfare. Even the capitalists and
communists are agreed that there is only one 21st Century economic
reality. This is the ideology of
economic growth, of full employment, of distributive justice and social
welfare. Socialists, communists and capitalists no longer debate such
issues. Controversy hinges on the method
of governance to curb unbridled capitalism; on how to strike a balance between
too much authoritarianism and too much freedom. To move along constructive
lines, capitalism must subordinate short-term plans and profits to such
long-term social necessities as investment in education, research and
development, environmental protection, the extension of health care, the
rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the redemption of the city. Capitalists are not likely to do this by
themselves. Long-term perspectives
demand national leadership and affirmative government.
Whilst dealing
with the twin pressures of technology and capitalism, we must guard against the
rise of tyrants and excessive government paternalism which stifles the
development of individualism and self-reliance.
At the same time we must also cope with the spiritual frustrations and
yearnings generated in the varied religious groups of Indian society. Fanaticism is the mortal enemy of
democracy. Fanatics who believe that
they are executing the will of the Almighty are notably harsh on
unbelievers. Today, fanaticism is under
control in India but poses a challenge to Pakistani democracy. This is an internal problem for the citizens
of Pakistan to resolve in their own way.
However, our Armed Forces must be kept strong in order to safeguard our
western borders against any fall-out of Pakistan’s internal struggle. Whilst so doing, let us not forget that
India’s strongest shield against any threats to its independence is not its
security forces alone, but its democratic traditions. As long as India maintains its democratic
core values, it will retain its greatest strength: its capacity for
self-correction through intelligent diagnosis.
The critics
and champions of democracy find it equally difficult to define their subject
matter. Winston Churchill has said that
“democracy is not based on violence and terrorism, but on reason, on fair-play,
on freedom, on respecting the rights of other people.” From an Indo-Aryan point of view, democracy
is at once a political arrangement, an economic approach, and an ethical way of
life. To work it successfully, certain
conditions are essential. These may be
enumerated as: concern for truth, aversion to violence, love of liberty,
courage to resist oppression and tyranny, spirit of cooperation, preparedness
to adjust self-interest to the larger interest, ability to voluntarily limit
one’s economic wants, respect for other’s opinions, tolerance, readiness to
take responsibility, belief in the fundamental equality of man, and faith in
the educatability of human nature.
Democracy
is not just an ideal or an objective. It
is a method and system of governance through which a country tries to manage
its affairs. No system is sacrosanct; no
method can prevail permanently.
Procedures have to be changed to keep pace with changing conditions so
that the system solves the problems of the people without loss of the ideal or
objectives. Thus, above all else,
democracy is a dynamic evolutionary process, the greatest merit of which is
that it contains a built-in mechanism for orderly and constitutional
change. In an autocracy, fundamental
change can take place only by coup d’etat or palace revolution.
TWO
The
concept of secession on the grounds of religion was a violation of a 5000-year
old tradition, which has always attempted to absorb new races, religions and
languages through a spirit of accommodation and cooperation. The acceptance of pluralism, tolerance of
diversity and the upholding of basic human rights are key values in our
constitution. Those who oppose these
values must be treated as hostile. The two-nation concept and the creation of
Pakistan violated Independent India’s values. Pakistan therefore became a
hostile neighbour, This would have been so even if the Jammu and Kashmir
problem had never arisen. The primary
role of the armed forces is to defend the borders against hostile external
threats. The role of the police is to
maintain law and order within India.
When the police are unable to cope with a problem, the government can
call upon the armed forces to perform its secondary role and aid civil
governance. The army is composed of many old regiments, which have been in
existence for over 200 year. They are
very familiar with both the primary as well as the secondary roles. However, the nexus between elected leaders
and senior military commanders was broken by imperial rule. This had to be re-established after
1947. In the process, political leaders,
bureaucrats and military officers had to relearn many basic axioms on the
management of military power.
Chapter 2
Strategy, like any other discipline,
has a rational foundation upon which logical doctrines and theories are
discussed, conceived and implemented.
During the peak of our Agricultural Civilization, India had a
well-established strategic tradition, which dealt with threats on five fronts:
the diplomatic, economic, social, psychological and military fronts. From antiquity, the basic law in India was dharma.
The true sovereign of the state was dharma
and constitution enforced by the king was danda
[stick]. Between dharma and danda the laws
of peace and war developed. War was
never waged before peace efforts through diplomacy were completely
exhausted. This process followed four
steps, [similar in many ways to the four levels of modern strategic control,]
conciliation [sama], gifts [dama], sowing of dissension [bheda] and chastisement [danda].
During Imperial rule, Great Britain
took over the military security of South Asia.
Indian leaders lost touch with the military aspects of strategy. After World War I [1914-18], our leaders began planning for
freedom from colonial rule. Because they
lacked military power, they were forced to confine themselves to the
non-military aspects of strategy. Thus,
the Freedom Movement adopted a non-violent satyagraha
[insistence on truth] approach. This
strategy was able to confront British military power because of Mahatma
Gandhi’s skillful moral leadership, and because our opponents were not ruthless
barbarians; such a strategy would never have worked against a Stalin or a
Hitler.
The freedom struggle involved four
different and separate strands of society.
Firstly, there were the individual revolutionaries and martyrs who
attacked pillars of the Raj and were hanged as criminals. Then there was the Gandhi-inspired mass
non-violent movement. Thirdly, there was
the Bose-inspired Indian National Army [INA].
Lastly, were millions of officers and men who joined the British Indian
Armed Forces during World War II [1939-1945] and forced the Raj to realise that
it could no longer prevent the rapid Indianisation of the Armed Forces and
could not ignore the national sentiments of that force. The Indian naval mutiny of 1946 drove home
this point most painfully. The British
knew that they could no longer rely on the blind loyalty of their Indian army
for Imperial tasks. Regrettably, many
politicians while discussion the contributions made by Freedom Fighters to the
struggle for independence conveniently play down Bose’s role and totally ignore
the indirect role of the Armed Forces.
Lawyers dominated the pre-1947
political scene. They were well informed
about the social, economic and cultural problems of the nation, but the
majority was less familiar with politico-military issues. Motilal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose were
exceptions. Jawaharlal Nehru, unlike his
father, took little interest in the Indianisation of the armed force, recruitment
policies and concepts of politico-military control. However, some Indian leaders, even prior to
1947, did realise that the armed forces had a role to play in national and
international relations. They were keen
to understand specific security issues.
They clandestinely sought advice from impressive-looking Indian military
officers who unfortunately did not know the difference between strategy and
tactics or between a rifle and a gun.
This inability of a civilian to assess military competence prevails till
today. Any smart-looking officer in
uniform easily takes in the average layman.
Many are still ignorant of the profound difference between a general in
the infantry/armoured corps, and general in the service corps. Thus, time and time again, at critical
moments in our history, our political higher command sought the advice of
incompetents and was unable to correctly assess the realities of the global
military scene. A few competent military
officers who did offer unpalatable advice were treated as British sycophants
and their advice ignore. The few
politicians who were realists and opposed the party line on security matters
found that their views were suppressed and they were threatened with expulsion
form the party.
Nehru hoped to create a world where
nations, instead of forming groups to act against each other, would learn to
eschew conflict and settle their disputes in a peaceful manner. He felt that India, with its philosophy and
idealistic past, could provide a lead in this direction. He placed his faith in the United Nations
[UN]. Overlying his idealism was his hatred
of war and of all things military. Thus,
his intellectual make-up lacked an important dimension; he gave no deep thought
to politico-military matters. This
prevented him from making sound security decisions.
Apart from Nehru, millions of our
people dislike violence and hesitate to kill a mad dog, what to speak of a
ruthless terrorist. Millions subscribe
to a romantic belief that non-violent actions are a better [nobler] substitute
for military action. These detractors of
force argued that if Gandhian tactics could confront and defeat powerful
Imperial Britain, then non-violent non-cooperation can surely deal with
internal violence and external aggression.
Thus, for different reasons millions accepted the armed forces as an
unfortunate expense; a colonial residue which ought to have no place or role in
a civilized democracy; an evil which would somehow disappear with time. Till that happened, the armed forces must be
tolerated; their role was to defend the borders; support the government in
dealing with internal unrest, remain disciplined and obey the order of their
elected leaders without question.
Nehru’s disinterest in military
affairs was to have serious implications, because he, as Prime Minister [PM],
played a key role in shaping India’s military command and strategic management
structure. His views indirectly
reinforced the opinion of the detractors of military power and shaped the
thoughts and prejudices of four decades of politicians, intellectuals and civil
servants. They took their cue from him,
and failed to acquire an interest or adequate understanding of the legitimate
role of military force in democratic governance.
The basic issues of national
security planning, both internal and external, are a challenge to any society,
whether democratic or totalitarian.
Security plans have to be evolved on five fronts [human activities]: the
diplomatic, economic, social, psychological and military fronts. This requires a willingness to accept that
military professionals have a legitimate role in the formulation of national
policies, which have a security content.
In a democracy, it is axiomatic that
the military remains apolitical and always subordinate to elected political
leaders. It is also axiomatic that
military force cannot be used to resolve some political issues. It is also evident that some diplomatic
decisions, which are not backed by force, may not be effective. A false cloak of secrecy with which security
issues are shrouded prevented a clear understanding of these basic issues. So serious public discussion of vital
matters, which should have been publicly debated never took place. Thus vital concepts and axioms of democratic
governance with regard to politico-military decision-making were systematically
ignored.
After independence, the Government
inherited an antiquated politico-military defence structure fashioned during
the Kitchner-Curzon era; a system in which the army chief and the civil
secretary who headed a small defence department operated in separate watertight
compartments. The army chief was
supreme. The navy and air force chiefs
were junior officers and his subordinates.
Obviously changes had to be introduced to provide for the supremacy of
an elected government, for the raising of air and naval headquarters, and for
the proper coordination and functioning of the three service headquarters and
the defence department. Nehru left
these important decisions to Lord Mountbatten.
At that time, because of Partition, each of the three services was being
split into two and the residue army was deeply involved in the maintenance of
law and order on the eastern and western borders.
In view of the unstable internal situation
prevailing, Mountbatten could not suggest many desirable changes. Thus he did not recommend the integration of
the defence department and the three service headquarters; an essential
managerial step. Such a structure had
been functioning in Britain since 1920.
That step would have necessitated the creation of three separate
councils, each headed by an elected politician who presides over an integrated
civil-military council [staff], consisting of the chief of the service
concerned, his principal staff officers and a civil servant.
In this
system, the three army, naval and air force councils would function very much
on the lines of the Railway Board. In
this situation, service chiefs are redesignated as the Chief of the Staff. The word “staff” in this context is
synonymous with “board” or “council”. Above the three service councils would be
the defence minister [an elected politician] and his secretariat consisting of
an elected member [minister of defence production], a military member [the
chief of defence staff], a defence secretary [a civil servant], and financial
and scientific advisers.
Until it was
timely to create such integrated councils, Mountbatten initially recommended
that minimum reforms be carried out to the existing organisationsas an interim
measure. This would give time to the
defence department, the air force and navy to establish their respective
headquarters. Till that happened, he
recommended that the three service chiefs should continue to function as
commanders-in-chief [C-in-C], and remain separated from the Defence Ministry. Further reorganisation would have to await a
more stable period.
Mountbatten
recommended the setting up of a series of committees to effect coordination
between politicians and the military, and between the civil service and the
three services. These interim
recommendations gave clear recognition to the axioms that the armed forces in a
democracy have a legitimate role in policy planning which involves a security
content. It indicated that the military
has a duty to advise the elected government when its opinion is asked for; that
political masters have the power and the privilege to reject the military’s
advice; that the final authority is always that of the elected leader.
Mountbatten
recommended that security issues would be reviewed and discussed at the highest
level by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet [DCC], presided over by the
PM. The DCC was composed of selected
ministers including the defence minister.
The service chiefs, defence secretary and financial adviser were to be
in attendance at all meetings. Working
under this apex body was the Defence Minister’s Committee [DMC] presided over by the defence
minister with the three service chiefs, the defence secretary and the financial
adviser as members. Apart from this were
other committees with members composed exclusively of military officers. The secretariat for the top-level committees
was to be provided by a Military Wing to be set up in the Cabinet
Secretariat. The DCC and DMC were the
only bodies where the service chiefs could discuss security issues with their
elected masters formally.
The Cabinet approved Mountbatten’s proposals. It is doubtful if Nehru appreciated that
these were interim proposals pending final integration; he was uninterested in
military detail. Moreover, other
important domestic and international issues demanded his attention at that
time. It must also be admitted that the
service officers in 1947 were equally ignorant and totally inexperienced in the
functioning of a military-political nexus at the highest level. Because of the urgent tasks of consolidating
India’s frontiers and military operations in Jammu & Kashmir [J&K],
Hyderabad state, Junnagadh and the north-eastern region, it suited both the
politician and military that they each be left alone at that time to work in
separate compartments. Thus, in the absence
of integration, a bureaucratic screen, composed of the newly created Defence
Ministry, began to operate between the politician and the armed forces.
For the first decade, the two top defence committees kept meeting as
when required. No controversial issues
arose. The armed forces cheerfully
involved themselves in the territorial consolidation of India; a task which the
young Indian Military Academy [IMA] trained officers performed with courage and
enthusiasm. The task of the senior
military officers was to stabilise the truncated services, maintain discipline
and provide sound administration.
Sandhurst trained officers did this with distinction. When Pakistani
raiders were threatening Srinagar [J&K], our army and air force, led by
dashing officers fought their first battle as free men to defend J&K
against a planned aggression. The elan,
courage and initiative displayed by our swift air borne response, stunned
British advisers who had assured Pakistan that it would face no serious
military opposition as there was no land route between India and J&K. While these exciting events were taking
place, the Defence department expanded into a Parkinsonian Ministry manned by
hundreds of civil servants and clerks whose sole task was to vet military
proposals; they enjoyed power without accountability or responsibility.
The army’s role was defined in simple terms. Its main role was to defend the borders
against external threats. Its secondary
role was internal security: to support the government, when requested, and curb
internal threats to the stability of the state.
The army’s first Indian Commander-in-Chief, General K.M. Cariappa was a
stickler for discipline and insisted that every soldier in uniform will carry a
printed copy of the “Role of the Army” in his pocket., along with his identity
card. Officers would be checked and
punished if found without his copy.
During this period, the status which the service officer had enjoyed
vis-à-vis his civilian counterparts was eroded.
Salaries of the Sandhurst-trained senior officers were protected, but
the salary difference between the Indian Administrative Service [IAS] and the
IMA-trained officers widened. Some
officers who resented these differences protested. A harshly worded circular was issued by the
then Chief whose salary was protected.
The circular stated that officers who were unhappy with the new pay code
should resign. A few very good senior
IMA-trained officers did resign prematurely.
However, the vast majority of the service officers saw the logic of this
change in precedence and accepted it as a necessary step in the democratic
process.
Over the years, as the Sandhurst officers retired, the IMA ones began
moving into positions of authority. By
now they had become experienced professionals who realised that the
decision-making system was out of date; they resented the bureaucratic screen;
the frustration of avoidable red tape and endless files and notes by civil
servants who did not know what they were writing about. Military officers began presenting
well-reasoned papers on the need to reform the interim arrangement, merge the
defence ministry and service headquarters, and adopt the Chief of Staff council
system. At that time, the naval and air
force chiefs were not supporters of these proposals; they were still in the
process of establishing themselves as separate entities and were afraid that
the Council system would be dominated by the army and that this would swamp
their growing identities.
Civil servants enjoyed this division of opinion between the three
services. However, some Members of
Parliament [MPs] took up the army’s proposal.
Nehru sensed the pressure for reform.
In March 1955, the PM announced in Parliament the change in the
designation of the three service chiefs from commander-in-chief to chief of
staff. This was nothing more than a
verbal smoke screen. It is a misnomer to
call our service heads chiefs of their respective service staffs without forming
integrated service councils. However this ploy confused the issue and silenced
the political critics. While announcing
this change of designation of the service chiefs, Nehru stated that as in other
democratic countries, India too would be having a defence council. The House loudly cheered this statement. Few understood what was being promised.
At this time, Krishna Menon was appointed the Defence Minister. Menon was a megalomaniac with a quarrelsome
and irritable nature. His ideologies,
like Nehru’s, had been formed in England in the early 30s when Communism and
its supposed embodiment, the Soviet Union, was accepted in certain intellectual
circles as the wave of the future. Menon
had two pet obsessions: a dislike for capitalist America and a belief that
Communist China would never attack India.
He had a Rasputin-like effect on our affairs in general and over Nehru
in particular. He seemed to enjoy
deliberately insulting those who worked with him.
During Menon’s tenure of five years as High Commissioner in Britain, he
quarrelled with a succession of deputy High Commissioners and civil
servants. Many felt that he was
temperamentally unfit to hold any responsible administrative or public
appointment in a democratic set up. But
the PM had blind confidence in him and despite every legitimate complaint of
various kinds against him by innumerable people, Nehru remained his staunch
supporter. The reason for Menon’s
offensive behaviour was probably a deep-seated source of insecurity; he had no
kind of base in India- familial, linguistic or political. His only base was Nehru and he was
protective of that base. When Menon was
moved from London after a Jeep scandal, he was appointed as Defence Minister
and General K.S.Thimayya took over as Chief of the Army Staff [COAS]. Their relations were cordial to begin
with. The Chinese were then
consolidating their hold over Tibet.
This period saw the rise of Major General. B.M.Kaul, a man with a brisk
military style who owed his advancement to his capacity for political
accommodation rather than military knowledge or experience, of which he had
almost none. At that time, there was an
acute shortage of married accommodation in all the army cantonments. Officers and jawans after serving for several
years in hard areas separated from their families, on returning for a peace
tenure, would be forced to live with their families under canvas. The obvious answer was for the government to
release funds to the Military Engineering Service [MES] and initiate building
projects in places, which required houses.
Kaul approached Menon directly and told him that the cheapest and
quickest way to meet this shortage of accommodation was for soldiers to build
their own houses. Local MES resources
should be placed under Kaul’s command and the required quantity of building
material made available to him. He would
construct houses using troops as unskilled labour. He promised to build 5000 houses at Ambala in
one year at barely the cost of the building material. The proposal was ideal bait for Menon who
accepted at once, even though Kaul’s military superiors objected to the
proposal as this would undermine the morale of troops, would eat into vital
training time and would not be cost-effective as the salaries of the troops and
wear and tear on operational transport were hidden costs which also affected operational
readiness. These objections were
overruled. 4 Infantry Division launched
Operation Amar, and built 5000 houses in the stipulated time.
Major. General. S.H.F.K. Manekshaw was then General Officer Commanding
of an infantry division in Jammu. He was
ordered by Menon, against the advice of the COAS, to visit Ambala, meet Kaul,
study the system he had used, go back to Jammu and build 5000 houses by
adopting the same methods. So Sam
visited Ambala where Kaul briefed him with his customary skill. In conclusion he dramatically asked, “Are
there any questions?” Sam smiled and
said, “Biji, I have a better proposal.
You go to Jammu and take over my division and build another 5000 houses
there. I will take over 4 Infantry
Division and train it within six months to be fit to face a Pakistani
attack."
By the early 60s it was evident that India and China had both opted for
a forward policy along the disputed northern border. Nehru’s forward policy was strategically
pragmatic. The Chinese could not be given
a free run to do what they pleased on the northern border. It was necessary that India fills the gaps
and displays its presence wherever possible.
However, while Chinese border posts were backed by administrative bases
on the Tibetan plateau and supported by road transport, Indian border posts
were isolated detachments widely separated from one another and in some cases
10-days marching time away from the nearest road head. Concerned field commanders pointed out the
tactical dangers of this posture.
At every session of the DMC, the COAS accepted the forward policy but
urged that our outposts be backed by minimum defences in depth; this was sound
military advice. The COAS was told that
the Chinese would not attack India.
Civil servants and intelligence officers at the meeting agreed with the
Minister. The COAS was overruled and told, “This is a political decision; don’t
argue. Obey orders.” So vital; tactical decisions were made on a
map by civil servants and politicians who were ignorant of realities on the
ground and the basic axioms of military power.
The COAS’s dissent was recorded in the minutes of each meeting.
Tied up with our traditional neglect and ignorance of military power is
a fear of the military. This was
understandable in the early years of independence because after World War II,
the military frequently played a key role in revolutionary situations in newly
liberated African and Asian colonies. In
a democracy, the armed forces are expected to remain apolitical. After Partition, this tradition was shattered
in South Asia in Pakistan in 1951 when a few leftists politicians, supported by
some military officers, plotted to assassinate the PM and the C-in-C, a British
officer. This attempted coup, known as
the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, was a political coup and not a military one. In fact, it was crushed by the military,
which remained loyal to the elected government.
However, since then Pakistan has witnessed seven coup d'’etats of
various kinds including the military variety.
All political systems, irrespective of whether these are democratic or
otherwise, have to face the dual problem of developing and controlling
military. In India’s formative years, a
military coup was very feasible; this would then have meant a simple matter of
taking over six centres of power; North and South Blocks in New Delhi, All
India Radio [AIR] and four international airports. It was therefore prudent for the government
to keep a close watch on the armed forces.
Thimayya was a charismatic and very popular leader; qualities which
Menon lacked. He feared that the General
would sway Nehru and that this would undermine his position as Defence
Minister. B.K.Nehru, in his book Nice Guys Finish Second, writes that
Menon concocted a story that the COAS was planning a military coup against
Nehru. If there was any officer wholly
disinterested in politics it was Thimayya.
Menon’s action is explicable only on the theory that he did not want
anybody other than himself to have the ear of the PM on defence matters. Menon did not succeed in getting Thimayya
dismissed but he destroyed the confidence of the PM in his military, and in the
course of time undermined the morale and solidarity of the armed forces.
These events coincided with Kaul’s promotion and were a time that tested
the character of the officer corps. Many
who saw that political power was on Kaul’s side craved for closeness to
him. It was sickening to see the effect
this had on decent officers who were tempted or acted out of fear of an adverse
posting or a bad career report which would effect their future. The army was divided into Kaul boys, those
who said, “There will be no war, so let us join the band wagon”, and those who
stood up for professional values, no matter what the cost.
Thimayya’s resignation as COAS created a national furore. Rumours circulated that he ha resigned in
protest of the government’s forward policy.
But is clear that he resigned because the Defence Ministry kept
overriding Army Headquarters on certain key appointments. Nehru sent for Thimayya and persuaded him to
withdraw his resignation, which he did.
Later, whilst answering questions on this issue in Parliament, he PM
referred to Thimayya’s resignation and subsequent withdrawal as ‘childish
gestures’ of no consequence. Thimayya
appeared to lose all influence thereafter and Kaul took over the key assignment
of Chief of the General Staff: a vital operational staff appointment. Field commanders who were not prepared to
accept Kaul’s’ forward policy instructions were sidelined and willing
sycophants were found to replace them.
The few times that the DMC met in Delhi, Thimayya continued to point out
the dangers facing our forward posts and our precarious tactical posture. There
was no rapport between the military and the Minister. Menon ignored those warnings and assured the
Committee that “the Chinese are playing a cartographic game. There would be no
hostilities.” The minutes of those
meetings are on record. Thimayya retired
in early 1961 on completion of his tenure.
Many had expected that Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat, GOC-in-C
Eastern Command , who was one of our few Sandhurst-trained battle-experienced
officers, would take over as COAS.
However, General P.S. Thapar, who was his senior, was appointed COAS.
In September 1962, Kaul was appointed to command the Corps responsible
for the defence of the North East Frontier Agency [NEFA] When our troops began
moving forward onto Tagla ridge in Towang district of NEFA, the Chinese
retaliated with force, overrunning a scattered brigade position and occupying
the whole of Tawang. They simultaneously
attacked forward positions elsewhere in NEFA and Ladhak. After a fortnight’s pause, they continued
their assault and overran the whole of NEFA up to the Assam border. The army’s
defeat was total; if they had wanted to, the Chinese could then have walked
into Assam without any opposition. In
December 1962, China unilaterally withdrew from NEFA back across the McMahon
Line.
Nehru, shocked by China’s success, admitted in Parliament that “we had
lived in an artificial world of our own creation.” He accepted that the debacle was due to his
ignorance of military affairs. To offset
his political opponents, he proclaimed the formation of a National Defence
Council composed of all the chief ministers, some retired service officers and
others. This was intended to pacify
public opinion; such a body is incapable of exercising effective strategic
control. It subsequently died a natural
death. The COAS and Kaul resigned after
the debacle. B.K. Kaul in his book, Nice Guys Finish Second, has described
how Menon’s hold over the PM was so strong that Nehru “remained unshakeable
even when the Defence Minister’s criminal responsibility for our national
disgrace by the Chinese was evident to the rest of the Country”. When the Congress Party insisted that Menon
be thrown out, the PM tried to save him; Nehru even threatened to resign if
Menon was dismissed. It was only when he
was told to go ahead and do so, that Nehru agreed to get rid of his favourite.
Significantly, not a single IAS officer resigned. After all why should they? They had no responsibility and are never
accountable. General J.N.Chaudhri took
over as COAS, and Y.B.Chavan as the Defence Minister. The latter started holding regular morning
meetings with the Defence Secretary and the three service chiefs; no agenda was
issued nor were any formal papers asked for or discussed. These meetings were useful in their own way
but were no substitute for formal meetings of the DCC or the DMC, both of which
were no longer held. It seemed as if the
politicians were afraid of a formal agenda, dissent and recorded minutes; all
these could later become evidence for some future historian.
An inquiry under Lieutenant General Henderson-Brooks was undertaken by
Army Headquarters to investigate the causes for the debacle. This report has still not been made
public. But it requires no great
imagination to list some of the reasons for the debacle. The obvious ones are material: our army was
equipped with World War I rifles , mortars and guns, the men lacked winter
clothing and even boots; logistic support was lacking due to poor road
communication. The less obvious reasons
were conceptual. Firstly, political
decisions, which have a security content, are worthless if they are not backed
by military power. Secondly, the armed
forces were functioning with an antiquated politico-military decision-making
system, which kept the military separated from politicians; key decisions were
being influenced by civil servants who were ignorant of military
realities. Thirdly, our intelligence
set-up was inefficient.
The government did nothing about reforming the decision-making
system. On the contrary, it went a step
backwards and stopped meetings of the DCC and the DMC, which were the only
institutions giving the service chiefs an opportunity to met their political
masters face to face, discuss security issues formally and record their
opinions. However, the intelligence set-up
was divided into two parts. A foreign
intelligence wing, which was named the Research and Analysis Wing [RAW] and an
internal wing, which continued to remain the Intelligence Bureau [IB].
There is confusion in come minds about the role of the IB and the
Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI].
The IB is engaged in collecting, collating, assessing and distributing
information, and denying sensitive information to foreign powers. The CBI is an investigative agency, designed
to deal with the detection and prosecution of criminals. The CBI is a police agency, which works in
conjunction with individual state’s Crime Investigation Departments [CID]. The CBI is best manned and headed by police
officers. Whereas the police can perform
some of the IB’s tasks at the lower levels, it is debatable whether RAW and the
IB ought to be headed by police officers as a matter of routine. This observation is not a reflection on the
character or ability of police officers.
Experience shows that police officers by their training, experience and
environmental duties, develop a temperament, outlook and aptitude which is
ideal for the CIB but not for intelligence duties. In other democracies, the overall direction
of intelligence work is left to distinguished citizens/civil servant/retired
military officers, or even police officers that have a proven ability for this
sort of work
After the 1962 debacle, it began to dawn on all concerned that India’s
vital interests have to be faced on five fronts: the diplomatic, economic,
social, psychological and military fronts.
These five fronts or human activities, do not operate in watertight
compartments. They merge into one
another. The diplomatic front is the
concern of the Ministry of External Affairs [MEA]; the economic front involves
the Finance, Industry and Commerce Ministries; the social and psychological
fronts are the concern of the Home and Human Resources Ministries. The Defence and Home Ministries deal with
security issues arising from external and internal threats. Thus, any national security plan entails the
co-ordination and orchestration by the PM of these five fronts, which are
controlled by several different ministries; all are influenced by rapid changes
in science and technology.
The DCC states its threat perceptions and formulates a strategic policy on
how India intends to meet this threat.
Each concerned ministry examines this policy and in conjunction with
their respective civil or military advisers, make detailed plans on how to
execute the national policy within the respective spheres of activity. If strategy were a simple one-time process,
then these detailed plans would be the end of the matter Unfortunately, the factors effecting a
strategic plan keep changing continually due to an opponent’s reactions,
domestic and international pressures, technology and other reasons. The
national strategic aim may remain constant but the conduct of strategic action
has to be a flexible on-going process, requiring full-time attention. In a crisis situation, action has to be
controlled and implemented on a day-to-day basis on all five fronts
Strategic control is effected at
four levels by persuasion, hindrance, coercion and force. The first three levels involve non-violent
actions on all the five fronts. Good
strategic management entails moving from one level to another and mixing these
three control elements on different fronts to achieve one’s aim without open
hostilities taking place. This is done
by keeping in touch with an adversary so that he receives our messages, and so
that we can respond to his reactions. It
is only when all these non-violent overtures fail to achieve the desired
results that the last level, the use of force by open hostilities, is
undertaken.
Thus there is need for close integration of several different
ministerial plans, and for the requirement of continual control during a
confrontation. It is therefore
desirable, purely from a managerial point of view, to have a group composed of
full-time multi-disciplined advisers with the role of recommending control
actions and responses to the DCC. The
DCC will only then be in a position to pass suitable instructions to the
ministries and civil-military authorities concerned. This group, call it a National Security
Council [NSC] or whatever you wish, is not a decision-making body but a
managerial tool, available to the DCC, which is the only legitimate body with
constitutional authority and responsibility for making national security
decisions. [A detailed explanation of
the role of a NSC is discussed in Chapter 10.]
At all stages of the Sino-Indian Conflict [1962], China displayed an
impressive degree of strategic and tactical control. It reacted to India’s forward policy with
carefully orchestrated moves designed to persuade, hinder and coerce without
using violent means. New Delhi had no
system to match this approach. Not only
were Chinese signals misunderstood and
countered by official bluster, but also they were sometime ignored. Those who lacked military commonsense,
persisted in the romantic delusion that
the Chinese were playing a cartographic game.
When non-violent actions failed, and the international situation
favoured them, the Chinese used force.
China’s initial aim must have been to overcome our forward posts, which
were anyway not tactically sited . When
their initial attacks succeeded with impressive gains in Tagla, China realised
that it faced no real opposition except in Ladhak. It grabbed this opportunity and overran the
whole of Tawang district. When this
worked, it went a step further and took over the whole of NEFA. China’s tactical and strategic control was
impressive at all stages. Mrs Gandhi was
a silent spectator of these tragic events and the impact of this on her father. She was quick to learn. She kept her thoughts to herself.
After 1962, the army set about rectifying its material deficiencies. New
mountain divisions were raised, and self-loading rifles and better artillery
were inducted. However, confidence
building is a long-term process and cannot be effected by the mere issue of
good arms and snow clothing. It takes
half a decade to make a fighting army; a decade to raise an effective air force
and three decades to fashion a strong navy.
There are no short cuts to professional excellence.
Pakistan had been closely watching events in India. They assessed that the morale of our armed
forces was low after the debacle. New
mountain divisions were being deployed on the northern frontier. But on the western border, Pakistan had
parity in infantry and superior artillery, tanks and aircraft. India’s new PM, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was an
unknown personality. Pakistan saw this
as an ideal opportunity to test India’s political and military will.
In April 1965, Pakistan moved a regiment of tanks into a disputed
portion of the Rann of Kutch. The Army Chief
advised the government not to react militarily to this threat as we had no
tanks in that area and our main military resources had to remain concentrated
in Punjab. The PM accepted this advice. India agreed to take the Kutch issue for
arbitration to the International Court where Pakistan won its case. Pakistani leaders misread our reactions to
the Kutch episode. They took this as
further proof that India lacked the political and military will for
battle. They began to prepare for
another adventure in J & K. The PM
warmed Pakistan that any aggression in J & K would be treated as an attack
on India.
In August, ignoring the PM’s warning, Pakistan infiltrated guerrillas
lead by army officers into the Valley through a gap north of Poonch. Indian forces, handled with skill, cut off
the guerrillas by capturing their route of entry. To counter this set back, Pakistan launched
an armoured brigade against Chhamb in an attempt to threaten the
Akhnur-Noashera road and cut off our forces located west of Akhnur. The PM ordered our armed forces to cross the
international border and attack Pakistan.
This order, reminiscent of Nehru’s fateful command in 1962, to “throw
the Chinese out” of Tagla ridge, was unreal.
The armed forces barely had the capacity to defend our borders. The Government, conscious of the 1962 debacle
and the dangers of political interference, went to the other extreme and gave
the armed forces a free hand to do what they pleased. There was no coherent political or military
strategy, nor any strategic control.
A ding dong battle took place along the western front when Pakistan’s
crack armoured forces launched a massive attack in the Punjab. This was a bold attempt to encircle our
troops defending the western border. It
was due to the valiant efforts of 4 Infantry Division and the flooding of
agricultural channels in the area that this attack was halted; this resulted in
the loss of over 50 Patton tanks, which were abandoned in the area when a cease
fire was imposed by the UN. Pakistan had
started the conflict with three main aims; to provoke an up-prising in the
Valley, to open up the J&K issue in the UN, and to inflict a limited
military defeat on India. They failed in
all three aims. They not only lost the
cream of their armour, but also suffered the humiliation of Indian forces
occupying some of their territory across the international border, and vital
areas in J&K. This was an indirect
victory for India. This “defeat”
weakened President Ayub’s political position.
He was forced to suspend individual rights and impose an Emergency,
which lasted until 1987.
After the cease fire, our forces were pulled back across the
international border, but continued to hold vital areas that had been captured
in J&K. As already pointed out,
President Ayub’s political power had been undermined and Pakistan had lost the
cream of its armoured forces. On the other hand, India was in a strong position
in J&K. It had no obligation to
withdraw from the areas it had captured.
A meeting between the Indian PM and President Ayub was held in Tashkent
under the aegis of the Soviet Union. It
is not known what pressure was brought to bear on our PM who signed the
Tashkent Agreement in which India agreed to withdraw from territories occupied
by us in J&K during the 1965 War.
Significantly, no responsible military adviser was in Tashkent. Shastri, perhaps overwhelmed by this decision
and the knowledge that he would face strong criticism on his return to Delhi,
succumbed to a heart attack shortly after signing the Agreement.
Mrs Gandhi replaced Shastri as PM.
She had been a silent spectator of both the 1962 and 1965
conflicts. She knew that the DCC lacked
a suitable managerial tool to oversee strategic action and control. She attempted to form an organisation designed
to advise the DCC. She termed this the
Apex Body. This was a progressive step
but the Apex Body’s role was not clearly defined and the organisation never
took shape.
Our set back in the Sino-Indian Conflict had been accepted as a debacle,
was analysed and some measures taken to eradicate the obvious shortcomings, The
intelligence set up has been separated into two parts: foreign and
domestic. A National Defence College for
senior civil servants and officers of the armed forces was established in Delhi
to educate them on the realities of the five fronts and their effect on
national security planning. The
Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis [IDSA] was established in Delhi with
the role of studying international and domestic events, and preparing papers
;and publishing journals on issues relevant to the security of India. To improve the training of higher commanders,
the government directed the three services to introduce appropriate courses to
train suitable officers in strategic and administrative planning at a higher
level.
But the outcome of the Indo-Pak War of 1965 was sufficiently ambiguous
to deny the nation the benefit of a well-understood failure. A few perspective officers were able to give
a sober assessment of how lucky we had been in the tank battle in Punjab. The system still lacked two essential
provisions for a legitimate role for the military leaders in security
decision-making: a revival of the DCC and the DMC; and reform [integration] of
our antiquated defence ministry and service headquarters.
THREE
Military
history is a record of wars and battles.
One learns of a battalion moved here, a brigade deployed there, actions
fought and lost. and an eventual cease-fire. We are sometimes apt to forget
that army units, naval ships and air force squadrons are composed of individual
citizens dressed in uniforms. Each one
of them has his own private ambitions, personal fears and domestic problems. In an ideal situation, getting to know ones command and fostering
morale as a prelude to battle, is one of the first and most important tasks of
a military leader. Unfortunately, individuals are often launched into battle
without the minimum necessary preparations for the ordeal they are about to
face; and military commanders sometime never get enough time or opportunity to
practice the ideal and get to know the men serving under them. Perhaps a short account of the personal
experiences of three officers who operated during the Indo-Pak War of 1965 may
best illustrate how and why the ideal can sometimes never be achieved, and how
everyone has to make the best of the situations facing them. In order to preserve the anonymity of the
three individuals involved, they have been named X, Y
and Z.
why the Indians came walking
confidently towards one of the most feared and dreaded elite Pakistani commando
units, in drill-square formation led by an enormous havildar who was making no
apparent effort to conceal himself or his men?
One cannot help sympathising with the paratroopers for their misreading
of the situation.
The India platoon, on the other hand, was probably under the impression
that this was but another of the numerous exaggerated false alarms that had
been trickling in for the past two days.
The men were not expecting to find any live paratroopers. Their feelings when they saw crack Pakistani
paratroopers armed to the teeth may well be imagined. It was indeed fortunate that the commando
began surrendering in groups without much fuss. They were promptly
disarmed. Two officers and fifty other
ranks with wireless sets, machine guns, automatic rifles and sophisticated
demolition stores were rounded up that morning.
The staff officers at HQ 21 Communication Zone Sub Area were quite
speechless when the havildar strutted into the officer to report his fifty-two
prisoners of war. {The Pakistanis, too, had been marched back in threes.] The havildar proudly followed up his report
by requesting for one truck to collect the stores, arms and ammunition left lying
in the fields under the guard of a solitary soldier who was being treated as a
hero and lavishly entertained by the village.
By now reports of similar para-drops by Pakistanis near two other
airfields in Punjab had been received.
Though all these paratroopers failed in their mission and were rounded
up before they could cause much damage to any of our airfields, false rumours
and the consequent threat of the presence of paratroops continued to prevail
till the cessation of hostilities. The
paratroop scare caused considerable concern to all static installations. This may have served to keep everybody alert,
but it added to the administrative strain already prevailing.
Tired air force and service personnel at the end of a hard day’s work got
little rest. Most of them, in addition
to carrying out vital night operations, had to perform extra guard duties at
night. Trigger-happy sentries kept
everyone awake by their indiscriminate firing at the smallest provocation. One had to walk about most carefully whilst
carrying out one’s legitimate duties after dark for fear of being mistaken for
a paratrooper and being shot out of hand.
None of this was then known to X-
who had commenced his journey by train on the morning of 6
September. He was soon to learn from a
wayside railway station that fighting had broken out on the Punjab border. His train pulled into Delhi station on the
evening of 8 September in total darkness.
A blackout had been imposed on major towns within range of the Pakistani
Air Force [PIA]. After some searching
around, he was able to contact the Military Transport Officer. He was given a berth in a train crowded with
young officers and jawans bound for Pathankot.
Rumours were rife but fortunately, because of the blackout, there was
little scope for casual conversation and all one could do was crawl into one’s
berth and fall asleep.
The train was scheduled to reach Pathankot by 8 o’clock the next
morning. Dawn revealed that they were
running very late. However, as the train
moved through Punjab, it was heartening to see home guard volunteers and the
National Cadet Corps protecting railway bridges. Civilians of all ages and sexes were out on
the railway platforms to greet each train and offer free food and liquid
refreshment to those in uniform who wanted it.
This was so, all through Punjab at even the smallest of stations. This was a great morale-raising factor.
It was about 6 pm on 9 September when the train neared Pathankot. Indian Air Force [IAF] fighter aircraft could
be seen circling overhead in pairs.
Apparently some Pakistani fighters had sneaked through on the immediate
outbreak of hostilities, surprised our air defences and caused some damage on
the airfield. As a result of this and in
order to protect vital rail and service depots at Pathankot, the IAF thereafter
maintained almost a continuous protective fighter patrol throughout the day
over the airfield and town.
X- was told that the army had
crossed the international border and entered Sialkot District that
morning. Confusion prevailed at the
railway station with thousands of soldiers who had been recalled from leave,
wanting to know the whereabouts of their units.
Harassed Movement Control personnel
were trying their best to function as an information centre and also organise
transport for soldiers to move on to Jammu transit camp. The combined factors
of security and battle moves made it difficult for the Movement staff to know
where to send soldiers who had to join units which were part of the corps that
had entered Pakistan.
X- was travelling light and managed to make his own way to HQ 21
Communication Zone Sub Area. There he
met Y-, an old acquaintance who was commanding the Sub Area. X- was delighted to see a familiar face after
his long boring rail journey. He walked
forward with a cheerful greeting and outstretched hand. Y-, who had borne the brunt of one week’s
intense pressure, had lost his voice in the process. He was in no mood for niceties and responded
less enthusiastically with a hoarse croak.
X- was then unaware of the rounding up of fifty-two commando and the
prevailing paratroop scare. He was keen
to join his formation and wanted to move on as quickly as possible. He began asking about his final destination
and what arrangements could be made for some conveyance and a guide. He was silenced with a glare of disapproval
and put in the picture about the paratroop threat through hoarse whispers. He was told that he would have to spend the
night at Pathankot anyway, as no one knew the exact whereabouts of his
formation.
Whilst X- was digesting this
information and considering what course of action he should take to quicken up
his onward journey, he heard the sound of machine-gun fire and two pistol shots
in the near vicinity fired by trigger-happy sentries. This helped him to make up his mind. The Sub Area staff were working and sleeping
in their offices. X- dumped his kit-bag
and packs on the verandah and resigned himself to an enforced night’s
halt. Y-
invited X- to share his slit
trench and asked him if he would mind manning his telephone so that he could
give his throat a rest. X- was only too glad to make himself
useful. He readily agreed to the
request. Little did he realise what he
was letting himself in for.
Now that he had time on his hands, X- tried to turn the conversation into
less professional channels. He made
inquiries about Mrs. Y- who had been living at Pathankot, which was a family
station for troops located there. He was
told that she had been evacuated to the safety of Dharamsala before the
outbreak of hostilities. This
conversation acted as a reminder to Y- who, because of his loss of voice, had
not spoken to his wife since the commencement of hostilities. He asked X- to book a telephone call to his
wife at Dharamsala and requested him to talk to her on his behalf and confrim
that all was well. X-, eager to earn his keep, promptly booked the
call. They settled back on their camp
chairs on the verandah to await the connection.
The silence was shattered by the bark of anti aircraft guns. Those that first opened fire were a few yards
away from the Sub Area HQ. X- who had no
knowledge of their proximity, very nearly jumped out of his skin. The others calmly walked across to their
respective slit trenches. X- joined Y- who had carried a field telephone with him
whilst entering his slit trench.
Meanwhile other AA guns located all around Pathankot had joined in the
chorus and a glowing stream of shells could be seen criss-crossing the sky.
“Ring up the Air Force Control room, number 31, and ask them what the
hell is happening,” Y- whispered. X-
asked the telephone exchange for the required number. After a short pause he was surprised to hear
an indignant voice say, “Ah..there you are.
What the hell’s happening?” After
some confused conversation, it was learnt that air force radar had reported no
enemy aircraft. This information was
relayed to Y-.
“Its those trigger-happy Territorial Army anti aircraft gunners firing at
a bloody satellite. They did that
yesterday and were warned not to repeat their mistake. Ring them up, number 29, and tell the battery
commander that the defaulters should be put under arrest and dealt with
tomorrow,” whispered Y-. His hoarse
voice trembled with penicillin repressed rage.
X- asked the exchange for the number 29 and spoke to a calm voice which
interrupted him and said, “I know that
the Sub Area commander is annoyed; so am I.
I’m trying my best to stop my men….Imagine the court of inquiry we will
have to face if we accidentally hit the
satellite.” He rung off. The sound of AA gun fire slowly died
down. Officers had begun to abandon
their slit trenches. X- joined them on
the verandah with the telephone. It was now 8 pm, and the office orderlies
brought the officers a light meal form the Transit Camp langar, which was located
across the road. They had barely
finished their meal when the air raid siren began wailing.
“This is the real thing,” whispered Y-
as they entered their slit trench.
The telephone began ringing and X-
picked up the receiver. It was
Air Force Control Room explaining that four Pakistani jet bombers had been
detected flying towards Pathankot. These
were expected to be over their target within a few minutes. X- relayed this information to Y- who nodded an acknowledgement. The minutes passed in dead silence, which was
suddenly shattered by the pounding of AA guns.
A faint sound of high-flying jet aircraft could be heard through the din
of the AA fire. Then several bright
flashes lit up the skyline. This was
followed by loud explosions, which appeared to be about half a mile away. The volume of AA fire increased. Every gun was now firing. After a short interval another series of
bright flashes were seen and this was followed by loud explosions from an area
that seemed to be a little nearer.
The sound of AA gunfire slowly died down and again there was silence,
which was broken by the clanging of a fire alarm bell and the sound of a truck
being driven at high speed. It was
reassuring to hear noises of organised activity, which indicated that the
military routine was working; the Sub Area fire fighting party were doing their
stuff.
.X- was informed by telephone hat
no major damage had been caused by the bombing.
A direct hit had been scored on an MES stock yard. This had started a small fire in a wood
stack, which was being dealt with by the station fire fighting party. This information was relayed to Y- and provoked an inaudible whisper, which
sounded suspiciously as if he was purring with pleasure at this choice of
target.. No sound of aircraft had been
heard for some time, yet the “all clear” had not been sounded. No one had
emerged from the trenches. X- was asked to ring up number 31 and find out
what was happening.
Air Force Control Room acknowledged that no enemy aircraft were in the
immediate vicinity. “However,” the air
force officer went on, “originally four jets had been tracked by us. One of these was seen flying off in a
north-easterly direction and only three aircraft pressed home their attack. These have since withdrawn, but we are
suspicious about this fourth kite. This
may be a ruse to wait for us to stand-down and then come in from the north for
a surprise attack at low level. If
nothing happens we will sound the all clear in another five minutes.”
Nothing happened for five minutes.
The “all clear” was sounded and X- joined Y- on the verandah. It had been a very hot day, but September
nights are cool in Punjab. Their
bedrolls had been spread out in the open, near their slit trench. They were sitting on the verandah, smoking
their last cigarette before going to bed, when the telephone rang. The exchange operator told X- to stand by for
a long distance call from Dharamsala.
This news perked up Y- who was expecting this to be his long-awaited
call to his wife.
When the call did come through, an excited Station Staff Officer,
Dharamsala, spoke to X-. He reported
that a single Pakistani jet bomber had flown over Dharamsala and bombed the
outskirts. The missing bomber had been
traced. One can only assume that the
pilot of this aircraft, un-nerved by the volume of AA fire over Pathankot, had
turned off course. Then seeing the
bright lights of Dharamsala on the hills in the distance, he decided to drop
his load of bombs there before returning to base. Fortunately no damage was caused. The officials of Dharamsala are believed to
have experienced no difficulties in enforcing a vigorous blackout for the remaining
period of the conflict.
Y- had been expecting his wife to
be calling. He had not been able to
over-hear what was being transmitted from Dharamsala. He had been listening intently to X’s-
responses with growing alarm. When he
was told about the bombing he sighed resignedly and whispered, “I moved my wife
there in the belief that it would be the safest place. I suppose there’s not much point in moving
her again.” X- agreed and suggested
they turn in for the night.
X- crawled into bed and placed the telephone on the ground near him. He was about to drop off to sleep when the
telephone rang. He picked up the handset
and said, “X- speaking.” A ghostly voice
whispered softly, “Z- speaking.” X- was
sleepy and tired and in no mood for social exchanges. He exasperatedly shouted, “Why are you
whispering? Don’t tell me you’ve also lost your voice.” The ghostly voice continued with a desperate
whisper, “Shhhh…..I am surrounded by paratroopers. Send help.”
X- was fully awakened by the impact of this astounding piece of
information but was not quite sure if he had heard correctly the first
time. He asked the caller to repeat his
message. He heard the ghostly voice
repeat its announcement of doom in the same desperate whisper. X- was
glaring disbelievingly at the receiver when the others asked him who was
calling. X- told them and there was a snort of anger from
Y-. “That idiot Z- has been imagining paratroops for the past
forty-eight hours. Ignore his message. He did the same sort of thing last night.”
X- was still pondering over this
incredible situation when one of the others who had overheard the conversation
cheerfully said, ”Don’t worry about that call.
I’ve sent Z’s- outfit a special
guard tonight. They were late getting to
their destination because of the air raid.
They are probably only now moving into position and have no doubt been
mistaken for enemy paratroopers. I’ll
sort that out…You may have a hard day ahead of you tomorrow. You should try and get some sleep.”
X- lay back on his bed roll feeling very much like the Chinese
philosopher-poet who wrote: “I, Chuang Chou, once dreamed that I was a
butterfly flitting about. I did whatever
I wished. I knew nothing about any
Chuang Chou. Then I suddenly awakened a
Chuang Chou with all his normal trappings.
Now I don’t know whether Chuang Chou dreamed he was a butterfly, or a
butterfly is dreaming that he is Chuang Chou.”
X- was saved from further philosophical distractions by the irrepressible
ring of the telephone. He wearily lifted
off the hand set, gave his name, and was relieved to hear a pleasant voice
announce itself and go on, “I have been sent to receive you. I should have reached you early this
evening. But what with the air raid and
trigger- happy sentries, I’ve been forced to halt outside Pathankot for the
night. Anyway, I’m glad I’ve been able
to trace you. I suggest that I come and
pick you up first thing tomorrow morning.”
X- agreed without reservations and
bid his caller goodnight. He replaced
the handset and settled back on his bedroll.
Now that he knew he was on his way, his weariness seemed to have
vanished.
FOUR
Battles are fought by soldiers, sailors
and airmen who are wedded together into battalions, air squadrons, flotillas
and so on. Team work depends on a
combination of individual professional skills, group drills, routine procedures
and rigorous training. Each man must
know his weapon and his designated role in the team. This is the ideal which, alas, often never
happens in real life. Senior military
commanders are forever putting up plans to modernize their respective
services. These proposals cost a lot of
money. These are seldom implemented in
full or in time. Thus, in every war that India has fought from 1947 to Kargil,
the armed forces have faced critical shortages of one kind or the other. What this implies may best be understood by
recounting an episode that occurred in the Indo-Pak War of 1965, when a brigade
was launched into operations minus one battalion and under a new commander, with
unit’s short of officers, maps and weapons, with mis-matching wireless
equipment and vintage guns which were inferior to what the Pakistanis were
using.
Chapter 4
Exploits
of a Mountain Brigade in Tank Territory
By the first week of September 1965, it was learnt that Pakistan’s 7
Infantry Division was defending Sialkot. [To avoid confusion in the narrative,
all Pakistan formations will hereafter be marked with P after their
designations.] It was estimated that 15
Infantry Division [P] and 6 Armoured Division [P] were located somewhere in the
general area of Pasrur and to its west.
It was elements of those formations, which had attacked across the
cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir [J&K], to capture Chhamb and threaten
Akhnur.
Against this we had 26 Infantry Division earmarked for the defence of
Jammu. In addition to this, 1 Armoured
Division and 6 Mountain Division, less one mountain brigade, were expected to
concentrate in the area of J&K to the east of Sialkot by 5 September. 14 Infantry Division was expected to
concentrate in the same area only by 14 September at the very earliest. Thus, on 7 September, we were actually
inferior in overall strength in this sector.
Nevertheless the army planned to enter Pakistan on 7 September through
J&K on a front of about 15 miles, to the east of Sialkot. This was necessary as a defensive measure in
order to ease Pakistani pressure on the Chhamb sector. The country chosen for the break-in was flat
and tankable everywhere except for Aik Nadi, which runs from east to west and
lies immediately to the south of Sialkot; this is a partial tank obstacle.
Sialkot district is heavily cultivated and small villages exist at
approximately every 1000 yards. The
chief crops are rice, wheat, bajra, cotton and sugar cane. In September, the rice fields were already
green with the crops planted in July.
However, these fields were not flooded and presented no obstacle to the
movement of vehicles. The sugar cane and
bajra fields had standing crops, which were over 6 feet high.
All the roads in the area were dirt tracks, except the main tarmac road
from Pasrur to Sialkot. Wheeled vehicles could move cross-country anywhere
without much difficulty. Observation
from the top of a tree was very good and generally possible till as far as the
horizon provided intervening obstacles did not obscure vision. However, the sugar cane and bajra fields, and
numerous sisal groves provided ideal concealment for rocket-launcher
jeeps. Every village served as a screen
behind which armour could be concealed.
On the night of 7/8 September, 6 Mountain Division crossed the
international boundary and secured Maharajke and Charwa. By last light on 8 September this salient had
been extended to Cross Road. Pakistani
screen positions composed of regular infantry soldiers along with an Engineer
Company [P] were captured in these preliminary actions. Several trucks loaded with anti-tank mines
and other material for the construction of defensive works were also captured. The Pakistanis had had no time to lay mines.
On the western flank of this salient, 26 Infantry Division had secured the area
Bahragarhi.
On 9 September, 1 Armoured Division pushed outwards from the
salient. This stage of the fighting was
intense and though Pakistan threw in all available resources of armour,
artillery and air into the battle, they were forced to fall back into Phillora
were a series of close-quarter tank battles were fought and casualties
inflicted on both sides. By 11
September, Phillora had been secured. To
the east of this armoured thrust, our forces had secured Kangre and infantry
patrols had entered Zafarwala located some four miles south east of
Kangre. The village was deserted..
However, events were less successful to the west. 43 Lorried Brigade, composed of a mixed force
of infantry and tanks, had tried to advance beyond Pagowal. This force was thrown back by a fierce
counter attack of Patton tanks, operating from the area of Kalarawanda. 43 Lorried Brigade had fallen back to the
area Kaloi.
The estimated locations of hostile forces at last light 11 September were
as follows-.
One infantry brigade {ex-7 Infantry
Division[P]} with a mixed regiment of Sherman and Patton tanks in Ura with the
task of denying the eastern and southern
approaches to Sialkot
On infantry brigade {ex-15 Infantry Division
[P]} with a regiment of Patton tanks in area Badhiana with the task of denying
the eastern approaches to Badhiana and the southern approaches to Sialkot.
6 Armoured Division [P] and 15
Infantry Division [P] less one brigade, in the area Pasrur and Chawinda. This
force had had at least one squadron of armour and one battalion of infantry
mauled in the fighting at Phillora.
The location of our forces at first
light 12 September were as follows-
168 Infantry Brigade [ex- 26 Infantry
Division] area Bajragarhi.
69 Mountain Brigade [ex-6 Mountain
Division] area Maharajke.
99 Mountain Brigade [ex-6 Mountain
Division] area Charwa..
35 Infantry Brigade [ex-14 Infanntry
Division] area Cross Road
116 Infantry Brigade [ex-14 Infanntry
Division] area Kangre.
43 Lorried Brigade [ex-1 Armoured
Division] area Kaloi being relieved by a battalion 99Mountain Brigade to enable
it to join 1 Armoured Division.
1 Armoured Division less 43 Lorried
Brigade in harbour north of Phillora.
Commander 69 Mountain Brigade had been relieved of his command on 5
September. His relief only reached the
brigade on 10 September. The new brigade commander had never worked or trained
with the units of the brigade; a desirable prerequisite before battle. His first task was to meet his subordinate
unit commanders and at least get to know their names. At that time, plans were being discussed for
a major thrust towards Chawinda. It was
necessary that Pagowal be secured before this operation could be launched.
The village of Pagowal [spelt as Bhagowal on Pakistani maps] is situated
six miles to the west of Maharajke and almost the same distance to the
southeast of Sialkot. Securing the area
Pagowal would ensure the safety of the western flank of our forces
operating ahead of Phillora. It would also widen our scope of operations
and control the roads leading from the southeast to Sialkot and the road
leading to Badiana, which cuts across the railway and road links between Pasrur
and Sialkot.
The new Brigade Commander, who had been anticipating orders for an
advance to Pagowal, had visited the area Kaloi on the morning of 12 September.
At 1700 hours on 12 September, the General Officer Commanding [GOC] 6 Mountain Division ordered Commander
69 Mountain Brigade to form an infantry-armour combat group and secure Pagowal
by first light 13 September. [The meteorological data for 13 September showed
first light as 0632 hours and last light 1800 hours. There was a full moon rising on 12 September
at 1950 hours and setting on 13 September at 0901 hours.] The troops allotted
to 69 Mountain Brigade for this task were as follows-
62 Cavalry less one squadron. This consisted of 24 Sherman tanks of which 6
tanks were fitted with 75mm guns and the remainder with 76 mm guns.
9 Kumaon [approximately 800 men]
3 Madras [ ditto ]
One company 4 Madras [approximately
100 men]
93 Mountain Composite Regiment
[Towed] less one battery. This consisted
of eight 3.7 howitzer guns [of World War I vintage] and four 120 mm mortars.
An Air Contact Team which enables the brigade to contact support aircraft
Two medium regiments and one field
regiment of artillery were located within support range of the brigade, but
these guns were on priority call to 1 Armoured Division.
A warning order was issued almost immediately. for all the concerned
commanding officers to assemble at Headquarters [HQ] 69 Mountain Brigade for
orders. However all were only able to
get together by 2100 hours, at which time final orders were issued.
6 Mountain Division had been located in the hills on the northern
border. It was neither organised nor
equipped to operate in the plains along with armour. Ninety per cent of the men had never trained
with tanks. The infantry battalions had
been issued with 106 mm recoil-less guns the week before and gun-crews had not
yet fired this weapon. Luckily, in their
first attack at Maharajke, 69 Mountain Brigade had captured several Pakistani
recoil-less guns with some ammunition. A
hurried field-firing practice had been conducted on 9 September by 3 Madras and
9 Kumaon to teach gun-crews the basic
essentials.
Only a few maps of the area were available. Major units had been issued with about three
maps each. This meant that most of the
infantry company commanders, tank squadron and troop commanders, and artillery
battery and forward observation officers had no maps and were working with
hastily prepared sketch maps. No radio
communications could be arranged between tanks and infantry, as their
respective wireless sets were incompatible.
It was not even possible to establish radio communications between the
Brigade Commander and CO 62 Cavalry. The
CO was therefore ordered to stay near at hand so that he could receive orders
and relay his advice by voice. Ad hoc
hand signals were devised for communications between individual tanks and
infantry platoons. The 3.7 howitzer
guns, which had been allotted in direct support had a very limited range, so
plans had to be made for them to accompany advancing troops. Considering all
these factors, the brigade commander appreciated that time for briefing and
“marrying up” at all levels was essential.
After consulting unit commanders he decided that 0400 hours 13 September
was the very earliest time they could launch this operation
No precise information of enemy locations in the area of Pagowal was
available. All that CO 62 Cavalry could
say with any certainty was that Patton tanks were operating there on 11
September. He sounded unnecessarily
emotional as he added, “I should know.
On squadron of them attacked me yesterday and knocked out three of my
tanks; their burnt out hulks are now lying outside Pagowal.” Very little infantry had been seen but at
least one heavy artillery regiment [155mm] located in Sialkot and one medium
artillery regiment [105 mm] located at Badiana had supported the Patton tanks
on 11 September.
The Brigade Commander, with calculated optimism, assured his unit
commanders that the main Pakistani defences were at Ura and Badiana. All that they should expect in the area of Pagowal was a light
screen position composed of some infantry and tanks. It was imperative that we by-pass this
position and do not attempt to enter Pagowal.
The defenders will run away once they know that they have been cut
off. We can then clear Pagowal at
leisure by daylight. The operation would
be conducted as a night advance with infantry leading the advance. The
Brigadier emphasised that no attempt must be made to clear small villages en
route. These will be skirted. The
walking time from Kaloi to Pagowal was two hours, and if they started at 0400
hours, and all went well, they would be in the vicinity of their respective
objectives [open fields located between Pagowal and Kalawaranda] just before
first light. Every effort must then be made to dig down on the objective as
fast as possible in order to be ready to face a tank counter attack and
observed artillery fire after first light.
Kaloi was selected as the starting point and 3 Madras was detailed as the
Advanced Guard. This would be closely
followed by 62 Cavalry, 9 Kumaon, Tactical Headquarters 69 Mountain Brigade and
the Gun Group, in that order of march.
Company 4 Madras and the main Brigade Headquarters would not move from
Kaloi till they received further orders.
The final bounds were to be treated as the Brigade defended sector. These were given out as follows-
3 Madras: West of Pagowal to secure the road leading from Pagowal to Ura.
[This is the Sialkot Cantonment road.]
Defences must keep at least 2000 yards away from Kalarawanda.
9 Kumaon: Southwest of Pagowal to secure the road leading from Phillora
to Sialkot [This is the Sialkot City road.]
Gun Area would be located east of Pagowal.. Tanks will be prepared to
harbour at night in that area. Company 4 Madras will be prepared to provide
protection to that area when called up
Commanders at all levels appreciated the fact that the ideal would have
been for troops to be dug down by before first light, but they were also aware
that the start time could not be made earlier than 0400 hours for the reasons
already explained. The Brigade Commander
warned his unit commanders that they should expect un-aimed small arms fire
from the villages en route. This should
be ignored. On no account must anyone
open fire in retaliation. The tanks would be making enough noise to wake up the
dead; so this was not a matter of maintaining surprise. Firing at night is seldom effective. It only creates confusion and usually results
in own troops firing at one another with consequent loss of control. If they physically contacted an enemy patrol,
they would deal with it with the bayonet.
Every effort will be made to maintain close contact with one another and
press on at full sped so as to reach the area of the final bounds by before
first light. After this, they should be
prepared to face observed artillery and tank fire, and be ready to meet a
counter-attack, probably from the direction of Kalarawanda, by Patton tanks
supported by fighter aircraft. It was
essential that they dig down as fast as possible after reaching their final
bounds.
The Brigade Commander ended his orders by cheerfully reminding his
listeners that “Pakistani armour, like ours, has never moved out of their
cantonments for the past 18 years. I
have no doubt that they will have withdrawn to safe night harbours. So you don’t have to worry about enemy tanks
till after breakfast, by which time we should be well dug in.” Whereas the Brigade Commander was wrong in
his first assessment, he was correct about the second, but for reasons other
than he anticipated.
The leading rifle company of 3 Madras crossed the starting point at Kaloi
at 0400 hours on 13 September and set out along the Kaloi-Pagowal track at a
fast pace. It was a bright moon lit
night. The company was followed by 62 Cavalry tank column moving in single
file. The tanks moved with a deafening
noise and were flanked on either side
and to the rear by the remaining three
rifle companies of 3 Madras, all in close order. Maintaining this formation,
the advanced guard reached the area of the track junction some two miles short
of Pagowal at 0530 hours from where the men got their first glimpse of Pagowal,
silhouetted against the skyline in the half-light preceding dawn.
Pagowal village consists of about 300 adobe and brick houses, which must
have housed a population of about 1500 persons.
Like most ancient villages, Pagowal stands on a high mound about 100
feet above the general ground level; the mound being the creation of centuries
of village debris. The other villages
immediately surrounding Pagowal are smaller and consist of clusters of about 50
to 100 houses.
From the track junction, the advanced guard moved cross country in a
north westerly direction, through thick sugar cane fields skirting several
small villages from which the sound of automatic fire was heard and
ignored. By 0630 hours the leading
elements were astride the Sialkot Cantonment road. 3 Madras began coordinating their defences
and digging down astride the road. 62
Cavalry moved a little ahead of the battalion to screen their position. Meanwhile 9 Kumaon moving westwards between 3
Madras and Pagowal, had still to reach the Sialkot City road. The noise of our
tanks, moving about in the area, was deafening. Some civilians and a few personnel
in khaki uniforms were seen running southwards from Pagowal, through
thick bajra fields. No attempt
was made to apprehend them or enter Pagowal. The guns were moving into their
allotted area. Not a shot had been fired
by our men till now. All were busy
reaching their respective objectives or digging down for all they were worth.
Pakistan’s main defences were located at Badiana. In the first week of September, strong
covering positions had been prepared on the general line Kalarwanda, Pagowal
and Phillora. Two miles to the south of Pagowal, on the road leading to
Badiana, is located the village of Wadianwala, which is the next biggest
village in the area. This consists of
about 250 houses and is also situated on a 100 feet high mound from where it
dominates the road to Badiana, and the
Sialkot City road and railway line.. Behind the forward covering position, a
second line of defences had been prepared at Wadianwala and Chawinda....
At the three forward covering
positions, Kalarwanda, Pagowal and
Phillora, the defenders had prepared dug-down positions for their tanks, which
were supported by mobile infantry, heavy mortars and artillery forward
observers who operated from wireless fitted jeeps. This line of defence was
first penetrated by our forces when Phillora was secured by 1 Armoued Division
on 11 September. The defenders at Phillora had fallen back and joined the
defenders at Chawinda.
By first light 13 September, when Pagowal was being by-passed by 69
Mountain Brigade, the Pakistan commander in the sector Pagowal must have been subjected
to conflicting emotions. At 0400 hours
he would have received reports from his forward patrols that a large force was
moving towards Pagowal. At about 0500 hours he would have heard the deafening
noise of out tanks. At 0600 hours, though they could see nothing clearly, the
Pakistanis were sure that a tank force was by-passing Pagowal from the
west. Fearing that their only line of
withdrawal to Badiana was being cut off, they withdrew in a hurry. They joined
the defenders at Wadianwala. In their
haste to get away, they abandoned one Patton tank and a wireless-fitted jeep in
the sugar cane fields to the immediate east of Pagowal. Both vehicles were brand new and in perfect
working condition. The jeep contained an
artillery pamphlet entitled, “Duties of an Artillery OP”. [This pamphlet was rather inappropriately
flagged at the chapter entitled “Static Ops”.]
Of the three original covering position, only Kalarwanda still remained
in their hands
At 0700 hrs, one Pakistani air observation aircraft flew low over
Pagowal. This was an unarmed propeller
driven two-seater plane. It began slowly circling over our troops. The brigade had no anti-aircraft guns or
fighter aircraft in support. It could nothing about this. The Pakistani
observers were primarily in search of our 1 Armoured Brigade, which till then
lay concealed in their night harbours north of Phillora.. The Pakistanis wanted to assess in which
direction our next main thrust was to be launched. One can picture the scene that presented
itself to the Pakistani observers.
Twenty-four tanks were edging their way under every copse or sugar cane
clump about 1500 yards east of the railway line in anticipation of a Pakistani
armour and air strike, which was expected at any time after first light. About 15 small and medium-sized vehicles
carrying ammunition and defence stores were being unloaded in the 3 Madras
defended area where the men were busy digging their positions.
9 Kumaon were still milling around, coordinating a defensive position
astride the Sialkot City road. Moving
along the track from Kaloi and skirting Pagowal was a column of 15 vehicles,
shrouded in a dust haze, carrying essential stores and ammunition for 9 Kumaon.
[This unit was short of military vehicles, their transport column therefore included six civilian load carriers. In the dust haze. the wooden rectangular
bodies of the civil trucks must have resembled brigade and divisional command vehicles.] Behind this were about 20 vehicles of the gun
group, each vehicle represented by a small cloud of dust as it moved forward to
the gun area. One can well imagine the
confused thoughts of the Pakistani air observers as they looked down at the
scene below them. One can further imagine the uncertainty prevailing at the
higher HQ [P] located at Badiana, which was receiving alarming reports,
firstly, from those who had fallen back from Pagowal to Wadianwala, and now
from the air observers. It was not
surprising that a second air observation aircraft, which was flying over
Phillora, was ordered to join the first aircraft and both planes began
apprehensively circling over Pagowal.
At 0715 hours, Pakistani guns opened artillery fire on 69 Mountain
Brigade defences from three widely dispersed gun area; one heavy regiment [P]
and one field regiment [P] from Sialkot, one medium regiment [P] and one field
regiment [P] from Badiana and one medium regiment [P] and one field regiment
[P] from Chawinda. Some heavy mortars
[P] also opened fire on the brigade from west of the railway line. These kept continually changing their
positions. It was appreciated that these
were mounted on carriers and were being employed in a mobile role.
By now the Brigade’s 3.7 howitzers had been deployed in the gun area; our
“pea shooters” reported that they were ready to fire and were available for
direct support. They were ordered to stand by.
When 69 Mountain Brigade tactical HQ reached about 1000 yards short of
Pagowal, the Brigade Commander intended to halt and establish himself
there. However, CO 62 Cavalry, forgetful
of the order to always position himself alongside the Brigade Commander, chose
that moment to follow Napoleon’s injunction of “marching to the sound of the
guns”. He suddenly left the brigade
tactical HQ and drove off towards the gap between 3 Madras and 9 Kumaon
defensive areas in a cloud of dust. The
Brigade was reluctant to move his tactical HQ further forward .as this was
unnecessary and would place it in a dangerous position. However, he did go forward to eventually
establish himself north of Pagowal, to the immediate rear of the gap between the two battalions’ defensive positions.
By 0800 hours the Pakistanis had fired about 1000 rounds of artillery
ammunition of all types. The heaviest
concentrations of Pakistani artillery fire kept landing along the road junction
to the south of Pagowal on the road to Wadianwala. The defenders at Wadianwala
were apparently convinced that an attack was about to be mounted on them. They
began vacating their defences and withdrawing to Badiana.
The two spotter aircraft kept returning to their airstrips for
re-fuelling in relays, At 0800 hours, 1 Armoured Brigade broke out of their
night harbours. The defenders at
Badiana were alarmed to observe Centurion tanks operating in the area of Alhar
railway station. [The Centurion tank is of British origin. Its tank gun is
slightly inferior to the gun of the American Patton tank. However, the tank
crews of 1 Armoured Brigade were confident that the Centurion’s superior
silhouette and track performance made it more than a match for the Patton in
tank battle.] On receiving this news,
one of the air observation aircraft flew off in the direction Chawinda. Now both Pagowal and Phillora were being kept
under continual observation. The spotter pilots and defenders at Badiana and
Chawinda were apparently still confused about the location of 1 Armoured
Brigade and the direction of the main thrust.
Had the tanks which were observed near Alhar Railway Station come from
the area Phillora or Pagowal ? Those who
were defending Badiana were probably convinced that the main thrust would be
across the railway line, west of Alhar.
Those defending Chawinda expected this to be across the railway line
between Alhar Railway Station and Chawinda
or from the east of Chawinda.
Perhaps it was only by about 0900 hours that they were fairly certain
that the main armour threat was from Phillora and not Pagowal. By then they had fired about 2000 rounds of
precious artillery ammunition all around Pagowal. [Pakistan had a marked
superiority in heavy artillery and their tanks were equipped with superior
guns, but they were extremely short of ammunition for both these types of
weapons.] Thereafter, hostile guns in the area of Chawinda and Badiana confined
their attentions to the activities of 1 Armoured Brigade. It was only the guns from the Sialkot area,
which continued to engage targets around Pagowal.
By 1130 hours on 13 September, fighting patrols from 3 Madras and 9
Kumaon had cleared the villages and copses up to about 1000 yards short of the
railway line. Sounds of tank movement
could be heard west of the railway line.
Forward movement by our infantry or tanks immediately attracted tank gun
and mortar fire. The Brigade Commander
was quite please with the progress of the operations. He decided to visit the two battalions. At 1200 hours whilst he was at HQ 9 Kumaon, a
red smoke flare landed on one of our tanks, which was located nearby. The flare appeared to have fired from one of
the copses east of the railway line.
Anticipating that this was some signal for an attack, the Brigade
Commander began walking back towards his command post. He was half way back when a second flare was
fired from the same area. This landed
near another one of our tanks. This was followed almost immediately by low
level rocketting and straffing of our positions by four Sabre jet
aircraft. The flares had been fired to
indicate targets and a safe bomb line to their aircraft. If the forward troops had reacted quickly at
the first instance and fired a few red smoke flares anywhere near the railway
line, Pakistani fighter pilots would have been thoroughly confused. They may have even been fooled into attacking
their own tanks. But it was now too late
for such a ruse.
Each Pakistani jet made six strikes on the two marked areas. Fortunately they missed hitting any
tanks. Unfortunately the Brigade
Commander, who was then lying flat on his face, was in the zone of likely
misses. It has been accepted by all
those who were within earshot that the Brigadier’s language on that occasion,
whilst reflecting little credit to his rank or service, was quite the most
lurid ever heard.
Appreciating that it was unlikely that there would be another air attack
the Brigade Commander ordered main
Brigade HQ to move forward from Kaloi and join
Tactical HQ. Telephone lines were
laid to both battalions and the gun area.
Line communications to Divisional HQ were still not through. The rest of the day was spent consolidating
the defences and searching every village within the area, including
Paghowal. 3 Madras reported that a very
old lady, age estimated to be over 90 years, was resident in one of the small
villages ..She had apparently been abandoned by her relatives because she could
not walk. The battalion was told to look
after her till arrangements could be made to evacuate her.
At 1500 hours, artillery and mortar fire once again opened up on the
brigafe position from two gun areas
around Sialkot and one gun area near Badiana.
This was being directed by the two spotter aircraft, which had resumed
circling our positions. The guns
appeared to be registering targets. CO
93 Mountain Regiment warned the Brigadier that this pattern of artillery fire
indicated that an attack was imminent.
At 1530 hours, an intense bombardment was started with rates of fire
varying from normal to rapid. Over 1000
rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition were fired on our positions. At 1600 hours the shelling ceased and
long-range tank gun fire opened up on us.
Twelve Patton tanks were observed advancing from the west of
Kalarawanda. The tanks moved forward
slowly in a line abreast formation with about 80 yards gap between the eight
forward tanks. Four tanks were located
further back in depth. About six
infantrymen followed each of the forward tanks.
Groups of infantrymen were also
reported to have been seen well to the rear, readily available in case of
success. Heavy tank gun fire and small
arms automatic fire also opened up from the copses located immediately to the
east of the Railway line.
This was the Brigade’s lucky day.
Radio communications had been behaving indifferently till then. But at that moment, CO 93 Mountain Regiment
got through to the Commander Artillery Brigade located at HQ 6 Mountain Division and, through him,to the Commander Artillery
Brigade located with HQ 1 Armoured
Division. 69 Mountain Brigade was
assured of the fire support of every gun within range. Commander 1 Corps Artillery, who happened to
then be through on line communications with HQ 6 Mountain Division, at once
offered and provided the fire support of all the Medium Regiments located in
Jammu sector.
Pakistani tanks had reached 1200 yards away from our forward troops when
our guns opened fire. This was perhaps
one of the heaviest concentrations of artillery fired in 1 Corps Sector. After 10 minutes, when the dust settled down,
Pakistani tanks were seen to be scattered and halted. Two enemy tanks appeared to have been damaged
by artillery fire. No hostile infantry
were in sight. They must have suffered
casualties during this engagement. But
the Brigade was then not able to follow up withdrawing enemy troops because the
four Patton tanks, which had been located in depth, continued to stand off
about 1500 yards away from our forward positions. From here they engaged any movement that
attracted their attention whilst the remainder slowly withdrew.
During this engagement, one squadron of our Sherman tanks had remained
carefully camouflaged in dug down positions within the infantry defended localities
in a static role. These tanks had not
opened fire or moved because for them to attempt to do so would have been
fatal. Their orders were to wait till
Pakistani tanks closed up to within 800 yards and only then to open fire for a
kill. The Patton tank has a telescopic
range finder graduated and coupled to their gun for ranges up to 4000 yards, at
which range their armour piercing shot could kill a Sherman if it struck
home. It was know, and tested, that the
Sherman’s 75 mm gun could barely penetrate the weakest parts of a Patton tank
at 1000 yards. Thus the odds were most
unfavourable and our tanks and recoilless gun crews who were deployed in a
static role in the open shouldered a very grim and unenviable task.
However, at the start of this action, our second armoured squadron, which
was in a mobile role, had been moved between and to the rear of the two
battalions. This gave flexibility to the
defences. It also confused the attacker
of the actual extent of our defences and our flanks. Whenever the dust cleared, the tanks of this
squadron kept up a slow long-range tank fire on the Pattons with high explosive
ammunition. These shells could do little
damage to the Pattons but it increased the dust and smoke in their vicinity,
thereby making it difficult for their tank gunners to take effective aim. This also made it difficult for Pakistani
tank commanders to stick their heads out of the tank copula and exercise
effective control. It certainly disconcerted the accompanying infantry. Hostile
tanks remained in position till 1800 hours when they withdrew towards Sialkot.
Despite these efforts to confuse their armour, Pakistani tanks gunners
were able to score three hits on our Shermans.
It is fortunate that none of these three tanks brewed up. However, all three tanks were put out of
action. Two of these were back into use
within 48 hours; the third took a little longer but was back in use within four
days. Artillery forward observation
officers were deployed on trees from where they directed artillery
concentrations. CO 62 Cavalry, who had
learnt how necessary it was for him to stay near the Brigade Commander, was
also able to relay individual tank requests for artillery fire support through
CO 93 Mountain Regiment. These
arrangements were far from ideal but they worked.
It is advisable for non-participants to keep their heads down when tanks
are firing at one another. A Patton
tank’s gun, if elevated, can lob a shell over 15 miles. The gun has a high
muzzle velocity and its shot has a flat trajectory for the first 4000 yards. If
a tank gunner misses his target, the shell will keep going, eventually hit the
ground and plough in, or ricochet with a terrifying screech and keep bouncing
and skipping through the fields till it hits something solid or loses its
momentum. Soldiers as far away as 10
miles from the scene of actions have been killed by stray tank shells. Over
seventy officers and other ranks were killed or wounded throughout the first
day’s action. Twenty-five per cent of
the casualties were due to tank gun and small arms fire and the remainder due
to artillery shelling. But morale was
high and the brigade was in full possession of its objectives. Medical teams worked well forward and it was
heartening to have the senior medical officer of HQ 6 Mountain Division as the
brigade’s very first visitor that day.
The territory situated between two
opposing forces is termed “no-man’s-land” as it is unoccupied. The aim of the two opposing forces should be
to dominate no-man’s-land. Whoever dominates
no-man’s-land, dominates the battlefield. This is done by vigorous
patrolling. Fighting patrols for the
night were planned and orders given out.
Meanwhile, tanks were withdrawn to a harbour west of Pagowal where one
company 4 Madras had already been moved for their protection. During the night, stray sniping and random
bursts of tracer ammunition were fired towards the defences from the copses and
villages that fringed the Railway line.
Several Pakistani jitter parties crept close to the defences and
attempted to draw fire of our forward posts but the men behaved like veterans
and held their fire.
At first light 14 September, our tanks broke night harbour and were once
again in position to meet any eventuality.
Our fighting patrols had returned from their night’s tasks and were
being debriefed. None of the patrols had
succeeded in making aggressive contact with suspected Pakistani tank night
harbours west of the railway line as planned and ordered. The performance of patrols had been unimpressive
but this had not disappointed the Brigade Commander. He advised the COs not to be over ambitious.
Patrolling is one of the most exacting of all infantry tasks. It would be unreal to expect outstanding
results on the first night. “Battle
inoculation is very much like losing one’s virginity. Green troops require to be introduced to
violence by a series of successful small-scale
actions.”
Reports from our eastern flank
indicated 43 Lorried Brigade was holding a firm base in the area Phillora, with
elements accompanying 1 Armoured Brigade in a close protection role. Wadianwala
was reported clear of hostile troops; its defenders had fallen back to
Chawinda. 1 Armoured Division dominated
the areas Alhar Railway Station, cross roads east of Chawinda and
Kangre. An armoured division dominates by maneuver; it does not have the
capacity to hold ground. Two infantry
brigades ex-14 Infantry Division had been
made available to 1 Armoured Division for the role of holding ground
overrun by it. These were deployed at
Cross Road and Kangre. Unfortunately, 1 Corps lacked further infantry
resources. The third infantry brigade of
14 Infantry Division was moving into the Corps area, but it would only be
available for operations after 15 September.
Patrols from 1 Armoured Brigade reported that Zafarwala, south of
Kangre, which had been reported deserted on 10 September, had since been
reoccupied by a Pakistani soldiers. No
attempt was made to clear that town
Reports from our western flank indicated that 26 Infantry Division ,
which was holding Bajragarhi, would attempt a night attack on Kalarawanda.
Reports from Punjab indicated that a major tank battle was taking place
west of Amritsar. None of us had any
doubt that the outcome of that battle would be decisive.
The Brigade Commander visited 3 Madras on the evening of 14 September and
was with them during the battalion “stand to”.
This is standard routine in a defensive position. All ranks take up their battle positions,
site their weapons, and famliarise themselves with their arcs of observations
and fire. This is done repeatedly twice
a day, at first light and last light.
Thus in an emergency, whether at night on in the day, everyone knows
exactly where to go and what to do.
Forward troops reported that a small boy, about ten years old, had
emerged from a copse ahead of the position and fearlessly walked towards the
defences. He was carrying a food
container and said that he had brought food for his grandmother; the old lady
who was in the battalion’s custody.
3 Madras was having quite a problem feeding the old lady. The boy was
taken to meet his grandmother. He opened the food container, which was filled
with a soft gooey rice preparation. He
explained that his grandmother had no teeth and needed soft food. The unit’s
overzealous cooks, little realising that the lady had no teeth, had gone out
their way to prepare a special Punjabi diet of parathas [flat fried wheat pancakes] and vegetables for her. She had been refusing the meal because she
could not masticate the parathas .
The boy was reassured that his grandmother was being looked after. She would shortly be handed over to the Red
Cross and sent to Pakistan. The boy was sent back across no-man’s-land. He was warned not to return as it was
dangerous and he could be shot by accident.
3 Madras, having learnt about the lady’s dental problem, thereafter
began preparing familiar south Indian rice delicacies, which she apparently
enjoyed eating. [She was visited by the unit’s medical officer every day and was
returned through the Red Cross after the cease-fire.]
Soon after last light, one company of infantry from 26 Infantry
Division attacked and captured
Kalarawanda. They were immediately
counter attacked by a mixed force of tanks and infantry and were thrown back
after fierce fighting. The situation was
retrieved by a battalion attack, which recaptured Kalarawanda by first light 15
September. Our guns and mortars provided
fire support during this phase of the action. Two Pakistani Sherman tanks were
knocked out in those battles. With
Kalarawanda in our hands, the northern flank was secure and 1 Corps could
devote its full attention to the west and south. The company of 4 Madras was
removed from the command of 69 Mountain Brigade and ordered to rejoin its
parent unit for operations elsewhere.
On 15 September, the third infantry brigade from in-coming 14 Infantry
Division was placed under command of 6 Mountain Division. The brigade was moved to occupy the area
Wadianwala and Alhar Railway Station, and was warned to be prepared for an
assault on Chawinda.
The movement of tanks each evening and morning into and out of their
night harbour is really meaningless whilst tanks are deployed in a defensive
role. This results in the cutting of
telephone lines laid along the ground, raises unnecessary dust and creates too
much noise at a time when silence is essential so that our forward patrols and
listening posts can pick up the sounds of Pakistani tanks moving into and out
of their night harbours. Tanks only need
to withdraw into a night harbour after a long day’s mobile action, when they
need infantry protection so that the tank crew can rest, and also require time
for re-fuelling and re-arming. In
defence, those requirements can seldom assume any degree of urgency. We therefore decided to modify our night
harbour traditions. Dug down positions
were prepared for the second tank squadron. The Brigade Commander ordered that
62 Cavalry would not move into night harbour each day, but would continue to
occupy their dug down positions after last light. Meanwhile, 69 Mountain
Brigade continued to improve its defensive positions. On the afternoon of 15 September, the
brigade defended area was engaged by intermittent artillery fire and two air
attacks which did no major damage.
Patrolling on each successive night after 15 September showed a marked
increase in aggressiveness. By 16
September, patrols lead by young officers were confidently crossing the railway
line and attacking transport moving on the main Sialkot-Pasrur Road. Several clashes took place between our
fighting patrols and enemy parties. Our soldiers came out on top in every action,
asserting our supremacy over no-man’s-land.
Fighting patrols from the brigade at Alhar Railway Station dominated the
area soouth of the railway line and west of Chawinda. The area
east of Chawinda was being dominated by 1 Armed Division.
Chawinda, situated on a mound dominated the roads leading to Badiana and
Pasrur was a tempting objective. Its
capture would unhinge Pakistani defences.
But Chawinda was not an easy target.
It was a well defended locality, which had been reinforced by troops
that had fallen back from Pagowal, Phillora and Wadianwala. Professionals know
that the firepower of modern weapons has given the defender an over-whelming
advantage over an attacker. World War I
had proved that disciplined and well-entrenched soldiers, with ample ammunition
and supplies, cannot be dislodged by attacking infantry. This factor brought stagnation to the
battlefield. This situation was broken
by the invention of the tank which restored mobility and offensive action and showed that there is no
reliable static defence against a well planned armoured offensive.
Because Chawinda “mound” was a tank obstacle, it could not be overrun by
tanks. The situation was very similar to
what faced 43 Lorried Brigade at Pagowal.
69 Mountain Brigade avoided a frontal attack on Pagowal and thereby
succeeded in forcing the defenders of Pagowal
to withdraw because they were being cut off. Chawinda’s western and eastern approaches
were already being cut off. An ideal tactical plan would be to impose two
further tactical blocks, one on the track Badiana-Chawainda, and another on the
track Chawinda-Pasrur. Once these were
in place, Pakistan’s military highher command would be faced with only two
options: either counter-attack and eliminate one of these “blocks” and thereby
keep a route of supply open to the defenders; or order the withdrawal of their
troops from Chawinda.
Unfortunately, 1 Corps did not have enough resources to hold on to what
it had already captured, and at the same time establish two strong “blocks” as
suggested, and to thereafter also maintain a strong reserve force to deal with
an anticipated counter attack by armour supported by air cover. GOC 1 Corps therefore decided to attack
Chawinda from the Alhar Railway Station.
He knew that the tactical odds favoured the defender. He planned to overcome this by heavy
artillery and tank fire support. He
hoped that the low morale of the Pakistanis, who had been retreating over the
past week, would favour the attacker. He
ordered that attack to be mounted on the night 16/17 September. The attack was launched as ordered and
pressed home with great courage. Indian
infantrymen were thrown back after suffering heavy losses. It would be unfair to attribute this failure
to lack of leadership or will. This was
a gamble that failed.
The gloom created by this set back was diminished by new received
from Punjab that attacking Pakistani forces
had suffered a severe defeat and lost the cream of their armour at Khem
Karan. By this time it was evident that
neither Pakistan nor India had the material resources to continue any
offensives in any sector. Patrol actions
became the sole activity on the battle field thereafter till a cease-fire was
brought into effect on the night 22/23 September. As if to leave no doubts in the Brigade
Commander’s mind that the fighting had indeed stopped, he was immediately
informed that though 62 Cavalry would continue to be located with 69 Mountain
Brigade to perform its allotted role, but it would now be under command 1
Armoured Division. Things were obviously
returning to normal.
69 Mountain Brigade’s total casualties from 13 September till the
cease-fire were 108 all ranks killed, wounded or missing. The breakdown of this total by rank and
category of casualty, was: killed, three officers, 2 junior commissioned
officers [JCO], 36 other ranks; wounded, 7 officers, 4 JCOs and 65 other ranks;
and missing 1 other rank.
Later, a team of military “experts” composed of serious-looking officers
from Army HQ, New Delhi visited the Brigade HQ.
During a post-battle discussion, the visitors expressed surprise that
the Commander had chosen to move a mixed group of infantry and tanks at night,
without night-driving devices. “Thank
heaven your tactical gamble paid off”. The Brigadier pointed out that he really
had no other choice. An infantry night
attack on Pagowal would have been suicidal; a day attack would have been
suicidal for both tanks and the infantry. The night move was
not a gamble but a good example of the KISS principle. His interrogators were
puzzled. “Kiss?”, they asked. They were
told that KISS meant “ Keep It Simple Stupid”
The Brigade Commander was next asked to explain why he had established
his HQ so far forward, in a dangerously exposed position. The Brigadier laughed and said, “I did not
have my third battalion. I wanted to
give the defence some depth and maintain some degree of symmetry. I also wished to regain visual
communications, if nothing else.” He was
then asked what he had learnt from these operations. He said that four factors had probably
contributed to the success of the brigade: good COs, competent non-commissioned officers [NCOs], disciplined
courageous jawans, and a fair amount of luck. [The Brigade Commander was being
modest. His subordinates claimed that the success of the brigade was largely
due to cool professional planning by the Brigade Commander and his unfailing
sense of humour.] His interrogators were
not happy with generalities and asked him to compile the customary list of
lessons learnt. The Brigade Commander felt
that it would be far wiser to write a factual account of what happened.
Sensible readers who read this would learn their own lessons depending on their
individual points of view.
FIVE
Soldiers
do not like to deal with an internal law and order situation for three
reasons. Firstly, it is his secondary
role and is always carried out at the expense of training and preparing for his
primary role. Secondly, a soldier dislikes having to shoot at misguided fellow
citizens. Lastly, soldiers resent being
involved in internal problems, which they believe could have been resolved by
timely action on the part of hesitant civil servants and police. The situation becomes acute when requests for
aid to civil governance is followed by orders for the armed forces to proceed
to Sri Lanka and Maldives to “further India’s vital interests” These oversea commitments, which are
undertaken without a debate in Parliament on what constitutes “vital national
interests”, not only imposes a strain on
the armed forces but also establishes dangerous precedents for the nation.
Chapter 5
Expanding
Military Roles, Internal Security & Morale
During the Indo-Pak War of 1971, Mrs Gandhi’s strategic perception and
control on the five fronts was superb.
She used persuasion, hindrance and coercion on all the five fronts
without opening hostilities. Military
force was only used as a last resort when Pakistan launched an air attack on
the western front. Men of the three
services rose to the occasion and displayed tactical initiative and skill of a
high order. The War was a triumph for
individuals who transcended an out-of-date institutional politico-military
decision-making system.
Initially, India had a modest aim of establishing an enclave in East
Pakistan where the Bangladesh flag of freedom could be raised. Then the aim was widened to embrace the
capture of several major towns. It soon
became clear that the peripheral towns were heavily defended and overcoming
Pakistani military strongholds would have been too costly. Then because opportunity arose in the eastern
regions to by pass major strongholds, the aim snowballed into a race for
Dhaka. The surrender of the capital
before any major military strongholds or city had fallen, resulted in the
creation of Bangladesh. The War culminated in the capture of 92,000 Pakistani
prisoners and a unilateral declaration of a cease fire by India after our
ground forces had made minor incursions into West Pakistan. Subsequently, a meeting between the two PMs
resulted in the Simla Accord. Once
again, policy decision involving vital security aspects were taken without
dequate military inputs.
There was widespread concern and anxiety in Pakistan over the prisoners
of war [POW] in India’s hands. There
were unanimous demands in the press and National Assembly for their early
repatriation. Some members of parliament
[MP] said, “Pakistanis are prepared to sacrifice their country for the sake of
the prisoners…it is better to have the POW returned than to have the land
back.” At the same time there were
carefully orchestrated false complaints about mistreatment of POW. In fact, India earned high praise from the
International Committee of the Red Cross for its adherence to the letter and
spirit of the Geneva Convention in the treatment of POW. Pakistan’s propaganda about their ill
treatment by India stood neutralised.
However, Pakistan’s PM Bhutto kept blowing hot and cold, and under-took
two hurricane tours of a number of countries where, in joint communiqués issued
from those capitals, calls were made for the speedy withdrawal of Indian troops
from West Pakistani territory and for the immediate release and repatriation of
POW. Mr Bhutto spoke with two
voices. In Pakistan he said, “ Your [POW’s] humiliation is our humiliation and we
will bend backwards to see to \it that no a moment is wasted for correct
results [release]”. Yet with India,
Bhutto would show no great concern for their early return. In these circumstances, there was nothing
immoral or illegal about using the POW issue as leverage to ensure a just and
durable peace. It appears that India
wanted to do this but lacked the resolution to carry this out. If we had no intention to use the POW as a
bargaining counter, where was the need to hold them in custody for so long,
earn the disapproval of the world community on their extended detention, and at
the same time bear such a high financial burden?
It was nobody’s case to demand war indemnity from Pakistan, or to hold
on to territory across the international border forever. However, the issue of repatriation of POW,
Bangladesh’s insistence on the trial of war criminals [about 1500 POW were
charged with genocide and serious violations of human rights], the climate of
public opinion in Pakistan for their early return, the elimination of the army
as a factor in the formulation of Pakistan’s policies, and the withdrawal of
Indian troops from Pakistani territory could all have served as levers to put
pressure on Pakistan to accept a no nonsense fair and just solution to the
Kashmir problem. Foreign observers,
basing their views on those close to Bhutto, have pointed out “that Bhutto was
willing to forsake the Indian-held two-thirds of Kashmir and agree that the
Cease Fire Line, to be negotiated, would gradually become the border between
the two countries.”
However, India seems to have been confused about its war aim. The Simla Accord was never linked to the
issue of POW and the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistani territory. This was a major blunder on the part of Mrs
Gandhi. When Mr D.P.Dhar went to Pakistan for a pre-summit dialogue with
Pakistani leaders, he was more concerned with the issue of recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan than the core issue of finding a lasting solution to the
Kashmir problem. While India held all
the cards at Simla, it was Bhutto who called all the shots. It was then being propagated that the
greatest merit of the Accord was that the two countries decided to renounce the
use of force against each other. But
that commitment was jettisoned when Bhutto talked of a 1000-year war, and later
when Pakistan breached the Accord by
launching cross-border terrorism in J&K.
Some career diplomats and commentators on foreign affairs have tried to
sell the line that after the 1971 war, India was faced with only two courses of
action: either the Simla Accord or something on the lines of the Treaty of
Versailles. They gave an erroneous
impression that between these two extremes there was a complete vacuum. In fact there were many other possibilities,
shades and gradations for a solution to some of the more vexatious problems
between the two countries. The
International Herald Tribune pointed out that “the Simla Conference apparently
could reach agreement on none of the substantive issues dividing the two sides”
It was obvious that Indian negotiators never seriously linked those issues with
the Simla Accord.
The plain truth is that India’s political leaders and bureaucrats failed
to assess Pakistan’s predicament correctly, did not have a clear national aim,
and were ignorant of the basic axioms shaping the role of the armed forces in
democratic governance. Our negotiators
lacked the realisation that diplomatic treaties, which are not backed by
military power are as worthless as a cheque issued on a dead account. They did not involve our military leaders in
security policy planning. After winning
a stunning victory, Indian leaders behaved as if the armed forces had done
something immoral or committed a sin.
The Simla Accord differed from the Tashkent Agreement on two
counts. Bi-lateralism was introduced;
the issue of a final settlement of the J&K problem at some future date was
brought in. The former was never
honoured by Pakistan, which at every opportunity tries to internationalise the
Kashmir issue. Anyway, of what use is
bi-lateralism when both parties have completely closed their minds on the
issue. The ink of the Simla Accord had
not even dried when Pakistani leaders began claiming that by mentioning in the
Accord that it would be settled at a future date, India had thereby recognised
Kashmir as “disputed territory”. Thus,
in 1971, India lost an opportunity to move towards a lasting solution in
J&K.
Throughout the period from 1947 onwards, rebels in the north-eastern
states had been keeping the army engaged in low intensity operations. [This
aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.]
It was clear that these rebels were being supported by arms and training
from East Pakistan and China. With the
creation of Bangladesh, Pakistani and Chinese interference in the north-east
diminished. But elsewhere in India there
was political and social unrest. Our
victory in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 could not conceal that we were faced with
serious internal law and order problems.
Between 1951 and 1970, the armed forces had been summoned to aid civil
governance on 476 occasions.
From 1972 onwards, there was a further increase of internal unrest and
violent dissent. Whilst carrying out
their primary task of defending the borders against external aggression, the
army began getting drawn into messy internal turmoil whenever the
administration and police threw up their hands and asked for military aid. Poor governance was allowing relatively minor
problems to deteriorate to the point where the army had to called out to bail
out state governments. By this time, the
number of armed police and para-military forces deployed on internal security
duties exceeded the army’s total infantry strength. Co-ordinating this mixture of forces and
different ministries, Home and Defence, and Centre and State governments, posed
managerial problems. The PM formed a
Policy Advisory Group for that task.
Unfortunately, this body’s role was not clearly defined nor was it
properly manned. This second attempt to
form some national security advisory body never really functioned.
Whilst making heavy demands on the army for assistance in internal
governance it was apparent that the government was still reluctant to reform
the system or even revive meetings of
the two top defence committees: the DCC and DMC. The only reason why this was not being done
was probably the politician’s distrust of the military. We have discussed in Chapter 2 how fears of a
military coup d’etat in the early years of our independence were perhaps
justified. However to persist in those
fears forty years after attaining freedom displayed an abject lack of political
self-confidence, which was preventing the healthy growth of military power
under responsible political control. It
is not being claimed that military officers had now become transformed into democratic
saints, but only to emphasise that Indian democracy had matured.
Over the years, India had developed and established numerous strong
separate centres of government, quasi-government and non-government democratic
power: state assemblies, many radio and TV stations, the press, trade-industrial-commercial
confederations and agencies, the judiciary, educational centres, labour unions,
municipal corporations, district, taluka and village panchayaats, police and
para-military forces; the list is endless.
Each of these institutions represent vested interests and are
independent centres of decision-making.
At the same time, we have held a number of free and fair elections to
parliament, state assemblies and local bodies.
The people have learnt to cherish their constitutional rights. Today, it would be difficult if not
impossible for any single military or political dictator to control each one of
these centres of power without the consent of the people. India is not unique in this respect; it is
the same in the USA, France, Britain or any other mature democracy.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi, in her desire to cling to power, overlooked
this political reality, and decided to use harsh methods to deal with dissent
and a detorating law and order situation. The PM declared an Emergency in 1975. This was a political coup, which resulted in
totalitarian rule. The military was never directly involved in the
Emergency. The armed forces, throughout
the Emergency, upheld their apolitical traditions. The COAS, General T.N.Raina and senior
officers located at various key commands, withstood any interference with, or
misuse of the army. When a few imprudent
orders trickled down on matters such as providing escorts for VIPs, compulsory
birth-control measures and attendance by troops at public functions to boost
the PM’s son’s political aspirations, the orders were scotched in no uncertain
manner. Mrs. Gandhi soon realised that
India could not be ruled for very long by dictates alone. When she suddenly released all political
detainees and called for a general election, the people showed that they cared
a great deal about freedom by throwing out the PM and her Party.
Pakistani strategists were watching the Indian scene closely. Three wars had made them realise that direct
military confrontation with India did
not pay. They decided to engage India
indirectly; they would arm and train dissident elements in Punjab and
J&K. They wold foster unrest and
terrorism elsewhere whenever possible.
This long-term plan was set into motion by their Inter Services Intelligence
[ISI].
After the Simla Accord, India pulled back from all incursions across the
international border. The Cease Fire
Line in J&K was renamed as the Line of
Control [LOC]. This was
physically demarcated on the ground by a joint Indo-Pak military team. The process commenced in the south and moved
northwards upto a point about 3000m above sea level. Beyond that point lay the Siachen glacier and
the permanent snow-line of the Karakoram range.
This could not be physically demarcated because of the formidable nature
of the terrain. So the agreement stated
that the LOC extended northwards beyond the last demarcated point to the
Tibetan border. The dispute about whether Siachen belongs to India or Pakistan
arises because of a difference of interpretation of that un-demarcated portion
of the LOC
Whilst the ISI plans were being hatched, to train and launch terrorists
across the LOC into J&K and across the international boundary into Punjab,
Pakistani mountaineers, apparently unconnected with any military plans, began
organising international expeditions into the Siachen glacier region, which
comprises about 2000 sq km of barren snow and ice. These peaceful unarmed
activities only came to our notice when reports of expeditions with photographs
were published in western mountaineering magazines. Indian mountaineers were indignant because
they had earlier applied for permission to take adventure expeditions to
Siachen, and had been banned form going there for security reasons. Local
Indian military commanders knew that the glacier has no strategic
significance. However, on their marked
maps, this is clearly shown as Indian territory. If Pakistani excursions were permitted to
continue unabated, this could eventually lead to the world’s acceptance that
this was Pakistani territory.
Local commanders ordered patrols to move into key passes to dissuade
Pakistani mountaineers from entering the area.
There appears to have been no Central government or Army Headquarters
directive for these local initiatives.
Pakistan army reacted hastily to our activities and attempted to throw
out our patrols; this resulted in a military disaster for them. In response to this, our troops were
reinforced and proper defences built at very high altitudes. Operations in
Siachen are a good example of how local conflicts can escalate into a major
national confrontation when no proper politico-military decision-making system
is functioning, and when no effective strategic controls and contacts are
established between India and Pakistan.
Today, an uneasy peace prevails in the area. Living conditions are harsh for the troops
deployed at there. Men suffer regular
casualties because of the climate. To maintain even a limited force in that
area is costing India a crore of rupees every day.
Meanwhile ISI plans of sponsored terrorism elsewhere in J&K and in
Punjab began unfolding. .Operation Blue
Star [1987], undertaken by the army to clear the Golden Temple of murderers and
terrorists, was a tragic internal security task arising from a failure of
timely governance. Pakistan also began inducting trained foreign mercenaries
into J&K with the task of carrying out systematic acts of terrorism
Operations in Sri Lanka, which were undertaken at that time were a
failure of political judgement and intelligence. Our armed forces ended up fighting the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] and suffered heavy casualties. They were able to get a difficult situation
under control, and facilitate a fair and free election in Sri Lanka. However they were then asked to withdraw at
the request of the Sri Lankan government.
This was followed by a successful joint operation conducted at short
notice by the three ser4vices against rebels who attempted to carry out a coup
d’etat in Maldives.
The conduct of military operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives indicated a
strategic shift in the traditional role of the armed forces. They were now being ordered to defend India’s
interests beyond our geographical borders.
This radical change of role was decided without even a debate in
parliament. The Policy Advisory Group
that had been formed by Mrs. Gandhi to advise her on strategic management had
been disbanded by Mr.Rajiv Gandhi. As
PM, he now relied upon the advice of
friends and cronies. It was individual
whims or the perceptions of bureaucrats, which apparently decided what were to
be India’s vital interests abroad. The
views of the military were not recorded.
The Defence Committee of the Cabinet never discussed these matters with
the Service chiefs in attendance.
Thus in 1987 our armed forces were dangerously over-extended and involved
in several widely separated operational areas: in Siachen, elsewhere in
J&K, Punjab, the north-eastern states, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Admittedly the government was purchasing expensive
modern aircraft, ships and arms, as requested by the services to meet these
threats. But it made no sense to do this
and not modernise the system, which had to manage and conduct those operations. Concrete proposals were made by the military
to reform the system In brief these proposed the integration of the military
and civil ministry into three separate service councils each headed by an
elected politician as already discussed in Chapter 2. These proposals were neither revolutionary
nor original. Such a system exists in
other democracies and has been functioning in Britain since 1920 onwards. These reforms will not cost money. On the contrary, it will save the exchequer
crores of rupees every year, reduce manpower, accommodation, paper work and
will enhance political control.
Reforms are not being adopted because of a mixture of reasons: misguided
fears of a military coup and a misunderstanding of the legitimate role of the
military in decision-making on security issues. Political instability at the Centre also
prevents any government from initiating such reforms. Bureaucrats presently occupy key positions in
the defence system, functioning as a “wall” between harassed politicians and
impatient military officers. Politicians
prefer this arrangement as it leaves them free to indulge in their first
preoccupation: to cling onto their seats in parliament. Keeping their respective constituencies happy
is their first priority. They have no
time to worry about reforming a military system, which is apparently working
fairly satisfactorily.
It is interesting to note that there has at last been general acceptance
by all national parties of the need to have some sort of body to facilitate
security management. This is because
successive cabinet ministers have personally had to face the practical problems
arising from the need to co-ordinate various security agencies from different
ministries in complex situations on five fronts. On the other hand, only the defence minister
deals personally with the military system, and then too indirectly. He prefers to leave things as they are;
reforms are not a vote catching event.
The military, which is the only direct sufferer of a flawed system, has
no political constituency. Thus the
reforms become no one’s specific concern.
A counter argument often made by those who oppose reforms is that the
armed forces are like any other public sector unit [PSU]. None of India’s many PSUs have a specific
political constituency. Why does the
military imagine that they are different?
Workers in a PSU are seldom worried whether their unit runs at a loss or
profit. They represent a vote bank and
have the backing of their union, the media and politicians in whose area the
PSU is located. All these agencies are
only too ready to air a worker’s grievance and organise a strike to gain
political advantage or increase their newspaper’s circulation. The armed forces are a disciplined body
which can only put up its proposals
through proper channels to the minister through the civil servant who is
experienced at confusing an issue with counter arguments and has a vested
interest in perpetuating the system. Subtle hints are made to play on a
politician’s fears of military dominance.
You will often find civil servants proclaiming that the system
exemplifies the democratic principle of the predominance of civilian rule over
the military, and how this must be maintained at all cost. These misleading statements confuse the issue
and obscure the constitutional truth that democratic civilian rule implies rule
by elected politicians and not rule by bureaucrats who are not responsible or
accountable to anyone.
Some bureaucrats blatantly say that the armed forces should accept “that
in India, civil control of the armed forces implies joint control by the civil
servant and the politician. It is only
the civil servant who understands the politician’s mind, in whom the political
boss confides and who has access to all other ministries and departments of the
Government at the Centre and in the States.”
This arrogant pronouncement has two implications: that politicians
cannot trust military officers and therefore will not confide in them; and the
military men are incapable of understanding or interacting with
politicians. Such false beliefs will
easily be dispelled when the bureaucratic “wall” between the politicians and
the military high command is broken down and an integrated council system
established. It is only the politician
who can break down the “wall”. But the
political system seems helpless and, as Nirad
Chaudhuri puts it, “flaps its wings against the bars of the cage in
which the bureaucracy has placed it.”
All political systems, whether democratic or totalitarian, are faced with
the problem of balancing political and military power, of building a strong and
confident military high command, and effective armed forces yet at the same
time keeping these forces under strict political control. This cannot be done by building bureaucratic
wills but only by good governance: establishing modern managerial institutions
and fostering trust and mutual confidence in the politico-military system.
The devious methods employed by bureaucrats to down the services at every
opportunity are particularly apparent in the succession of orders issued on the
Warrant of Precedence. The Committee of Secretaries, which decides the Warrant
of Precedence, recorded that “military officers have been placed unduly high in
the old Warrant of Precedence, presumably as it was considered essential for
officers of the army of occupation to be given special status and
authority.” So, after the Indo-Pak War
[1947-48] the service chiefs were made junior to the Supreme Court judges. They further dropped in status after the
1962 Sino-Indian Conflict and became
junior to the Cabinet Secretary. Their
decline continued unabated and they were made junior to the Attorney General
after the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Yet
again, after the 1971 Indo-Pak War, they were put next to the Comptroller and
Auditor General. General O.P.Malhotra,
as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in a note to the Defence Ministry
in 1981, expressed concern about this and highlighted the fact that the
lowering of status of Service officers seemed to coincide with the end of wars
fought in 1948,62,65 and 1971
What should concern every citizen is the timing and the motive behind
changes made in the status and emoluments of service officer. Are these changes a genuine attempt to erase
the colonial past? The outcome of
inter-departmental inferiority complexes and rivalries? Some bureaucrats, glued to their desks and
involved in dull, boring officer routine, envy the serviceman’s outdoor
activities, espirit-de-corps ;and quality of life. [The police also envy the services and try to
copy their drills, uniforms, insignia, ceremonials and organisations. This is an indirect form of flattery and is
very much like the watchmen at luxury flats and industrial estates who dress
like soldiers in the hope that they will thereby frighten away prospective
burglars.] Responsible politicians must
begin asking themselves: are these changes in the Warrant of Precedence
justified? Is the Committee of
Secretaries motivated by envy to keep the services down? Is a message being sent to the nation that
the armed forces are being cut down to size? What is the impact of this on the
military rank and file?
Today, traditional indifference to the armed forces and a conceptual
ignorance of the role of the armed forces results in a general lack of
whole-hearted social acceptance of the military. Some argue that in other democracies, even if
service salaries are low, the military officer enjoys many other
privileges. In western countries, the
USA and Japan, senior military officers are automatically accepted in the best
of clubs and enjoy social prestige. At
no time is his honour allowed to be lowered in the eyes of the nation. It is this kind of attitude and not money
that attracts the right kind of officer material. No doubt this is so. But we must remember that it is natural for
that to happen in those countries because so many of their citizens, civil
servants, politicians, and their fathers and their sons, have fought in wars as
conscripts or volunteers. Those nations
know the character qualities required to lead men in battle and the key role
that military power plays in democratic governance. They therefore understand the need to nuture
and develop an efficient military command.
However, it would be unreal to expect the same degree of public
acceptance from one and all under Indian social conditions. Happily, there has been a marked wave of
sympathy and enthusiasm for the armed forces after India fought its first TV
war in Kargil in 1999.
Military officers and jawans ask for no special privileges. But they can see that their seniors are
helpless in the face of the system. A
commanding officer’s qualities of integrity, courage, professional skill and
discipline are admirable leadership requirements for battle against an external
enemy. But these qualities are of little
consequence in dealing with simple domestic problems on their home front, in
the absence of the rule of law at the village level. Many soldiers find that
even the fulfillment of basic administration and justice is sometime denied to
his family while he is away from home.
In the old days, when an absent jawan had a problem effecting his home,
a letter to the District Commissioner or the police would elicit prompt
action. Today, it is rare to get even an
acknowledgement from the concerned authorities.
The jawan, if he has not lost his case by default, has to deal with the
problem when he comes home on leave. He
then often finds that his whole period of leave is spent running from one
office to another. He sometime has to
return to his unit with half his work incomplete.
Soldiers can see how absentee police personnel of the Border Security
Force or the para-military forces do not face the same problem because of their
police contacts. He knows that in the
absence of the rule of law, very often a local dada and his gang are the real
power in a locality; they dominate even the local administration and
police. The soldier has no
"constituency" to plead his case.
In those circumstances, he will invariably lose to a local rival who has
the support of the dada. The government is aware of this problem. Army commands have been instructed to hold
regular civil-military liaison conferences with chief secretaries and senior
police officers in the states in which they are located, to discuss service
grievances and mutual problems. This
helps in specific cases.
Socio-military problems should not blind us to the many good things,
which have evolved in India over the past 50 years. Today, recruitment to the armed forces is
open to any Indian and all-class units have raised in the army.
We have a strong well-led apolitical military force. India could not have survived and prospered
over these years were it not for hundreds of dedicated politicians and
bureaucrats, thousands of brave and disciplined military and police personnel;
and millions of honest hardworking jawans, farmers, clerks and workers who
faithfully carried out their allotted duties.
They maintained the fabric of the nation, enabling India to build up a
large number of democratic institutions and centres of responsible power. This is India'’s success story for which we
should justly be proud.
However, whilst congratulating ourselves about these achievements, we
cannot deny that our democratic system is being eaten away by corruption and
criminals. This results in poor
governance, which undermines internal security.
History tells us that we cannot have secure borders without internal
security. We cannot have internal security
without social stability. We cannot have social stability without economic justice
and the rule of law. All these taken
together constitute good governance.
Stability does not mean tranquility.
In a free and lively democracy, the rule of law will prevail, but there
will always be the din and noise of dissent, a conflict of opinion and debate.
There will be a struggle for leadership as new areas of empowerment are opened
up. Good governance ensures that all
this takes place and yet is not allowed to get out of hand. Let us not confuse legitimate dissent with
violence and terrorism, the burning of public property and the coercion and
killing of innocent citizens. Let us not
confuse a desire for the creation of new states with demands for secession and
insurgency.
India faces many old and complex problems. History will forgive our leaders if they take
time to solve these problems. But they
will not be forgiven if they do not recognize that a rotten political and
administrative system is a greater threat to the security of India than Pakistani
or Chinese soldiers. A crooked minister,
judge, civil servant or military officer is more anti-national than a Dawood or
Mir Jjaffar. Let us face it. There has been a slow erosion of the sanctity
of constitutional provisions through bureaucratic, political and legal
collusion. Political instability gives
rise to manipulative politics into which the Constitution, the President and
the Supreme Court are willy nilly dragged.
There has been a rise of extra-constitutional practices. We should not underestimate the extent of the
criminal network, which grows on sex, the sale of drugs, smuggling, extortion
and a vast black-money economy. The
mafia sponsors political aspirants who, if given a ticket and elected, enjoy
sanctuary and immunity within honourable legislatures.
In August 1997, the Election Commission released statistics which listed
over 40 members of parliament and 700 members of legislative assemblies who
face criminal charges including murder, dacoity, rape, theft or extortion. Add to this as many as 166 requests by the
Central Bureau of Investigation for official concurrence to either start a
probe or sanction prosecution of public servants, which are pending with
ministries and departments of the Central Government for years. This data is the tip of the corruption
iceberg and does not include the list of those who are involved in scams and
other white collar offences, and who may not figure in police criminal
records. These statistics give a picture
of the nexus of criminality and politics and may explain why India is classified
as the eighth most corrupt nation in the world.
These statistics make faint-hearted Indians ask, what sort of democracy
are we creating? They look at the state
of Bihar and bemoan its violence, corruption and lethargy. All criticism is directed at Bihar’s
shortcomings; complaints of something missing or something pathological, which
explains Bihar’s backwardness and India’s inability to run a parliamentary
democracy.
Some pessimistic observers claim that Bihar, because it is backward and
populist, displays the declining pattern of India’s future democracy. This statement may make some readers sit up
and add to their sense of tragedy. They
fail to see that the din and noise of Bihar is the din and noise of democratic
empowerment of people who have never before tasted political power. Mr. Z.A.Bhutto, the ex-Prime Minister of
Pakistan, recognised this. In his
autobiography If I am Assassinated,
composed whilst reflecting in jail on the eve of his execution by the Military
Government that had over-thrown him, he wrote, “India is more heterogeneous
than Pakistan but India has been kept in one piece by the nose and chaos of her
democracy.”
Perhaps the best way to understand this whole business of empowerment
accompanied by chaos, one should examine the Rabelesian figure of Bihar’s
charismatic leader, Laloo Prasad Yadav, and his re-invention of democracy. Laloo’s concept of democracy is very
different from that of, say, the Andhra Pradesh leader Chandrababu Naidu’s cyberspace.
Laloo’s democracy does not require vision. It does not insist on betterment of
human condition. It does not need law
and order. It does not distinguish
between the law-abiding and the criminal.
It does not ask for transformation and progress. All that Laloo’s democracy implies is that a
large fraction of the electorate has a right to choose for themselves. To do what?
Only to wield power. [And surely that is what the political elite of
India, in every other state is attempting to do, but are reluctant to admit
that they cannot do it as well as Laloo does.] Laloo has created populism as a
political spectacle. It has nothing to
do with governance or development. Many are afraid that Laloo’s over-populism
and froth will catch on in other states.
Too many Laloos coould shatter the dreams of Indian democracy. Many pray and hope that Laloo is a unique
phenomenon.
Let us face it, Laloo’s view is realistic and inventive. It tells us what democracy is about in its
crudest, most populist form. Laloo has transformed Indian politics with his
dramatic display of dignity and self-confidence. Here is a new entrant who, having been
empowered, enjoys the celebration of politics as politics. Laloo enthralls his
listeners when he exclaims, “What is this IT – YT? Can it give every village drinking
water?” Laloo does not believe in
setting an example and practicing birth control; he has nine children. [His wife and female members of the family
have been named after sell-known Indian sweetmeats- rabri, jalebi and so on.]
When Laloo scorns sociological tracts and World Bank reports, he does
not mince his words or lose his sense of humour. He makes those worthy documents seem
irrelevant and boring. When Laloo was
faced with alleged corruption charges, he had to step down as Chief
Minister. Unfazed by that he termed was
a “conspiracy” to oust him, he promptly appointed his wife Rabri Devi as Chief
Minister, and ensured that she was duly elected to a vacant assembly seat.
Of course Laloo’s form of populism
cannot survive for long; it has to give way
to planned rational governance and the realities of central rule and
economics. Laloo knows the value of a
good education. [Soon after becoming the Chief Minister of Bihar, he had one of
his daughters admitted to an expensive English-medium boarding school in
Rajasthan.] There are indications that
his party, having gained a popular mandate, is now attempting to disprove its
critics and produce results in such basic matters as education, uplifting the
lot of the down-trodden, curbing corruption and promoting economic
development. It will be a boost for
Indian democracy and Bihar if he succeeds. But if he fails, let us hope that
Laloo has set a pattern for empowerment of underdogs in other states. Indian politics is overpopulated with a
secession of sanctimonious fuddy-duddies.
The system needs newcomers with Laloo’s kind of self-confidence, fizz
and humour, and hopefully they will be good managers.
SIX
Open
any newspaper in India and you will read some account or article about a
terrorist or an insurgent attack. A
great deal has been written on the subject.
Most of this requires no repetition.
However, some myths; and misconception about terrorism and insurgency
still prevail in the minds of the layman.
These matters need to be clarified.
Chapter 6
Terrorism
and Insurgency
It is often
said that there is no difference between terrorism and insurgency, “one man’s
terrorist is another’s freedom –fighter: it all depends on the viewpoint.” Admittedly, violence is a common factor to
both terrorism and insurgency, but the difference between these two terms is
more than a question of semantics. It is
evident that all violence will rouse terror and fear; yet all violent acts
cannot be defined as terrorism. All
extremists and insurgents do not adopt the weapon of terrorism to achieve their
ends. We should also draw a distinction
between acts of cruelty, violent crimes, dacoities and communal riots on the
one hand, and acts of terrorism on the other.
Although terrorists may argue that
they are revolutionaries seeking to overthrow an unrepresentative government,
terrorism has always been distinguished from other forms of political violence
associated with the conduct of a legitimate campaign against a repressive
regime, usually of a despotic military or fascist type. The resort of violence against innocent
unarmed citizens by terrorist groups for achieving political ends in a
democracy where free and fair elections prevail, is an illegitimate and
unjustifiable use of violence. We must
guard against confusing the crucial difference between these two kinds of
violence. One kind is that of patriots
at war. Another kind is that of
murderers. The terrorist attacks
innocent unarmed citizens and avoids the ballot box; the insurgent attacks a
tyrant’s security forces and administrative apparatus because he cannot avail
of free elections.
Terrorism is manipulative. It seeks to turn India’s strength against
itself. For example it can exploit
India’s cultural diversity and legal infrastructure against India’s own
interests. This type of exploitation is
particularly successful in cultures with a strong tradition of personal freedom
and limitations of executive power.
India already endures a high degree of disorder as the price of
democracy and is less able than others to respond uncompromisingly to
terrorist’s threats. By contrast
terrorism is relatively ineffective in totalitarian societies, because it is
easily denied an environment for existence as a matter of state
prerogative. To be successful in a
totalitarian state, terrorists must form part of a full-scale revolution. On the other hand, there is hardly a major
democratic country that has entirely escaped terrorism.
Terrorism is an attempt to
destablise democratic societies and to show that their governments are
impotent. Terrorist groups in India
realise that public support for democratic values and institutions is a major
obstacle to their schemes. Hence, the
democratic process becomes a key target of the terrorist. Terrorism is not an
ideology but a tactical weapon, which can be by people of different political
convictions Terrorism is not an ideology but a tactical weapon, which can be by
people of different political convictions. Terrorism is the use of cruelty and
fraud for political ends, and conspiracy is necessary for this to happen. The
thing that is clear about terrorism is that it is always just to condemn it,
even if we lack an understanding of its nature. Liberal democracies view
terrorism as a criminal rather than a political offence. Terrorism is therefore
treated as a law and order problem to be tackled by the police.
Today, an agreed international
definition of terrorism does not exist, and the concept has been given
different meanings by various authors.
The UN Committee on International Terrorism proclaims that, “murder,
sabotage and subversion, the destruction of public records, the spreading of
rumours, the closing of churches, the sequestration of property, the breakdown
of criminal law enforcement, the prostitution of courts, the narcosis of the
press- all these contribute to a common end and constitute terror.” However, from India’s point of view,
terrorism may be defined as an act or the threat of an act, aimed to create
extreme anxiety and fear-inducing effects in a target group, larger than the
immediate innocent victims. The purpose of such terrorism is to coerce that
group into acceding to the religious, political or administrative demands of
the perpetrators.
The first task for the government
whilst responding to terrorism is on the Psychological Front; in the realm of
discipline, law and order, values and tradition, so that the semantic battle is
won. The public must be made to realise that terrorist, whether they call
themselves freedom fighters or guerrillas, intend to intimidate and kill
innocent citizens and then rule by fear and violence. Intellectuals, journalists, judges and
politicians who romanticise terrorists must be made to individually face the
infliction of suffering which their statements sometimes encourage. Few will be prepared to undergo the
experience, but it should at least be made clear to them what it is.
The historical roots of violence may
help us to recognise the difference between terrorism and other forms of
violent protest. When one group
challenges another, this may be done non-violently or violently. If the latter course is adopted then a fight
ensues. Whether it is a riot or a war, the participants will use any weapon
available to them: sticks, stones, spears and guns. Early man soon learnt that the voice and
physical appearance of a combatant could be used to bring psychological
pressures on an opponent, create fear in others and build up discipline and
morale among one’s own kind. This is the
reason for the adoption of battle cries; this is one of the reasons for the
Tenth Guru making it obligatory in 1699 for his followers to wear their hair
and beard unshorn.
Apart from non-violent measures
designed to instill fear in an opponent’s mind, combatants also adopt violent
measures calculated to terrorise an opponent.
Historically, the Assyrians were the first recorded practitioners of the
tactics of calculated terror. They would
skin prisoners alive and impale them on stakes.
To begin with, these tactics were effective. West Asia trembled with the knowledge of what
the Assyrians did to those who resisted them.
The mere blast of their trumpets was sufficient to open the city
gates. Other armies quickly followed
Assyria’s example and were soon developing refined methods of dealing with
their defeated opponents; children were thrown off towers or roasted alive over
a slow fire.
Early Turks and Mongols were no less
sadistic than the Assyrians. But whilst
terrorism can be used as a weapon in war, it can never substitute for the other
weapons of war. Thus, it is not
surprising that the tactics of calculated terror began to rebound to one’s
disadvantage when pitted against disciplined and well led soldiers who refused
to be intimidated and adopted better tactics to beat his terrorist opponent on
the battlefield. It was probably partly
because of their reputation for mercy to the conquered that Alexander and
Caesar undermined the morale of their opponents and conquered the Mediterranean
world so easily.
During the Middle Ages, Machiavelli
kept alive the doctrine of political terrorism in his teachings, which
proclaimed the use of cruelty, fraud and conspiracy for political ends. The planned use of terrorism a weapon in war
seems to have died out till after the Second World War. Its reappearance thereafter is evident from
the practice of modern terrorists who preach the transformation of the
Machiavellian vices of cruelty, fraud and conspiracy into political virtues
After World
War II, even though old colonial masters no longer occupy lands, the borders
they drew and institutions they established still inspire conflicts within and
between newly liberated colonies. But the cost of waging even a short limited
war with tanks, aircraft and ships has risen astronomically. Lesser powers
began to realise that it was no longer cost effective to wage even a small war.
Thus the emphasis shifted to guerrilla tactics. Guerrilla war is as old as the
history of man. It goes by several
names: low intensity war, people’s war, revolutionary war, insurgency or wars
of national liberation. Such conflicts
are asymmetrical that is one side employs guerrilla tactics and small arms out
of necessity while the other employs a fuller range of modern weapons.
Factors, which
favour a guerrilla movement are geographic contiguity with a foreign country
that affords sanctuary to insurgents, a sources of money and arms, a cause,
support of at least five percent of the locals, areas within the victim state
which could provide a secure base, and young men ready to take up arms and
fight. During the Cold War, the bipolar
ideological and anti-colonial aspects of the international scene encouraged the
intervention of third parties in ostensibly intrastate conflicts: so the US
fought in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan.
A Guerrilla War is the small man’s
attempt to negate the scientists and the technocrat. The war in Vietnam should clearly have meant
that the better-supported and armed South ought to win in a straight fight with
the North. But the North avoided a show
down. The same situation prevailed in
Afghanistan where a Soviet supported regime could not subdue a rag-tag and
disunited guerrilla force for eight years.
Though some insurgencies have been known to adopt terrorist tactics,
successful insurgencies avoid the weapon of terrorism. Historically, there are
many examples of insurgency movements, which have defeated the forces opposing
them, but it is difficult to find a case in which terrorism has had any lasting
effect.
Insurgency, being a form of warfare,
is best tackled by the armed forces and not by the police. The first rule of
insurgency is to avoid indiscriminate terror tactics and adopt tactics, which
ensures that the enemy is initially half-drowned in a sea of public hostility,
and only then tackle the opponent’s military force. In essence, a Guerrilla War is a struggle to
win the hearts and minds of the people and gain the allegiance of those who
inhabit the battlefield.
When governments begin to realise
that they are losing the allegiance of their people they attempt to induce this
by military success and propaganda, or hope to compel obedience by a campaign
of calculated terror. Pakistan’s crack
down on Sheikh Majibur Rehman and his supporters on 23 March 1971 was a
deliberate attempt to terrorise the public by dealing ruthlessly with selected
victims. The Pakistani army killed over
50000 unarmed citizens in the hope that the remainder would be cowed down by
terror. This failed and Bengali freedom
fighters struck back. In the Peoples War, which ensued, guerrillas had the
total allegiance of their people who did not need any propaganda or inducements
to hate their opponents. Here again was
an example of the tactics of terror rebounding to the disadvantage of the
executant.
Current
discussions of guerrilla war use the terms “quantitative” and “qualitative”
violence. The former is essentially
indiscriminate and can be measured in quantitative terms, for example: the
number of rounds fired, tons of bombs dropped and body count. In contrast, qualitative violence
discriminates; it only targets particular victims so as to minimize collateral
damage while maximising political impact. A guerrilla war is primarily a
theatre of qualitative violence. The
contestants struggle to win power within a community and they therefore need to
be selective about their use of force.
Every casualty inflicted can increase hatred against the perpetrator,
since kinsmen and friends of the victims turn against him. This factor, along
with the end of the Cold War, has restricted third party intervention in
intra-state conflicts for two reasons.
Lack of restraint by a third party force can undermine the very
legitimacy of the side it wishes to aid.
Secondly, indiscriminate violence by a third party can erode support for
the intervention back home. Thus, apart from the question of high costs, today
great powers are no longer keen to intervene in intrastate wars. The international system seeks concert of
joint action rather than promoting unilateral belligerence. International pressures attempt to moderate
conflicts. Military forces of many
nations take part in peacekeeping and peace-making operations under the auspices
of the UN.
Having noted
the difference between terrorism and insurgency in general terms, we can now
examine how these two phenomena have evolved in India. Revolutionary terrorism emerged as a highly
romantic and admired strand of the Freedom Movement in India at the turn of the
20th Century. This threw up
its own legends and heroes. To begin
with, terrorist organisations were centred in and around Bengal. The Ghadar [rebellion] Party [1912-1925] was
the Punjabi complement to Bengali terrorists.
However, Indian revolutionaries were unable to outwit British
intelligence agencies and were overwhelmed within a decade after World War
I. Thereafter the Freedom Movement
confined its struggle to non-violent action.
Independence brought in its wake the adoption of an insurrectionary line
by the Communist Party of India [CPI] at its congress in Calcutta in 1948. This resulted in the intensification of
violent peasant movements using terror tactics in Andhra Pradesh and West
Bengal. These were crushed before the
CPI sponsored movements were finally withdrawn in 1951.
1967 saw an uprising
of peasants in the small north Bengal village of Naxalbari in north
Bengal. This left-extremist movement
came to be called the Naxalite Movement.
It was Marxist inspired and its non-allegiance to the Indian
Constitution freed it from the inhibitions, which prevent the CPI, whose
offshoot it is, from adopting violent means to achieve its end. The Naxalite Movement spread to the tribal
areas and cities elsewhere, but degenerated into a senseless vendetta based on
terrorism and urban violence, and collapsed after a heavy loss of young
lives. Some Naxalite leaders returned to
their parent states, where they laid low.
But elsewhere the movement continued though the tactics have
changed. It activities show a tendency
of being more open, legal and mass-based, and thus present a challenge to local
politicians rather than a law and order problem for the police.
Violent
insurrection broke out in Nagaland in the early 50s. To understand why that happened requires a
brief analysis of the geography and history of the region. Northeastern India consists of the states of
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya,
sometimes referred to as the Seven Sisters.
The region constitutes 12 per cent of India’s land mass bearing 80 per
cent of its tea, a high percentage of its forests, on-shore hydrocarbons,
uranium and hydroelectric power potential. Yet the rest of India has neglected
the region economically, historically and psychologically. The external and internal threats to the
region take many forms, which are the direct consequence of geographical,
social, demographic, psychological and economic factors.
If we examine
a map of the area, we will see that the Seven Sisters are linked to India by a
narrow 70-km stretch between Bhutan and Bangladesh. At the western end of this link, which is
flanked by Nepal and Bangladesh, lies West Bengal. Through this bottleneck which is also
referred to as the Siliguri Corridor, runs the rail and road communications
that serve the region. In striking
contrast to this constrained geographic link, the Seven Sisters share an
uninterrupted international border of over 3700-km with Bhutan, China, Burma
and Bangladesh. Assam occupies a key
position in the region; it is the fulcrum of the northeast, the only state that
is physically linked to every one of the other six states, and the rest of
India. These geographical factors exert
an influence over all the other factors.
The region is
populated by a number of ethnic groups, which spill over the border into
Bhutan, China, Burma and Bangladesh.
This is a common phenomenon in the border regions of parts of China,
Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Tibet, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran,
where hill people of a specific ethnic group inhabit both sides of an
international border. During the
colonial period, set boundaries were imposed on these relatively remote regions
which till recently continued to enjoy the benefits of free cross-border
movement and a loose dual citizenship.
Northeastern
India is under-populated when compared to some of the areas that adjoin
it. For example, Assam and Arunachal
Pradesh have a population of 20 million to 153,000 sq. km against Bangladesh
with more that 100 million people to 144,020 sq. km. Demographic distribution when combined with
attractive economic prospects that the region offers, results in six distinct
categories of infiltration taking place into north-eastern India. First are
those of comparable ethnic types who migrate to join a relative’s family. Next
is the large Indian work force, mostly from eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar,
which was inducted as labour to the tea gardens in the 19th
Century. Their descendants constitute a
sizeable number in Assam. Their
constitutional right to be there cannot be disputed.
Third are the
citizens from elsewhere in India who continue to come as traders, labourers or
entrepreneurs. Their movement into some
of the frontier regions is restricted by regulations. But elsewhere, such movement is
unhindered. Theoretically, free movement
is a constitutional right, which cannot be banned. Nevertheless, some locals resent the presence
of “outsiders”. Like others elsewhere in India, they have become vociferous
supporters of an economic “sons-of-the-soil” policy, which faces the Centre and
the state with a familiar dilemma. To
begin with the people blame the government for their backwardness due to a lack
of development plans. Attempts to ally
those resentments by initiating plans inevitably entail the influx of Indians
from elsewhere. This fuels accusations
that non-residents should quit the area.
Thus a viscous circle begins and leads to resentments and violence. This adversely effects long term planning and
the stability of the region.
A fourth category of migrant is the
Hindu and Buddhist refugee from Bangladesh.
The 1947 Partition arrangement did not lay down any time limit for the
exchange of population. There can be no cut-off date for non-Muslim migration
from West Pakistan or erstwhile East Pakistan.
In 1947 the migration of a fair number of Hindus from East Pakistan into
West Bengal, Assam and Tripura did take place, and was not resented. But a slow trickle of migrants has been
continuing thereafter for political, economic, religious, linguistic and ethnic
reasons, and this provokes resentment.
The fifth
category of migrant is the Muslim of Bangladesh who has never had the
constitutional right to migrate to India as an outcome of Partition. These migrants come purely for economic
reasons. Relatives and friends living in
the region facilitate their movement.
This infiltration causes resentment, which may have nothing to do with
communalism but is certainly economic in nature and is backed by constitutional
law.
Lastly there
are the Nepalese who originally formed the major element in the Assam Rifles
which policed the region. After
retirement the men usually settled down wherever convenient, and sometimes
under regimental arrangements. The
locals did not resent this. But over the
years, there has been a steady influx of migrants from over-populated and
economically backward regions of Nepal, either to join their compatriots who
are already well established in a region, or independently as cheap labour.
The three
border regions of Nagaland, Manipur ande Mizoram have many similarities. All three have wooded hills with an average
of altitude of about 350 m above sea level.
All have numerous rivers flowing through them, yet a shortage of food is
endemic in the area. All are bordered by
Burma. Bangladesh also border
Mizoram. The people are Mongoloid and of
tribal origin but are not related to one another nor speak a common
language. All three have common ethnic
and linguistic groups living across the border in Burma and Bangladesh. Most of the area adjoining India in those two
countries is thickly wooded and undeveloped.
Burmese and Bangladeshi civil servants and police patrols find it
difficult to visit the area, which for all purposes therefore remains
unadministered. These become a natural
haven for smugglers and guerrilla gangs.
The terrain hampers the movement of security forces and this adds to the
other factors, which make these states ideal for guerrilla warfare.
The tribes
inhabiting these states have been influenced by Christian missions since
1872. Yet it would be wrong to blame
foreign missionaries for de-nationalising the tribals, because in the first
place, they had never been nationalised either by Aryan Hindus, Muslim Moghuls
or the Christian British. Ethnically and
linguistically, the various tribes of the northeast are different not only from
the Assamese but also from each other. The Baptist Mission, far from being a
cause for unrest, has proved to be a major factor in fostering peace in the
region
In 1857, the
British established an administrative centre at Kohima. This led to several uprisings. The British formed the Naga Club to help the
Deputy Commissioner [DC] understand the problems of the Nagas. This later became the Naga Tribal Council,
which in 1946 changed its name to the Naga National Council [NNC]. At that time portions of the Naga Hill
District were being administered as part of the North East Frontier Agency
[NEFA] which was later renamed Arunchal Pradesh, and portions were under Assam. In early 1947, the NNC issued an ultimatum
that the Naga Hills should cease to be a part of India after August 1947.
After India
achieved independence, Assam was a large sprawling state with peripheral
districts, which included Meghalaya, Mizoram and portions of Nagaland. The governor of Assam, who was also the
Governor of Manipur and Tripura, worked out a nine-point Agreement with Naga
leaders. This recognised the right of
Nagas to develop according to their own wishes. In 1950, the Nagas boycotted
the elections to district councils. In
1951, Mr. Z.A. Phizo organised a plebiscite in which almost all adult males
voted for independence. The Nagas also
boycotted the 1952 general elections. In
1953 Phizo organised a rebel government and several armed groups openly
revolted. This revolt was quelled and
the rebels fled to Burma. On 22 March
1956, Phizo proclaimed a Naga Federal Government [NFG] and unilateral
independence. This was followed by an armed revolt, which was brought under
control by the army. Phizo moved to East Pakistan and from there to
London. The next year, after
negotiations with a Peoples Convention at Kohima, the Naga districts of Assam
and NEFA were amalgamated and placed under central administration. A Naga
Baptist Convention formed a peace movement and a Reforming Committee.
Naga rebel
traffic to East Pakistan commenced in March 1962. Some 2000 Nagas were trained there and
returned with arms. Nagaland was granted statehood on 1 December 1963. But extremists continued their movement for
independence and hostilities by armed groups persisted. In 1964, the Naga Baptist Convention revived
its peace mission and an agreement to suspend operations was arranged between
the underground and the Government. A
series of peace talks took place over the next ten years whilst minor violations
by extremists continued.
Rebel
traffic to China commenced in November 1966.
About 300 Nagas infiltrated to China through northern Burma where
Burmese rebels were themselves revolting against the Rangoon government.
Collusion with Pakistan and China was only stopped after the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971. In 1973, about 1600
armed rebels surrendered. Most of these
men were absorbed in the Border Security Force [BSF] and Naga Armed
Police. But an equal number continued to
operate along Nagaland’s eastern border from bases located in Burma. Whilst
peace talks with Naga rebels through the Baptist Convention continued, military
pressure was maintained against those who broke the agreed cease fire
agreement. In 1974 about 1500 rebels
surrendered with arms. It may be noted that throughout this period of unrest,
Naga rebels never resorted to acts of terrorism
In
1975 rebel leaders opened a dialogue with the Government and signed a peace
agreement, which has been termed as the Shillong Accord. After this all
military operations were suspended and rebels were given complete freedom of
movement. Since then, there have been no
major hostile activities within Nagaland.
However, rebel groups continue to live in camps across the border with
Burmese Nagas. Locals in Nagaland are
not supporting these insurgents. Their
activities are therefore confined to trans-border raids. Nagas now participate in state and general
elections; the aspirations of the people have been politicised and are now
expressed by legitimate democratic activities.
Whilst
all this was happening, security forces also found themselves involved in
insurgency operations in Mizoram. Again,
we must turn to history to understand why this happened. The area was annexed by the British in 1891
and named the Lushai Hill District, which was administered by a chief
commissioner. After Independence the
area was renamed the Mizo Hill District and placed under the jurisdiction of
Assam. The population is mainly
Christian with a small number of Buddhists and animists that live in the
southern and western fringes of the district.
The region remained isolated from the main stream of Indian life and was
neglected during the British period except for education. Thus, the people had a high percentage of
literacy and political awareness but remained economically backward.
The
local political party prior to 15 August 1947 was the Mizo Union, which stood
for a separate Mizo state within the Indian Union. The protracted nature of the armed revolt of
the Nagas cast its shadow on the Mizos.
In 1960, the Mizo National Front [MNF] was formed. This stood for complete independence and was
dominated by extremists. As there were
few economic opportunities and the people were frustrated, the MNF gained
popularity. Mr. Laldenga, President of
the MNF, contacted the authorities in East Pakistan and was given money and
arms. On 28 February 1966, the MNF broke
into open revolt. The situation was
handed over to the army, which quickly restored order. The MNF continued to
wage a guerrilla war and for the next two years kept ambushing military
transport columns but scrupulously avoided attacking unarmed detachments of the
Border Road Organisation [BRO], which
was developing the state’s infrastructure.
The Army kept constant pressure on the rebels and by 1968 was able to
break the movement. Its leaders escaped
to East Pakistan, which provided rebel gangs with sanctuaries.
In 1972, the district was given the status of a Union
Territory and renamed Mizoram.
Consequent to the creation of Bangladesh, the MNF were denied safe
sanctuaries. Some moved into Burma from where at least two groups of about 75
each went to China in 1973 and 1975.
There they were trained and armed.
They returned to find that their people had been politicised and no
longer supported a violent uprising. The
state elections in 1978 threw up a regional party, which further split the
MNF. In desperation, extremists in 1980
let loose a reign of terror, killing innocent non-Mizo civilians and attacking
unarmed BRO engineers. These acts of
terrorism were widely denounced by Mizo pastors and by the vast majority of the
Mizo people. Terrorism tactics were soon
discontinued. No major hostile incidents have occurred since then.
Manipur,
sandwiched between Nagaland and Mizoram, consists of three main ethnic
groups. The population consists of
various tribes, which may be grouped into three ethnic categories. In the northern hills are Nagas who are
Christians allied to their brethren in Nagaland. The southern hills are inhabited by Kukis and
other Christian tribes allied to the Mizos.
In between these two hill tracts is Imphal valley whose population,
though Mongoloid, has over the years absorbed the influence of early Brahmin
missionaries who Hinduised the valley.
These people are mainly Hindus and are known as Meitei.
For centuries,
the Meiteis have been the dominant political and economic power in
Manipur. They controlled the
agricultural based economy of the region.
A Meitei raja had always ruled the State of Manipur. With advent of Christianity and after a Kuki
tribal uprising in 1917, though the Raja continued to rule as a figurehead, the
area was divided into three sub-divisions to correspond to the ethnic
sub-division; each was headed by an officer from the government of Assam. In 1947, the political authority exercised by
Assam was abolished and the Raja ruled through a durbar [council]. In 1949,
Manipur was declared as a Union Territory.
Over the next
two decades, the Meiteis watched the activities of their northern and southern
neighbours with growing concern. Some Meiteis began to argue that they were
being ignored both by Delhi and the other hill people because they were Hindus
and peace-loving citizens; the best way to overcome these handicaps would be to
reject Hinduism, revert to their tribal past and resort to violence. An organisation was founded with the object
of reviving the Meitei animist religion and exploiting anti-outsider feelings
by propagating that it is the plainsmen from India who are the root cause for
the continuing social and economic ills of Manipur. By 1968, other dissident groups had joined
the movement, which named itself the Revolutionary Government of Manipur [RGM]. However the situation remained fairly
peaceful.
Manipur became
a full-fledged state in 1972. To begin
with the Meiteis dominated the state assembly.
But over time the hill tribes began to assert their influence and this
brought instability to Manipur politics. In 1979 the RGM sent a group to
contact the Chinese. Unlike Naga and
Mizo rebels, this group avoided the tedious footpaths through northern Burma
and traveled by train and bus to Nepal and then crossed over into Tibet. They were well received in China but were
given no weapons. Instead they were
trained on how to ambush police patrols and steal their weapons. They returned to Manipur and promptly began
to put into practice what they had been taught.
Within a short time they had purloined over 50 weapons and their leader
had acquired a romantic reputation with young Meiteis. In October 1980, because
of a deteriorating law and order situation, Manipur was declared a disturbed
area and handed over to the army.
Counter-insurgency operations were conducted with skill and yielded
quick results. The leader of the RGM was
captured and rebel gangs fled to Burma where they joined rebel Nagas who were
camping in Burma.
By now it was
evident that Naga and other rebels located in Burma are facing serious
problems. Ironically, Burmese tribes living along India’s eastern border yearn
to be part of India. They reside in
areas, which have been neglected by Rangoon for centuries. They can see the political and economic
development taking place in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram; they wish to be
reunited with their brethren. This
demand was voiced even before 1947. Burmese have begun to resent the presence
of rebel Nagas in their area; they have to provide them with recruits, free
labour and bear the brunt of “taxes” collected by the rebels. Moreover, these bases have to continually
guard against the stray Burmese military patrol, which may suddenly descend on
them, forcing the rebels to flee and exposing the locals to the danger of
reprisals. Today, the number of armed insurgents operating along India’s eastern
border from bases in Burma and Bangladesh are not large. None of them can survive without financial
aid, which is no longer readily available from foreign sources; and there is a
limit to the imposition of unpopular local taxes. Insurgents are now being sustained by the
control of the overland contraband trade, particularly of narcotics and opium
which is cultivated in northern Burma and Thailand.
Tripura, the
smallest of the Seven Sisters, is bordered on the north, west and south by
Bangladesh and on the east by Assam and Mizoram. Tripura was a Hindu kingdom more than 1000
years before it became a part of the Moghul Empire. The Raja has always been of tribal origin
with a pronounced Bengali cultural tradition.
Prior to 1947, the Raja ruled with the familiar British political agent
in the background. At that time, the
population was 5 lakh tribals; most of who were animists mixed with a few
Christians. There were about an equal
number of non-tribals, mostly Bengali Hindus, with a sprinkling of Muslims and
Buddhists.
During
Partition, there was an influx of about 5 lakh Hindus from East Pakistan. Local Congress party workers welcomed the
refugees and took pains to rehabilitate them.
In 1956 the state was declared a Union Territory. The Congress Party was swept into power in
the ensuing elections because of the non-tribal vote. In 1971, during the creation of Bangladesh,
there was a further influx of about 5 lakh refugees; these were mostly Hindus
but there were also some Muslims. This
time local Communist Party workers who took pains to rehabilitate them welcomed
the newcomers. The next elections saw
the Communists come into power. By now
the population had increased to 20 lakhs.
The number of tribals had remained a little over 5 lakhs whilst the
non-tribal vote-bank had tripled. Within Tripura, two regional parties began
organising themselves on tribal and non-tribal lines. The tribals knew that they had lost the game
of electoral numbers. They were
determined not to lose tribal lands to outsiders. Tripura’s predicament was widely discussed
all over northeastern India and increased the common man’s apprehension and
distrust of the Indian plainsman and unprincipled opportunists of the national
political parties.
No matter what
racial, linguistic, religious, economic or social reasons we may attribute for
a riot, the fact is that mal-administration and poor governance is invariably
the root cause of the break-down of law and order. Once this happens, extremists will foster
violence and terrorism may result. Then,
if the other prerequisites of insurgency are prevalent, we can be sure that
insurgency will follow. One saw this
happening in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur, and could see this pattern
unfolding in Tripura with textbook precision. In 1981 the tribals went on the
offensive and one night slaughtered some 600 Bengalis. The non-tribals retaliated, killing some 200
tribals.
It is not
surprising that the tribals have thrown up a group of extremists who style
themselves as the Tripura National Volunteers [TNV] with the proclaimed aim of
an independent tribal homeland. TNV
leaders were quick to establish contact with MNF hard liners located in jungle
bases in Bangladesh. Though security
forces were able to keep the situation under control, it was soon evident that
arms were being supplied to the TNV.
There was also evidence that extremists from Manipur were infiltrating
through Assam into Tripura to support the TNV.
Events in
Tripura, and the other states had not escaped the notice of the people
inhabiting the hill districts of Assam.
Their leaders joined together and demanded separate statehood. So in due course the hill districts were
detached from Assam and renamed Meghalaya, which was granted statehood in
1972. This brought a degree of stability
to Assam. Recently, the Bodo people, who
inhabit the Brahmaputra valley, have begun demanding a separate homeland and
indulging in stray acts of violence to support their demands. Moreover, the
problem of infiltration still agitates the locals
The
northern-most and largest of the Seven Sisters is Arunchal Pradesh, formerly
the Union Territory called the North East Frontier Agency [NEFA]. Its 880-km-long northern border, known as a
McMahon Line, has been in dispute between India and China. During the brief Sino-Indian Border Conflict
[1962], the Chinese army overran small Indian army outposts and occupied the
whole of Arunachal Pradesh. After a few
weeks, they withdrew unilaterally.
Thereafter, the area continues to be administered up to the crest line
by India. Arunachal Pradesh was granted full statehood in 1987. The State has a tribal population of 557,000
of which 50,000 are Buddhist. The
remainder is animist with a sprinkling of Christians.
. Those who blame Christianity for the troubles
of the northeast divert attention from identifying the real factors responsible
and absolve the administration’s failure in solving the region’s problems. Christianity serves as a defence mechanism
for tribal interest and identity against the threat of domination and
absorption into the large Hindu society of the plains. The separatist tendencies amongst some hill
tribes are an attempt on their part to defend their socio-political-cultural
identity in the new circumstances of modernization.
Arunachal Pradeesh and Tripura are both a good
illustration of the religious pressures at work. The Christian element of the animist tribal
population of Tripura has been gradually increasing over the past decade. Yet for over two decades no foreign
missionary has been allowed into that area.
Today’s missionary is not a white clergyman but a jean-clad Naga or Mizo
teenager who carries a Bible in his hand, identifies with the locals and speaks
their language. On the other hand, Arunachal Pradesh is still largely animist
and is trouble free. Some fear that
Christianity will make the neutral tribals hostile by converting them first and
indoctrinating them later. In the past,
tribal societies have displayed a strong sense of community without class
distinctions. The faithful have given
the Church the maximum of the little they possess, making the northeastern
Churches amazingly self-supporting. We should also not forget the key role
played by the Churches in bringing peace to Nagaland and Mizoram.
Everyone has the right to follow any path or
religion and even change it. The
acceptance of this right does not authorise any establishment or individual tp
resort to organised proselytisation which creates tension and conflict between
religiours communities, and impairs inter-faith goodwill. It is distasteful and
unacceptable for anyone to attempt mass conversions of poor tribals through the
attraction of food, clothing and shelter.
However, any long-term plan for the region must take into consideration
the fact that the Christian church has become a significant reality in the
northeast. [And elsewhere in the animist belts of India.] When an animist is educated beyond a certain
point, he begins to ask the basic questions which all thinking people ask: Why
am in this world? Where do I go after death?
He can only turn to the traditional religions for answers to such
questions. It is difficult for him to convert to Hinduism where no caste would
accept him. Buddhism does not
proselytize. Islam does not attract
him. He falls back on the tribal
Christian pastor as the most convenient choice.
Events in the
northeast have had repercussions in West Bengal, Sikkim and elsewhere in India.
The Gorkhaland movement in West Bengal has gained impetus from the eviction of
Nepalese from Assam who are forced to take shelter in north Bengal where
agitators have been fomenting discontent among the Nepalese-speaking people for
years. To begin with the demand was for
greater recognition of the Nepali language and regional autonomy for the northern
district of West Bengal. The agitators won substantial support among the youth
and extremists who soon pushed the moderates into the background. In May 1986, the Gorkha National Liberation
Front [GNLF] in furtherance of its demand for the establishment of Gorkhaland,
a homeland for the Nepali-speaking people living in north Bengal and Sikkim,
called for the abrogation of the Indo-Nepal Treaty and organised a bandh which resulted in widespread
violence. There is little doubt that the
Nepali-speaking people are being influenced by the general situation in
northeastern India.
The
GNLF’s struggle for the abrogation of the Indo-Nepal Treaty is aimed at
securing an identity for Nepalese settlers.
The Treaty permits Nepalese citizens to migrate to India in search of
work. They have all the privilege of
Indian citizenship except the right to vote; their families and Nepal’s economy
benefit immensely by their remittances.
Indians in Nepal are similarly deprived of franchise. Neither Kathmandu nor Delhi wishes to upset
the status quo so long as they are
both able to enjoy the advantages brought by the Treaty without facing its
wider implications. But the time has
come when the two governments have to review all the arrangements of their
Treaty in the light of the last four decades of experience. This is not going to be an easy task as an
estimated six million Nepalese national are in India without any valid
documents. Many of these have been here
for a long time; their children are now in a position to claim Indian
citizenship. The Treaty also involves
the recruitment of Gorkhas into the Indian Army, and other far-reaching social,
economic, political and security implications. But whilst this is being worked
out, let there be no doubt that the first priority is northeastern India.
At
the national level, the question of dealing with the northeast’s dilemmas has
till now been ambivalent or indifferent.
The problem has been to modernize the region without losing ethnic or
cultural identity. Cultural integrity
has been ill served by encouraging the notion that tribals must be preserved as
museum exhibits. Change is everywhere
and is relentless. Attempts to regulate
it have been undermined by the steady influx of outsiders; legal and
illegal. The tribals fear that they will
be reduced to hewers of wood and drawers of water, while the outsider becomes
the overlord. Law and order cannot be
bought with money nor won with weapons.
It will have to be earned by good governance, sound administration and
economic development. The first step is
to get our priorities right.
The
two key problems facing the region are infiltration of foreigners and
communications. The administration should give up trying to solve in filtration
by gimmicks; and the biggest of all is the proposed fence along the entire
border with Bangladesh. This will cost
over Rs500 crores with an annual recurring expenditure of Rs 100 crores. Even then the project will be a dud. There are too many riverine routes that the
fence cannot span; the fenced are is too overgrown with jungle and scrub to be
patrolled effectively; pachyderms and the jungle itself will knock down the
fence; barbed wire can be cut down and sold.
Anyway a man wanting to enter Assam illegally can first cross into West
Bengal legally, take a train to Assam, join his patrons there and then
“disappear”. Why take the trouble to
cross a fence? There is no better
protection and safeguard against illegal immigrants than a loyal and patriotic
people, a well organised network at the village level to keep track of all
movements; ration cards and land records; an identity card system and vigilant
police outposts.
In
the past, the quickest and cheapest approach to Silchar from Calcutta was via
the rivers of Bangladesh. The rivers
still exist and we must revive this traffic and inland water transport systems
to the mutual advantage of both Bangladesh and India. There is no reason why this should not only
be revived but also modernised. A fleet
of relatively inexpensive heavy-duty hovercraft should augment the traditional
fleet of riverboats. These would not
only save time but also enable the forward distribution o9f stores to South
Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram along shallow river routes
without the need to off-load the hovercraft or build expensive roads and
bridges, which require costly and constant maintenance. Hovercraft could also function in the lower
reaches of Arunachal Pradesh and in Assam.
Punjab was the
next entrant into the fold of organised terrorism, which was mixed with
revolutionary insurgency. To understand how and why this has come about
requires one to go back into history.
Sikhism is a unique phenomenon in the history of faiths. It derives its inspiration and liberal mystic
outlook from the Vedas and Upanishads, and was constructed as a simplified form
of Vedanta in the language spoken by the people. Thus, the dividing line
between Hindu and Sikh remained blurred.
Sikhs visited Hindu places of pilgrimage, observed Hindu festivals and
fasts, and continue to marry Hindus of their own sub-castes.
From the very
beginning, Guru Nanak faced serious challenges in the spread of his religious
philosophy. Hindus and Muslims tried to
diminish the growing influence of Sikhism, the Third Faith as it was called. He was arrested by Emperor Babar and put
behind bars. He was jeered at by
orthodox Hindus for keeping Muslims in his entourage. The second, third and fourth Gurus too faced
difficulties with temporal and religious authorities, which reached a crisis
point with the roasting alive of the fifth guru Arjun. This started a prolonged war with Moghul
rulers in Delhi.
Sikhism was considered a non-violent religion
till the Sikhs took up arms against the Moghuls under the sixth Guru Hargobind
who built the Akal Takht at Amritsar in 1606.
In 1699, Guru Gobind Sing decided to institute the Khalsa [fraternity of the pure].
He also decided to suffix the names of Keshadhari [baptised] Sikhs with “Singh”, meaning lion. From its
inception, Sikhism sought to establish an egalitarian society where all men and
women would be equal and share their resources collectively. Sikhism never believed in casteism. The ten
Gurus have left no consolidated code of conduct for the Sikhs; not even a
definition of who is a Sikh except that “he who is pure of heart,
compassionate, devotee of the one God, shorn of superstitions of all kinds and
who treats humanity as one, is a Khalsa.” Nor did any Guru create or fight for a
religious state. The letter of protest that Guru Gobind Singh wrote to
Aurangzeb clearly states that the Gurus’s fight was for religious liberty for
all, and against the irreligious and un-Islamic conduct of Aurangzeb.
When Ranjit
Singh [1790-1839] created a sovereign State, he made is a secular and not a
Sikh State, though he himself was a devout Sikh. Ranjit Singh’s Cabinet was a composite one;
his Prime Minister was a Hindu Dogra, and his Home Minister was a Muslim. Maharaja Ranjit Singh symbolised in his
person some of the confusion resulting from the difficulty of drawing a
dividing line between the Sikh and Hindu.
He observed the keshadhari external
symbols and insisted that his European and Hindu courtiers did likewise. Although he had the Granth read to him every
day, he often worshipped in Hindu temples and revered Brahman priests. When he realised he was dying, he wished that
the diamond Koh-I-Noor be gifted away, not to the Har Mandir [Golden Temple] in
Amritsar but to the Jagannath Temple at Puri.
When he died seven of his wives and concubines committed sati on his funeral pyre, a practice
forbidden by the Sikh Gurus but accepted by Hindu tradition.
After the
death of Ranjit Singh and the subsequent defeat of the Sikhs by the British,
the former had to surrender their arms in a humiliating ceremony. The British appointed their own custodians
for the Golden Temple and other gurudwaras.
Disbanded Sikh soldiers sulked for a while, but it was soon evident that
a revival of the old Khalsa spirit
was no longer possible under British rule.
A British report of 1851-52 observed that: “The sacred tank at Umritsar
is less thronged than formerly….the initiatory ceremony for adults is now
rarely performed….[people leave the khalsa]
and join the ranks of Hinduism whence they originally came, and bring up their
children as Hindus.” Far-sighted
Imperial administrators were concerned by this trend and made determined
efforts to win over the Sikh community, specially the keshadhari soldiers whose fighting elan they respected.
Till now, it
was the Bengal Army of the East India Company, overwhelmingly comprised of
people from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, which had helped the British,
conquer India. These people had claims
to martial traditions dating back to the Magadha Empire. It was with these troops that the British had
defeated the valiant Sikh Armies. After
1857, because elements of the Bengal Army had mutinied against their British
masters, they ceased to be recruited into the army. In a matter of one generation they were
classified as non-martial. On the other
hand, those who had fought for the British, the Sikhs and the Gorkhas in
particular were eulogised as martial races.
The exodus of
Sikhs to Hinduism disturbed the British. The Government of the day admitted,
“modern Sikhism was little more than a political association formed exclusively
from among Hindus, which men join or quit according to the circumstances of the
day.” This development in accord with
Indian reality was not liked by the British.
They considered it something “to be deeply deplored, as destroying the
bulwark of our rule.” The political aim was to use the Sikh to offset both the
Muslim and the Hindu. Imperialism
thrives on divisions, and even sows them where they do not exist. From then onwards, “Sikhism is in danger”
became the cry of British scholar-administrators. Every effort was made to emphasise the
external marks of the Sikh, which separated him from the Hindu, as once these
were lost, a Sikh relapsed into Hinduism.
Sikhs were encouraged to regard themselves as a totally distinct and
separate nation. Khalsa activists who called themselves Akalis [belonging to the
immortals] moved from place to place and occupied different gurudwaras.
The British
also worked on a political level. Singh
Sabhas were started. These were manned
mostly by ex-soldiers and worked under two Khalsa Diwans at Lahore and
Amritsar; their badge was loyalty to the British. In 1872,the Singh Sabhas spearheaded the
suppression of the Namadhari Sikhs who had started a Swadeshi [homemade]
Movement. In 1902, the two Diwans were
amalgamated into one body, the Chief Khalsa Diwan, which provided political
leadership to the Sikhs. Steps were
taken to separate various ceremonies and rituals, which were the same as the
Hindus. In 1909, the Ananda Marriage Act
was passed.
That same year
the Morley-Minto reforms were promulgated to provide separate electorates and
reservations for Muslims. By this
measure, the British were on one side of a triangle, the other side being
controlled by nationalists of all communities who began to consider themselves
Indians. The Muslim League was on the
third side. Within this triangle,
pliable Princes, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and others were readily
available to play the Imperial game whenever it suited the Government. This arrangement
spelt a diffusion of power. Any one
side, which did not wish to cooperate, could neutralise the other to hold
anyone to ransom.
It was not
long before British officials were found complaining that their policy of
“glorifying” the Sikhs in order to separate them from the Hindus had its
disadvantages as it tended to give the Sikhs a “wind in the head”. Sikh
nationalism once stimulated, refused British guidance and developed its own
ambitions in which “there was no place for the British officers.” Sikh nationalism, which had been fostered to
undermine Indian nationalism, in fact began to hurt the British, for what
nourished Sikh nationalism also nourished Indian nationalism. Thus, even during the heyday of Sikh loyalty
to the British, there were many rebellious Sikh voices.
In 1920, the
Akali movement demanded the liberation of the gurudwaras. British appointed custodians were replaced.
by Akali appointees. In 1925, all
gurudwaras were placed under the control of an elected body called the Shiromani
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee [SGPC].
The SGPC institutionalised the urges and aspirations of the Sikhs and
gave them a semblance of independent power in religious and social matters. The formation of the Akali Party gave them a
political voice. From then onwards we
can see the mixing of religion and politics, and the misuse of gurudwaras for
political purposes. The records show
that there is not a single political party or personage who has not addressed
gatherings there and harangued them on political themes.
Historically,
the Akalis were not an independent Sikh component of the larger freedom
movement as the [Pathan] Khudai Khidmatgars in the North Western Frontier
Province were a Muslim component of it.
They could not be, for they were the products of a British-inspired
movement among the Sikhs, which emphasised their separateness from the
Hindus. Nevertheless, Sikhs had been at
the forefront of the freedom movement. So complete was the understanding between
the Akali Dal and the Congress that in the 30s, one could be a member of both
organisations simultaneously. Up to
1946, the Akali representatives remained an unalienable part of the opposition
Congress Party in Punjab as well as in the Central Assembly in New Delhi. But by then, things had already begun to sour
between the Sikhs and Hindus. The blame
for this must rest squarely on the Hindu zealots and was perhaps an unavoidable
consequence of the history of those times.
A Hindu
revival had begun at the end of the 19th Century, mainly to counter
the onslaught of Christian missionaries on idolatry and Hindu mythology. But this soon degenerated into polemics with
the Muslims and Sikhs. Guru Nanak was
called a dambhi [pretender] because
he did not know Sanskrit; shudhi [a
purification ceremony] was performed on the Sikhs at Lahore. Few Hindu institutions, schools, colleges,
banks or hospitals would recruit a Sikh, let alone a Muslim. Even Punjab University after 100 years, was
controlled by revivalists elements which had never permitted a Sikh
vice-chancellor, or even a Sikh professor till fairly lately. The Punjab language was classified a ganwaroo basha [language of the rustic]
even though it was the mother tongue of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs who conversed
in it with zest.
Sikh zealots,
faced by these realities, began to fight for their political rights on communal
lines, as was happening with the other religious communities, elsewhere in
India before Partition. This made the Sikhs a separate political entity as much
as a religious entity. The Akali Party
began demanding a separate Khalistan from 1942 onwards when the British first
began serious negotiations to reach a settlement about India’s freedom. When the Cabinet Mission came to India in
1942, an Akali delegation presented a demand for “a separate independent state
with the right to federate with Hindustan or Pakistan.” But they found that they were in a majority
only in two tehsils and the idea of a separate state was not viable. Nevertheless, some Akalis kept reiterating
their demand for Khalistan in the name of the Sikhs, and maintained this
position up to the transfer of power.
Partition
brought about cataclysmic changes in the fortunes of the Sikhs. The separate electorates and special
privileges they had enjoyed were abolished and the most prosperous Sikhs were
uprooted. The community's separate
identity had to be reasserted in a secular state in which they formed less than
two per cent of the population. It must be appreciated that the Sikhs accepted
joint electorates without demur, merged their communal identity with the
political identity of the nation, rolled up their sleeves and made their half
of Punjab the granary of India. We
should therefore not be dismayed that the Akalis wanted that the same status be
given to the Punjabi language as had been given to other languages elsewhere;
this, and not secession, was the motivating force behind the Punjabi Suba
movement. But nor must the Sikhs be
surprised that Punjabi Hindus feared Sikh fundamentalism and its penchant for
violence.
Khalistan was
never a campaign slogan during an election in Punjab. Sikh demands centred on increased water
rights, the status of Chandigarh as the sole capital of Punjab and other local
religious, cultural and linguistic issues.
Khalistan is the demand of think tanks outside India. Since 1933,”the Sikh movement has been
controlled from every side by British and American universities”. However, whereas moderate Sikhs may have
wanted a secular state in which Khalsa traditions
could be maintained, and where they could wield political power, behind these
legitimate and non-violent aspirations lurked a hardcore of separatists and
extremists. Nevertheless, terrorism in
support of the Khalistani cause was never demonstrated at that time. The other distressing circumstances, which
prevailed on both Hindu and Sikh refugees before, during and after the greater
common terrors of Partition, absorbed everyone's attention. Survival and personal rehabilitation became of
greater importance than Khalistan.
But the
Punjabi Suba Movement gained in strength over the years. After prolonged agitation, the Government
agreed to the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. In any fair division of Punjab on a
linguistic basis, it should have been a Hindu majority state with Punjabi as
its language of administration and medium of instruction. But the problem of carving out a linguistic
state in the Punjab was not one of language but of script. Both Hindu and Sikh spoke Punjabi; the former
disowned the Gurumukhi script. Sikhs
must therefore not be surprised or dismayed that those who were charged with
the task of demarcating the boundaries of Punjab, saw to it that the Sikhs, who
may have wanted a Punjabi-speaking state, ended up with a Sikh-majority
state. The Punjabi-speaking Hindus of
Himachal Pradesh and Harayana refused to identify themselves with the new
Punjab. This hurt the moderate Akalis
who were further frustrated when they tried to win power democratically in the
new Punjab where the Sikhs were at least in the majority. They were soon to realise that the Congress
continued to dominate the political scene through a combination of the secular
Sikh and Hindu vote.
Apart from the
linguistic and political struggle, Punjab saw an intense clash between the
influence of modernisation and the guardians of Khalsa orthodoxy. They
identified the Congress with modernisation, and saw both as not only a threat
to their power over Sikh society, but to the very survival of the Sikh
religion. The Sikh author Khuswant Singh
in the preface of his book The Sikhs, published
in 1955, wrote: “The chief reason for my writing an account of my people is the
melancholy thought that contemporary with my labours are being written the last
chapters of the story of the Sikhs. By
the end of the century, the Sikhs themselves will have passed into
oblivion.” There was an immediate
reaction to this, and uproar among the Sikhs whose fears of the Congress and
modernisation mounted.
Once the
underlying Sikh fear of survival of his religion is recognised, it appears
logical that the comprehensive control over gurudwaras becomes a central
factor. So does the use of the Golden
Temple as a general headquarters, the communalisation of Sikh politics and the
Akali stand over protecting the sanctity of the Temple’s surroundings. The rise of fundamentalism, as spearheaded by
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, must be understood as an attempt to preserve
the separate identity of the Khalsa
Panth. The Sikhs have always
combined religion with politics, along with a tradition of authoritarianism
sprinkled with an exaggerated belief in the martial qualities of their
principal actors.
The Anandpur
Sahib Resolution of 1973 claimed to be made, not in the name of the Akalis but
in that of all the Sikhs. It smacked of
the pre-independence manifesto of the Muslim League for the creation of
Pakistan. The strategy was to couch the
separatist demand in terms that were open to a variety of interpretation; this
gave flexibiliy to the Akali leadership in negotiating a new constitution and
brought into one fold not only those Sikhs committed to Khalistan but also
those who entertained grave doubts about separation.
At that time,
Dr Jagit Singh Chauhan, a former Punjab finance minister, established his
headquarters at Khalistan House in Reading, England, and proclaimed himself
“president in exile” of the non-existent Sikh separatist state. London was the “capital” of Khalistan but
most of Dr Chauhan’s supporters lived in Canada and USA. This period saw the rise of several Sikh
terrorist organisations with links to the Naxalites. We have seen how socio-economic factors
including neglect; isolation and poverty may explain aspects, which supported
insurgency in the northeast. But those
factors do not apply in Punjab where terrorists conform to a typical
sociological profile of European terrorist groups; single, male, aged 25-35
years, having a partial university education with an affluent middle-class
family background and deriving much of his motivation from frustration and anarchist
or nihilist notions. In 1978, Naxalites swelled the ranks of the All-India Sikh
Student Federation, the most fanatic supporters of Sant Bhindranwale, and the
recruiting ground for the terrorist groups
By this time,
the SGPC had become a state within a state with an annual income of Rs 12
crores and activities which encompassed schools, colleges, hospitals and
missions spread throughout India and the world.
Once he had gained influence as a religious leader, Sant Bhindranwale
began his odyssey in Sikh politics by putting up 30 candidates for the SGPC
elections against Akali candidates. The
struggle between these two forces may be seen varying points of view: haves
versus the have-nots, moderates versus the extremists, rural versus urban, Jats
versus Khattri. But whatever one’s
opinion, this battle for the source of Sikh money-power increased tensions. The
situation became overcharged when frustrated Akali leaders also moved their
headquarters into the Golden Temple and coalesced their political and economic
agitation with religious demands; a massive public response was generated under
the rallying call: the panth is in
danger.
Meanwhile,
proclaimed criminals, murderers and terrorists, when pursued by the police also
sought refuge in the Golden Temple.
Visitors witnessed the astonishing scene of arrogant criminals and
militant Sikhs strolling in and out of the Temple complex openly carrying
loaded sub-machine guns and mingling with the pilgrims without any hindrance or
even apprehension of arrest. Punjab presented the perfect example of the
entwining of terrorism and insurgency, mixed with religious and political
grievances. It was now e evident that
the military strategists across the border in Pakistan were taking a keen
interest in Punjab’s affairs and were busy cultivating expatriate Sikhs in the
USA, UK and Canada.
The separatist movement enjoyed outside
support of arms and money from across the border and from Sikhs abroad. It preached the cause of Khalistan and many
young men were ready to fight for the cause.
But it lacked important ingredients necessary to fight a sustained
guerrilla war. Punjab provides no
jungles or mountains for a secure guerrilla base. Terrorists therefore
attempted to convert every gurudwara into a safe sanctuary. Some Sikhs resented this. They became the targets of terrorists who
attempted to cow down all opposition.
This alienated public support for the cause.
Terrorism,
like most diseases, has unpleasant symptoms, which if neglected can develop
dangerous consequences. Law and order in Punjab were allowed to drift due to a
mixture of reasons: primarily, poor governance, a lack of coordination between
the police and the armed forces who had to deal with the two separate problems
of terrorism and insurgency, and the absence of adequate laws to deal with the
situation. The period from 1980 till
mid-1984 provides a gruesome record of terrorism in Punjab: murder, hi-jacking,
arson and loot were a frequent occurrence.
Hundreds of innocent victims were killed in cold blood. God-fearing Sikhs knew that by giving refuge
to killer in gurudwaras, their religious and political leaders were guilty of
being accessories before and after the crime, and of obstructing the course of
justice. But it required courage to
dissent under the fear of being put on a hit list. Up to January 1984, of the
220 people killed by terrorists, 190 were Sikhs.
Contrary to
popular misconceptions, terrorism in Punjab was not the outcome of spontaneous
anger because of religious or political grievances. It was carefully planned and organised
violence for effect, not on the actual victims of the terrorists but aimed at
Sikh and non-Sikh onlookers. Fear was
the intended effect and not the by-product of terrorism. The aim was to destroy the confidence which
the people had in the government by provoking it to act outside the law; to
bring about the moral alienation of the Sikh masses from the government until
its isolation becomes total and irreversible, to make life unbearable for the
free press and a democratic administration so long as the terrorists: demands
remain unsatisfied. Security forces knew that they had a difficult task on
their hands. State administrators and the judiciary seemed helpless in the face
of the twin strands of terrorism and insurgency. Fear and apprehension spread through Punjab
and from there, throughout India.
Many began
demanding that the security forces be given a free hand to deal with the
situation. Those with experience in
counter-insurgency operations knew that the problem was how to deal with
internal violence without infringing human rights, and in this case without
offending religious sentiments. One of the terrorist’s tactics is to provoke a
political over-reaction and force the state to drop its democratic constitutional
mask. They were aware of the dangers of “terrorism” being practiced by
government agencies, which act to curb or eliminate dissent. It was clearly
understood that security forces must function under strict supervision in
accordance with the laws of the land. Democratic nations therefore have
stringent laws and Special Forces trained to distinguish between insurgents,
misguided dissenters and terrorists. Israeli Commando earned fame after their
spectacular Entebbe Raid when hostages were rescued from Uganda. The Germans have their Grennzschutzgruppe 9
[GSG-9] and the French their Groupe d’intervention di la Gendarmerie Nationale
[GIGN]. The US have Rangers and Green
Berets, and Great Britain its Special Air Services [SAS] which has the
reputation of being the world’s finest counter-terrorist unit and a
trend-setter for the others. India had
no such special force.
Apart from the
lack of specially trained forces, there was a legal lacuna facing the challenge
of organised terrorism. Indian laws and
the Penal Code made no real provision for terrorism, so action had to be
limited to the use of criminal laws whilst employing a mixture of police and
military force. President’s Rule was
imposed and several new laws were proclaimed but the overall system had
flaws. Two examples may explain the
problem. It is difficult to fight a
mixture of terrorism and insurgency unless all the five fronts [the economic,
social, psychological, political and military aspects] are coordinated and
functioning under a unified command. Our
procedures lack a unified system. This
results in various agencies pulling in different and sometimes contrary
directions. Apart from this, the legal
system is unable to deliver prompt punishments or justice. The security forces find it difficult to
convict murderers who get bail or are
freed, and then terrorise witnesses. So
all concerned had to re-learn the lessons that had already been learnt the hard
way in eastern India, that terrorism cannot be legislated out of existence by
laws alone. There is no substitute for
firm governance and sound professionalism.
By April 1984,
a point was reached when terrorism, as emanating from agencies lodged in the
Golden Temple, Amritsar, became so blatant and the para-militay forces so
ineffective, that the question for the Government was not only of
self-assertion but of self-preservation; its existence was challenged to act
and show what it is. The authorities had considered laying siege to the Temple
and cutting off supplies to the terrorists. They were advised, with justification, that an
extended siege would result in greater loss of life, as the security forces
would have to prevent Sikhs from the surrounding countryside defying the curfew
and converging on Amritsar.
In June 1984,
the Army was ordered to launch Operation Blue Star and clear the Golden Temple
complex, where an intricate maze of passage-ways was being heavily defended by
fanatical extremists armed with machine-guns, rocket launchers and
semi-automatic weapons deployed behind sand-bagged entrenchments. The Army was ordered to operate so that
minimum damage was inflicted on the Akal Takht.
This restraint perhaps accounts for the high casualties it suffered;
over 90 officers and men were killed.
The defenders fought determinedly and about 2000 of them died. The body of Sant Bhindranwale was identified
among the dead.
After
Operation Blue Star, many expressed disapproval “of the increasing involvement
of the armed forces in the management of affairs in what is tantamount to a breakdown
of civil power.” There is truth in the
criticism that the army should not be used where the police can suffice. But we must guard against the false belief
that the various tools available to a government to counter threats to its
survival are alternatives. On the
contrary, the diplomatic, social, psychological, economic and military fronts
are not alternative but complimentary tools which have to be orchestrated
simultaneously to achieve success.
Similarly, on the military front, the armed forces, para-military forces
and police are not alternative tools but form part of one front, which has to
be coordinated skillfully to ensure victory. Admittedly there are some
anti-terrorist tasks, which are best performed by the police, and some best
executed by the military. An experienced
leader will know when to use one or the other or both, but will guard against
attempting to draw a firm line between the two.
The public
seemed unaware that the army, in conjunction with the para-military forces and
police had been involved in counter-insurgency operation the northeast, on and
off, for the past thirty years.
Apparently, few bothered about stray killings in isolated jungles on a
remote northeastern border. But Punjab
is close to Delhi and the horror of the Battle of the Golden Temple could not
be hidden from the press, TV cameras and the public. The nation was shocked. There were many Sikh units and individual
Sikhs who were members of other units that served with distinction in the
operations in Punjab. However there was
unrest in four Sikh army units [out of a total of about 100 Sikh units] located
in far away states. The men were carried
away by false rumours of what was really happening in Punjab. Some mutinied or
absented themselves. All were rounded up
and dealt with by military courts. Their
trials were open to the public. The
majority was dismissed from service; some were given prison sentences.
Three days
after Operation Blue Star, the British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] broadcast
a statement by Dr Chauhan calling upon loyal Sikhs to rise up and assassinate
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, her son, and the high-level military officers who
led the army assault on the Golden Temple.
Chauhan’s Khalistan government-in-exile founded the World Sikh
Organisation [WSO], an international organisation spanning several countries.
The founding convention of WSO was held in July 1984 in Madison Square Garden,
New York. Present were representatives
of the Kashmir Liberation Front, Tamil Separatist terror organisations of Sri
Lanka and Afghan mujahideen. WSO was given the task of building a fresh
terrorist capability.
It was evident
that the Prime Minister would be the target of Sikh extremists. But Mrs. Gandhi
had shown the Sikh members of her personal guard to some foreign journalists as
a symbol of trust saying, “You see him; what could I possibly fear from some
one like him?” On 30 October 1984, Mrs
Gandhi was gunned down by those very same Sikh members of her bodyguard whilst
walking from her residence to her office.
Her assassination, at one stroke, did what the murder of by terrorists
of hundreds of Hindus in Punjab had failed to do; it provoked communal riots
and drove a wedge between the Sikhs and other communities. There was a violent Hindu backlash in various
parts of India and hundreds of innocent Sikhs were killed.
It was not
difficult to establish the complicity of Pakistan’s military regime in the
conspiracy to destabilise India by supporting Sikh terrorism. Pakistanis had been infiltrating into Sikh
and Indian organisation in the UK, USA and Canada. Nearer home, the interrogation of captured
terrorists had clearly revealed Pakistan’s involvement with Sikh extremists who
were being given sanctuary in Pakistan where they are paid, trained, armed and
infiltrated across the border to Punjab.
Indian currency was smuggled into Pakistan in exchange for sophisticated
weapons and drugs. The last item is
funneled to the West at a profit, which is added to the terrorist’s funds
In the general
elections, which followed Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, her son Rajiv Gandhi
secured a massive mandate. One of the
Prime Minister’s first moves was to conclude an accord with the Akali leader
Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. This
comprehensive document dealt with compensation to innocent persons, army
recruitment, rehabilitation of those discharged from the army, the formation of
an all-India Gurudwara Act, centre-state relations, sharing of river waters and
promotion of the Punjabi language. Those
who were masterminding the secessionist strategy were determined to teach a
public lesson to anyone who had enabled this settlement. In January 1985, the head priest of the Akal
Takht, Giani Kirpal Singh was attacked in broad daylight. He suffered serious injuries but survived. A little later Sant Longowal was
assassinated. Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala
assumed Akali Dal leadership. He fought
and won the state elections held in October 1985. This brought the Akali Party into power for
the first time in Punjab.
In 1985, the
extremists switched their offensive to targets abroad. In June, Air India flight-182 exploded over
the North Atlantic killing all 300 passengers and crew. The explosive device had been planted by Sikh
terrorists operating from Canada. Other
bombings and assassinations were reported in Japan, the USA, UK and Canada.
Meanwhile at home, unarmed extremists occupied the Golden Temple and began
dismantling portions of the Akal Takht and the surrounding complex, which had
been re-built at a great cost by the Centre.
Extremists, lodged within the Temple, finding that the authorities were
ignoring them, began publicly espousing the secessionist platform and announced
a programme of establishing “Khalistan with Delhi as the Capital”. Mr. Barnala ordered the police to clear the
complex of extremists. This was done
without any loss of life.
In November
1985, Giani Sahib Singh, the head granthi of the Golden Temple was shot within
the precincts of the Temple on the morning of Guru Nanak’s birthday. Mercifully he escaped with non-lethal wounds
but his bodyguard was killed on the spot.
In June 1986, a large number of militants armed with swords swooped on
the Golden Temple attacking members of the SGPC security force, killing one
person and injuring many. The police
were sent in to disperse the mob and arrest ringleaders. Contrary to concern expressed by some
administrators of hurting Sikh psyche, it became evident that the Sikhs were
fed up with the antics of the extremists; they wanted peace and were ashamed
that their holy shrines were being misused by anti-social elements.
Frustrated in
their efforts to win over the Sikh masses, the terrorists shifted their target
and began attacking Hindus; murdering individuals and busloads of innocent
passengers. Some Hindus began to leave
Punjab. The authorities were aware that
if an exodus of Hindus assumed unmanageable proportions, it could lead to a
backlash. Hindu fanatics in their zeal
to settle scores could start murdering innocent Sikhs residing outside
Punjab. This could eventually lead to an
exchange of population and fulfil the dreams of
pro-Khalistani terrorists. In
fact, tensions did rise between Hindus and Sikhs in a few cities but this was
promptly controlled by alert administrators.
It is often
argued that there is no defence against extremists willing to sacrifice their
lives and that arresting or shooting them cannot solve the problem because the
“blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.” Historical experience does not confirm such
wisdom. The number of potential
terrorists inside India is limited. A
recent study reaches the obvious conclusion that “the more terrorists in
prison, the lower the violence level.”
Terrorism has been stamped out with ease not only be modern states by
also by governments that are anything but modern. In 1981, the mujahideen and other terrorist groups turned on the newly
established Ayatollah Khomeini government in Iran. The terrorists were many and experienced;
within three months they succeeded in killing the prime minister, many chiefs
of police, half the government and the executive committee of the ruling party,
not to mention dozens of members of parliament.
Never before had a terrorist onslaught been so massive and so successful. Yet, the Khomeini government counter-attacked
with great brutality; it killed without discrimination; it extracted
information by means of torture; it refused as a matter of principle to extend
medical help to injured terrorists. And
it broke the back of the terrorist movement.
Within another three months, the terrorists were either dead or had
escaped abroad.
The power of a
state is infinitely greater than any terrorist group, and it will always
prevail provided there is the determination and ruthlessness to do so. The question invariably boils down to whether
a democratic Indian society can subdue terrorism without surrendering the
values central to our system. Again,
history shows that this can be done. The
Italian authorities defeated the Red Brigades while acting strictly within the
law by a mixture of political reforms, penetration of the terrorist ranks and
promise of substantial reduction in prison terms to the penitents. Indian society is vulnerable to attack, but
it is also amazingly resilient. On the
other hand, terrorist movements have a limited life span. When terrorists realise that the murder of a
few politicians and officials [and many innocents] is not bringing them any
nearer their goal, their confidence is undermined and their resolve weakens.
Admittedly a
terrorist movement, which is entwined with an insurgency separatist movement
can be long lived, specially when this enjoys an open border with a hostile
Pakistan and outside aid. But the
overwhelming majority of Sikhs in India do not support the Khalistani concept. They know that they are not an oppressed
minority and also realise that Khalistan is an impractical non-viable
state. That is why Sikh terrorists no
longer attract public support. They now
survived only because of financial aid from abroad, a limited number of “safe
houses” within Punjab, and sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan.
Faced with
this situation, India has three broad options. The first is to retaliate
overtly across the international border with military force. Israel has for long used overt combined
action by its ground forces and air force to strike at suspected terrorist’s
bases. This option can only be exercised
effectively by states, which have an efficient C3I system and also possess the
strength to offset or contain hostile reactions that could arise from such
offensive responses. This option
involves several other risks. Innocent
people are likely to get killed, and India would then be blamed for creating
and new dangerous situation. India could
be branded as “aggressors” and its actions could attract international
condemnation. India cannot resort to such a course or action lightly. It will only do so when it has good reason to
believe that refraining from offensive counter-action would have fateful
consequences and cannot be ignored.
India’s second
option is to retaliate covertly. As an
experienced anti-terrorism fighter put it: to catch a mouse one uses a cat and
not a tank or an aircraft. An effective
cat ought to have a covert James-Bond-capability. Then it would be possible for India to pay
back the external sponsors of Khalistan in their own coin by killing specific
targets abroad. However, even if India
trained such agents, would it be willing to authorise them to covertly kill
people residing in friendly countries such as Canada, the USA or UK?
India’s third
option is defensive:to accept casualties and take internal measures to deal
with the situation as best it can. At
the same time adopt non-military measures to deter Pakistan from sponsoring
cross-border terrorism and attempt to diminish its influence on Sikh
organisations abroad. This was the
option adopted by India in the 50s and 60s when both Pakistan and China were
supporting extremists operating in northeastern India.
To begin with
there was some loose talk of building a fence and even a wall to seal off the
Indo-Pak border. Fortunately, good sense
prevailed. It was appreciated that a
fence could be constructed along the border more efficiently than was the case
in northeastern India. It was also understood
that this could be no more than a “cattle fence”; it would keep out animals but
not human beings unless constantly observed and patrolled. It was wisely decided to fence only a few
selected areas and declare a 5-km belt along the whole border as a protected
zone within which movement was restricted.
This step, along with improved surveillance methods and an identity card
system began yielding good results and curbing infiltration. Significantly, two tunnels constructed under
the fence from Pakistan into India were detected after some time. This emphasised the need for constant
vigilance.
When the armed
forces were withdrawn from active participation in counter-insurgency
operations, Punjab police were revitalised under the leadership of a succession
of dynamic Director Generals. Constant
surveillance of the border, good leadership and sound training began to show
results. Extremists were no longer
having it their own way. Their attempts
to stage dramatic acts of terrorism were repeatedly frustrated with heavy
casualties by skillful and ruthless police counter-measures. In May 1988, 80
armed extremists once again laid siege to the Golden Temple. It appeared that
they wanted to stage a dramatic coup to regain public sympathy for their cause. In fact the move misfired. Police forces were able to carry out a 10-day
siege of the Complex and then flush out the extremists killing several of them
without suffering any casualties.
Significantly, the Sikh community did not react adversely to the siege; on
the contrary there was praise for Mr.K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of
Police. Sikhs were clearly fed up with
terrorism.
Despite the
success achieved in Punjab and the Northeast, professionals know that the
growth of terrorism and violence will continue to increase in the coming
decades for several different reasons.
First, the tools available are becoming more lethal and much more
frightening than before. However, we should
bear in mind that sophisticated weaponry facilitates rather than causes violence
and terrorism. Second, the media
attention, which is focussed on a terrorist act, is immediate, global and
usually undisciplined. Third, the
motives for terrorist attacks today span a spectrum that includes at extremes,
personal grudges and political ambitions of independent statehood; there is
little certainty as to what underlying motives may really be at play in any
particular case.
Terrorism won’t go away as along as it serves
a purpose. The use of terrorist tactics
will persist as a weapon of political expression, as a substitute for diplomacy
and sometimes as a weapon in an insurgency movement. Small groups with a limited expenditure and a
capacity for violence, can always use terror tactics to achieve
disproportionate effects. They hope to
attract wide attention to themselves and to their cause. The terrorist will
always retain one major advantage: India cannot protect everything, everywhere,
all the time. Terrorists increase their
leverage by the careful selection of highly symbolic targets; the level of
violence remains the same but the effect is expanded dramatically. This forces India to devote vast resources to
protect likely targets against terrorist attacks. Security measures against terrorists at
airports, around politicians and civic leaders have become a permanent feature
of the Indian landscape, just as terrorism has become a permanent feature of
the world’s political landscape.
Parliamentary politics and religion/caste in contemporary India are two
entirely different streams of activity that operate on separate planes; their
dynamics and points of reference are dissimilar. Politics involves the struggle of groups,
classes and individuals to impose their will upon society in a manner acceptable
to it; it is directed outwards and seeks sanction for popular policies which
are rational. Religion/caste is inward
looking. Its sensibilities pertain to
individual spiritual/traditional choices.
Religious belief and faith derive their justification from the other
world and God. An arbitrarily
constituted religious/caste group may be sufficient authority for a religious
edict or a narrow caste programme. But democratic politics is concerned about
legitimate representation of the popular will through delegation or directly.
Some moralists believe that terrorism is a response to injustice,
oppression and persecution. They
therefore conclude that by removing the underlying causes, terrorism will
wither away. This sounds plausible,
since happy people are unlikely to commit savage acts of violence. But this simple abstract proposition seldom
works in real life, which is never free of conflict and revolt. Dissent and revolt is the pattern of the age,
but we should draw a distinction between technological, cultural and
ideological revolt that endeavours to give the Indian variety of non-conformity
a place in world history, and
caste/linguistic/religious revolt that attempts to challenge
modernization.. The search for identity by minorities, caste groups and some
sections of Hindu society, has coincided with the process of globalisation and
India’s search for effective integration through modern communications and
administration down to the smallest and most remote village. This process sets up many conflicts, which
could always be better managed, but can
never be reversed or avoided. The
upheavals in Punjab, the Northeast and elsewhere are an unpleasant confirmation
of the success of Indian democracy and the process of empowerment of the
under-privileged.. Many feel that they
are at bay because they are now forced to articulate their aspirations not
within the confines of their shrinking communities but within a larger
India. They cannot opt out the all-India
scenario and they cannot dictate its terms.
In fact, democracy denies them the caste or religious group dominance
that they had previously enjoyed.
Today, communal riots are not confined to Hindu-Muslim communities; Christians have become a new target.
Senseless acts of violence are not confined to Punjab and northeastern India alone,
but take place in traditionally law-abiding regions. [Unrest in the state of Jammu & Kashmir,
which began when India was partioned, is a complex problem and will be dealt
with in Chapter 7.] Few states are immune from the virus of public disorder. In
some regions caste killings take place at regular intervals. Large migrations
from poorer overpopulated underdeveloped states to the more prosperous regions,
adds to the tensions. Such migrations
are opposed by local political leaders who preach a “sons-of-the-soil”
policy. In Bihar, rich landlords have
organised their own armed militia and an undeclared “war” exists between the
landlords and rural tenants who are supported by armed Naxalites. This situation cannot be remedied merely by
creating more para-military forces.
Good laws,
bold leadership, effective intelligence, contingency planning and relentless
professionalism will make it difficult for a terrorist to operate freely. Further success will depend on the discipline
and morale displayed by individual citizens who are under attack and their
political leaders who must set a public example by ensuring that the laws
enacted by parliament and state legislatures will be strictly enforced and that
no interference of any sort will be tolerated.
Too many politicians and citizens do not recognise their responsibility
in these matters. People seem to fall
into the “why-so-I-pay-taxes?” mentality, and the typical response to a public
act of terrorism is, “Why didn’t the police stop this from happening?” Citizens must realise the limitations of the
criminal justice system: police, the courts and prisons merely react to crime
and cannot do much to prevent it. Public
discipline and morale are relevant factors in the fight against terrorism;
continual political support for elementary public disciplinary measures is a
vital first step in building up such morale.